' Brief facts are, an unregistered factory known as Veera Button Factory, measuring 2 Kanals 6 Marlas bearing Khasra No,7180/1, owned by Seth Fatehchand etc. Formed part of Property No,S.86.R.218/7, Ferozepur Road, Lahore. It was put to auction as an industrial concern by the Settlement Department on 13-11-1962 and was purchased by Bashir Ahmad Khan predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners for a sum of Rs,4,000.This auction was confirmed in due course by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Bashir Ahmad Khan, the auction-purchaser, paid the total price of the factory in the following manner:--
(i) Rs,1,000 paid in cash at the time of auction on 25-11-1962, and
(ii) Balance amount of Rs,3,000 adjusted through compensation book on 10-1-1963 (Annexure A/2).
' The payment was duly certified by the department through a letter dated 12-1-1996. Permanent Transfer Certificate was issued to the petitioner on 28-8-1971 vide Annexure ' C'.
2. Evacuee Trust Property Board, respondent No,2, hereinafter called the "Board" moved an application in 1966 under section 4(3) of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act, 1958 before District Judge/Chief Settlement Commissioner, for a declaration that the said factory and few other properties situated at 218-Ferozepur Road, Lahore were evacuee trust properties. A prayer was made for cancellation of the transfer documents issued by the Settlement Department in respect of all such properties, inclusive of the disputed one.
' These proceedings remained pending till the evacuee laws were repealed. The case, initiated by the "Board" was transferred to its Chairman in terms of section 2(2) read with section 2(3) of Act XXIV of 1975 for disposal.
3. Ultimately, the Chairman of the "Board" vide order dated 17-9-1976 declared the entire Property No,218, Ferozepur Road, Lahore as evacuee trust property. He, however, proceeded to uphold the transfer of those portions of the property, giving benefit of section 10 of the Act, payment of the transfer price whereof had been made before 30-6-1968 and their P.T.Ds. Were validated.
4. The matter about the disputed factory should have been allowed to remain rest there. However, that was not to be. On 22-1-1981, an application was moved by one Khalil Ahmad Khilji, before Chairman of the "Board" seeking cancellation of the transfer properties situated at 218-Ferozepur Road, Lahore by the Settlement Department on the ground that the same were owned by the "Board". On receipt of this application/complaint, the Secretary of the "Board" addressed a letter dated 17-10-1981 to the Federal Government requesting for cancellation of the order dated 17-9- 1976 (passed by the Chairman of the Board), in exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction, under section 17 of Act XIII of 1975 and also for setting aside the transfer documents.
5. Notices were thereupon issued to the petitioners and others who entered appearance before the Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs, respondent No,1 on 14- 2-1984 when impugned order was passed. Operative part of the order reads as under:-- "Section 10 of the Act ibid protects only those bona fide transfers which had been made in satisfaction of verified claims before 30th June, 1968. To the extent that the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore's impugned order, dated 17th September, 1976, validated transfers in respect of which Permanent Transfer Deeds had issued on or before 30th June, 1968, it is upheld; to the extent, it is not, it is set aside and remanded to the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore for re-hearing and reconsideration, on merits."
' Hence this writ petition.
6. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the revision petition/reference made/filed by the "Board" before the Federal Government was not within time in view of the proviso to section 17 of Act XIII of 1975 and merited to be dismissed summarily. It is also submitted that the impugned order dated 14-2-1984 is a nullity in the eye of law as it is not a speaking order. Lastly, it is contended that, in any case, the petitioners having paid the transfer price before the target date i,e, 30-6-1968 had become absolute owners of the disputed property, irrespective of non-issuance of P.T.D. In their names before the said date and the transfer in their favour would be deemed to have properly been validated under section 10 of the Act.
7. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti, Advocate, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, while opposing the writ petition, has argued that since admittedly P.T.D. Had not been issued before the target date in favour of the petitioners, therefore, question of its validation could hardly arise and no relief could be granted to the petitioners in this case. He also submitted that the matter having been remanded by the Secretary to the Chairman of the Board, no writ petition was competent against such an order and the petitioners can, if so advised, participate in the remand proceedings and put forth their point of view before the Chairman.
8. Law has placed embargo of limitation on the initiation, of proceedings in the nature of stfo motu action under section 17 by the Federal Government. It reads as under:-- "The Federal Government may at any time, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Act, which is pending or in which the Chairman, an Administrator, a Deputy Administrator or an Assistant Administrator has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such an order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as the Federal Government thinks, fit: ' Provided that the record of any case or proceedings in which the Chairman, an Administrator a Deputy Administrator or an Assistant Administrator has passed an order shall not be called for under this section on the application of any aggrieved person made after the expiration of fifteen days from the date of such order."
' It is clear, from the facts narrated hereinbefore, that the Federal Government did not, on its own motion, call for the record of the proceedings of the case. It was in fact a reference made by the "Board" through its Secretary on the complaint of one Khalil Ahmad Khilji. Such proceedings, by the Federal Government, cannot be termed to be suo motu in terms of section 17. See Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 3 others v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and 4 others PLD 1977 Lahore 461. Therefore, the period of limitation as embodied in the proviso to the section was to be adhered to. The proceedings taken by the Secretary and the impugned order flowing therefrom being hit, by rigors of limitation, cannot be sustained.
9. Even if the question of limitation is to be kept aside, the direction issued by Secretary of the Federal Government in impugned order requiring the Chairman of the "Board" to validate only those transfers wherein P.T.D. Had been issued before the target date i,e, 30-6-1968 is not sustainable in law, qua the petitioners. It would be seen that the transfer price of the disputed property had been received by the Settlement Department, in full, on 10-1-1963 and it was duly acknowledged through letter (Annexure C/2) dated 12-1-1963. Nothing was thus left to be done by the petitioners in the matter of procurement of P.T.D. Duty was, thereafter, cast on the Settlement Department to take necessary steps in this regard. They slept over the matter for more than eight years and ultimately issued the permanent transfer certificate on 25-8-1971. It is a typical case of lethargy/inefficiency rampant in various Government Departments. Be that as it may, the petitioners cannot be punished and made to suffer for no fault of theirs.
' As regards the legal consequence flowing from the payment of full transfer price to the Government, in respect of the property purchased from it, the law stands settled since long. In Faiz Ali v. Mst. Rafia Jan and others PLD 1965 Lahore 74 almost a similar question arose for determination. A widow had paid the sale price of State land, originally allotted in the name of her deceased husband, but formal conveyance deed was not issued till such time amendment was brought about in the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 through amending Act of 1944 whereby section 30-A was introduced which provided that the widow who had acquired proprietary rights in the land after the commencement of the said amending Act would not be treated to be absolute owner of the land. It was held that she had become full owner of the tenancy land on the date when she deposited and the Government accepted the sale price.
' Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ilam Din v. Muhammad Din PLD 1964 SC 842 dealing with the question has authoritatively laid down at page 848 of the report as under:-- "The question whether the estate of Mst. Zainab Bibi in the land here in question devolves under the aforesaid section 30-A turns upon whether her acquisition of proprietary rights takes effect from the date upon which the payment, and the order for transfer of the rights to her were made, or on the much later date on which the deed was executed and registered. Some argument was addressed to us upon the requirements of section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which was then in force to support the contention that the contract of sale was ineffective, unless duly executed as required by the aforesaid section. The reply presented with a great deal of force is that ever since 1915, it had, in an unbroken line of cases, been held that in respect of obligations to third parties, the title in the property matures in favour of the purchaser when transfer having been authorised, the proper dues have been deposited."
In view of the above, issuance of P.T.D. In the instant case, being a mere executive act, which having been delayed for about eight years by the departmental authorities themselves, could not be legally made the basis for non-suiting the petitioners by the Chairman of the "Board", in terms of the remand order of the Federal Government, impugned herein. To that extent, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
' It is true that generally remand order is not to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. However, in the instant case, the terms of the impugned order are such as to unjustifiably affect the petitioners, in violation of the law on the subject and the same merit to be interfered with in judicial review.
10. The upshot of the above discussion is that this writ petition is accepted and the direction, contained in the impugned order, to the effect that the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board would validate only those transfers in respect whereof P.T.Ds. Had been issued before the target date, irrespective of the fact that payment of the entire transfer price had been made before the target date cannot be sustained and the same is declared to be without lawful authority.
' The net result would be that the Chairman of the Board shall now pass a formal order of validation of the transfer of the disputed property in the name of the petitioners and if need be, issue a letter acknowledging the petitioners to have become full owner of the disputed property. No costs.