1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.--The learned counsel has attempted to explain the office objection as to laches by saying that the delay, if any, in filing the present petition on 24-4-1996 occurred because an earlier Constitutional Petition namely, D-473 of 1994, which had been filed impugning the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 28-9-1992, was dismissed for non-prosecution. Such period, according to this contention, is to be excluded while examining the element of laches.
2. ' It seem to be factually correct that an earlier Constitutional petition was filed as above. However, the same was dismissed for non-prosecution on 12-9-1994. An application for restoration, according to the learned counsel, was filed on 14-1-1996, but that was dismissed on 18-3-1996 upon a finding that sufficient cause for revival of proceedings was not made out. The present petition was instituted, in turn, on 24-4-1996.
3. Now, the rule in relation to Constitutional petitions, we reckon, cannot be any different from that applicable to suits because Constitutional petitions are decided in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this Court. When, on such analogy, a suit is dismissed for default or for non- prosecution, a fresh suit, where Order IX, C.P.C. So permits, may be filed but that has to be done within the period of limitation, if remaining unexpired. A fresh suit in such circumstances, all things being equal, beyond limitation would be barred. Likewise, when a Constitutional petition is dismissed for non-prosecution or for default and a fresh petition is filed on the basis of the original cause of action, that petition should be instituted before the element of laches intervenes. It is for this reason that in borderline cases where laches would come into play, defaulting petitioners prefer to seek restorations rather than going for independent petitions de novo. In this view of the matter, there are serious laches involved here, which cannot be ignored. While no hard and fast rule as to laches can be laid down, we may add that, normally a petitioner is expected to approach this Court within a period of around six months for redress in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. Clearly, a much longer period is encountered in the present proceedings.
4. ' It may also be observed here that the reprieve envisaged in section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, does not as well apply to such-like matters because there what is contemplated is another proceedings, earlier instituted, which may have occasioned delay in filing of the application on the ground that such earlier proceeding did not lie because of want of jurisdiction or other cause, the applicant in that proceeding always having acted in good faith and diligently. Manifestly, the earlier proceeding here namely, Constitutional Petition No,D-473 of 1994, did not involve any want of jurisdiction. Besides, because of absence of sufficient cause for restoration, apparently, the same was not even pursued diligently. That consideration also, accordingly, cannot benefit the petitioner.
5. The petition, as a result, has to be dismissed, being hit by laches.
6. ' As to the merits of the controversy itself, the two findings appear to be concurrent and the petitioner has not been found by the Courts in the Labour Jurisdiction to have been an employee of respondent No,3, Adamjee Insurance Company. The learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to show that the funds utilised for payment of the salary of the petitioner were distinctly made over by the company to the Assistant General-Manager, who, from such funds, in turn, paid the petitioner's salary. This question, patently, also requires minute examination of evidentiary facts, which are by no means non-controversial. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to undertake that exercise.
7. ' The petition, as a result, is dismissed and with it also the pending applications in it.