The appeal is directed against the decision dated 3-6-1996, rendered by the Punjab Labour Court No.3,. Lahore, at Ferozewala. Allowing a petition filed by the Atlas Tyres Employees' Union, Lahore- Sheikhupura Road, read with section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, respondents there being the General Manager, Atlas Tyres Limited, Lahore, and the Registrar of the Trade Unions, Lahore Region, Lahore. The Union aforesaid, claiming to be the CBA, had made a move to the Labour Court, for a direction for holding referendum, the previous one for a term of to years having been held in February, 1994. An allegation was levelled that the proprietorship) management of the concern had become revengeful against the C.B.A., and was making a desperate bid to victimize the members and the office-bearers of the union oust them from service, and effect them from the, premises used by the union as its office. As many as 89 workers were allegedly stopped at the gate and prevented from making entry into the interior Whereas the C.B.A., it was asserted, was keen for holding the referendum at the earliest, the management was out to delay the exercise, with ulterior consideration and mala fide motives.
2. In the proceedings before the Labour Court, the establishment did not make participation, although the Registrar's representative did appear and submitted also the written statement.
Evidence of the establishment was closed; and on considering the evidence led by the trade union in the light of, the averments embodied in the written statement filed by the Registrar, the Labour Court proceeded to allow the petition, with a direction that process of referendum would be conducted and completed within one month positively.
3. The instant appeal was preferred by the establishment on 19-6-1996, when, as prayed for by the appellant concern, proceedings of the referendum were stayed. I have carefully gone through the grounds of appeal and I am constrained to observe that there is little force in the main plea taken up by the appellant, the same being that ex parte proceeding had been taken against the establishment by the Labour Court with no legal justification. A perusal of the impugned decision leaves little doubt about the fact that a number of attempts were made by the Labour Court to effect service upon the establishment, respondent No. 1 before it, but the report always come that it had not been possible for the process-server to do the needful and that service was being deliberately avoided. Learned counsel for the appellant states that the proclamation issued in the weekly ' KAHKUSHAN' was not in the knowledge of the establishment and no effort had been made to serve the notice through registered post. Submission is that on a number of dates of hearing, in the petition pending before the Labour Court, the appellant concern and their counsel were present in the Court, in as many as 14 grievance petitions and connected matters, but neither the Court nor the process-server made a bid to serve them as regards the petition in question. In this regard my own experience is that even regularly engaged and heavily --paid Advocates avoid acknowledging service, even in the course of the same proceedings, if, for instance, the matter has been dismissed in default and a move has been made for its revival. Ex parte proceedings may have been ordered against a respondent, and before the next date of hearing, an application has been submitted for annulment of the order of ex parte proceedings and notice has been ordered to be issued to the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, who would generally refuse to receive the notice, stating that the same be served upon the party or person concerned direct. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned lower Court had failed to record the statement of the process-server, who had actually furnished a false or bogus report. Well there was no occasion for the Court to have called upon the process-server to make a statement, as his report about service of the respondent was in normal course, to be treated as a correct one, unless the -affect had come along and made a move for setting aside the order of ex parte proceedings or made an application for action against the process-server. A resume of the developments, having taken place during the past to years, as revealed in the petition under section 34, furnishes an irresistible indication that efforts made by the Registrar towards holding a referendum seemed to have consciously and persistently been frustrated by t1ie establishment, who obviously were interested that the field should remain open and collective bargaining with the labour class should be avoided over as long a period as possible. I have also not been able to follow in what manner had the appellant made appearance in the Court in other matters, whether he was the Managing Director of the concern or another representative. How could the Court be cognizant of the fact that in a different matter, the concern or their counsel were evading service, so that the Court could call upon its process-serving agency to establish contact with the representative of the establishment, as also the counsel in the Court for purpose of service. I would, therefore, treat this plea as a flimsy one. I am convinced that the establishment had intentionally avoided service and the Court had no alternative but to proceed against them ex parte at the end.
4. There is another plea. Three trade unions are in existence and the Employees' Union, in the proceedings of the petition under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, had not impleaded the other to trade unions as parties. This aspect of the matter could have been brought to the notice of the Court by the establishment alright, and the Court could then make a proper order; but when nobody for the establishment had turned up, this Court could not, on its own, acquire awareness about this fact, or hold an opinion that the other to unions had been left out, wilfully, and the only union having approached the Labour Court thus was not acting in the matter with clean hands and bona fide intentions. In so far as the contention about the Employees' Union having no locus standi in the matter is concerned, I find it difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. Although the to years term of the C.B.A. Had expired, new referendum had not been held and responsible for it mainly was the establishment, and, in the circumstances, trade union already certified as C.B.A., about which there is no dispute, could hold on.
5. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the N.I.R.C. Having become cognizant of the affair, the Labour Court was divested of its jurisdiction in the matter, and reference has been made to subsections (10) and (11) of section 22-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Subsection (12), however, postulates that jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain cases of unfair labour practice would not be ousted, although when a case of unfair labour practice is pending before the Commission, the Labour Court will refrain from dealing with it, in exercise of its jurisdiction in the matter. On perusal of the papers placed before me, by the learned counsel for the appellant, it has been disclosed that the President/General Secretary of the Workers and Staff Union had approached the N.I.R.C. In September, 1995, and the N.I.R.C. Had announced its order on 30-6-1996.
The learned Labour Court had rendered its decision earlier on 3-6-1996. The establishment, as already said, did not make appearance in the proceedings before the Labour Court; and it is not known if the Registrar had brought to the notice of the Court the fact of pendency of any, matter, respecting Atlas Tyres Limited, before the N.I.R.C. The vital aspect of the issue, however, is, if it was the same matter which the to forums were seized of simultaneously. The C.B.A. Was in enjoyment of certain benefits and privileges as had been agreed upon in the settlement arrived at with the establishment, and the Workers and Staff Union had made grievance of the fact that they were being deprived of the requisite amenities, benefits, etc. By the rival union, namely, the Employees'
Union.
6. It is interesting to find that even the Hon'ble Chairman of the N.I.R.C. Had, while making a direction that the establishment would not discriminate between the rival factions and accord them equal treatment, had passed orders that the Registrar, Trade Unions would hold the referendum, at the earliest, under his supervision. Negotiations respecting the demand notice the Registrar was restrained to undertake, so long as the status of the C.B.A. Was not conferred on one of the three trade unions through the referendum. In the course of, arguments before me, as well, I have felt that the" trade unions may be at daggers drawn, for advancement of their selfish ends, but they are all keen that the referendum be held at the earliest, without which exercise the establishment may resort to exploitation, and the cause of the working class will essentially be jeopardized.
7. This being the factual and legal position, the appeal is rendered to be one without merit, and I proceed to dismiss it, with no order as to costs. The Registrar, Trade Unions, Lahore, respondent No. 2, shall immediately p take steps to initiate the exercise of referendum, so as to conclude it by 31-1- 1997. It is expected that the Registrar would remain absolutely impartial, independent and fair, in the entire process.