1. M. SALEEM CHAL'DHRY CHAIRMAN).-In this appeal the appellant, an ex-Civil Judge assails the following order dated 8-4-1975 of termination of his service during probation period by the respondent: "Whereas the performance of work of Mr. Amanullah Malik, Civil Judge, Jhang (Probationer) has not been found up to the mark and satisfactory the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to terminate his services with immediate effect under subsection (1) of section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974."
2. This appeal was instituted on 8-5-1975 before us. During the course of hearing the appellant raised the issue that although the impugned order purported to terminate his services on the ground of inefficiency but in fact there was adequate material on the records of the department to show that ter--mination of his services had been 9rdered on the ground of misconduct and thus the order is tantamount to removal and since the order has been passed without any service of charge-sheet, enquiry and show-cause notice, the same was liable to be struck down and the reliance in this behalf was placed on the ratio of decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Mohammad Siddiq Javid Chaudhry v. The Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1974 SC 393) The appellant in particular relied upon the following observations: "In my opinion, if the service of a probationer is terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work that will not amount to dismissal or removal from service, such termination will be in terms of the con--tract or the rules made by the Government but if the service of a pro--bationer is terminated on the ground of misconduct that will amount to removal or dismissal. It will be a stigma in his favour. In the last mentioned case, the probationer will be protected by the provision of Article 177 of the Constitution of 1962 and will be entitled to a show-cause notice and a proper enquiry against him must be made."
3. We called upon the appellant to show to us as to whether in the authority relied upon by him the impugned order itself contained any obser--vations as to the conduct of civil servant concerned as well. This fact was not clear from the judgment itself. However the appellant pro--duced before us the printed paper book of Civil Appeal No. 295 of 1969 Muhammad Siddiq Javid Chaudhry v.
4. West Pakistan Government. Even the aforesaid printed paper-book did not contain the impugned order in original but the relevant portion of the admitting note by the Supreme Court of Pakistan appearing as page 26 of the printed paper hook was to the following effect: "CORNELIOUS, C. J.-This petition by one Muhammad Siddiq Javaid Chaudhry, seeks leave to appeal against his dismissal from the posi--tion of a probationary Civil Judge in West Pakistan, which happened during the initial period of two years probation, "on account of his work and conduct having been found unsatisfactory". The order purports to have been made under rule 8 of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1962."
5. As such from the above it was clear that in the aforesaid impugned order viz. the order of termination specifically referred to the conduct of the Civil Servant concerned. The appellant, however, tried to argue before us that the word conduct found mention in the termination order as the relevant rule 8, adverted to in the admitting order by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, referred to the work and conduct both whereas in the rules presently in vogue, the word "conduct" was no longer there. We are hardly impressed by this contention of the appellant, We cannot read the rule 8 above as it originally stood to enjoin upon the Government, to take scion ova both the grounds viz, conduct sod work in all events or not at all. In fact there is nothing in the Rule to suggest such construction. Accordingly we find no merit in this contention of the appellant. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan relied upon by the appellant however clearly laid down that if the impugned order was grounded on the performance i. e. the work of the appellant alone, the same was not tantamount to an order of removal. Since in that case the order of termination was also passed with the observations as to the conduct of the appellant, therefore, their Lordships were pleased to summon the records wherein the allegations as to the corruption on appellant's part were found to exist. As such their Lordships came to the conclusion that it was a case of removal. But in this case we do not find any reference to the conduct of the appellant and as such the order passed with regard to the work of the appellant simpliciter is not covered A by the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and in fact such type of order could not be said to carry any stigma against the appellant and thus could nut amount to an order of removal.
6. Our conclusions above are amply supported by the recent decision of the Lahore High Court reported as PLD 1376 Lah. 1310 at page 1314 in which following observa--tions are to the point: "It was further held that when the impugned order themselves did` not contain any charge or stigma against the respondents, it could not be said that their services were terminated by any of penalty merely because an allegation about their inefficiency was made in the office note. This view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in Abdul Karim v. The West Pakistan Province and Noarul Hassan and others v. The Federation of Pakistan Respectfully following the principle of law laid down in the said authorities it is held that in the given circumstances there was no need to afford an opportunity to the petitioner by way of show-cause notice"
7. Following observations from an authority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1970 SC 98 at page 130 also supported or conclusions.
8. "Compulsory Retirement which carry with it no stigma, vindictiveness against the person concerned, is different from the removal from service or dismissal."
9. The upshot of the above discussion is theft unless the order itself contained any observation or finding as to the conduct of civil servant the same could not be considered to be an order of removal or dismissal. We respectfully agree with the decision of Lahore High Court, which appears to be based upon the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan cited therein. The authority of the Supreme Court relied upon by the appellant is not applicable to the facts of this case as in the aforesaid case the order of term nation was evidently passed on the conduct of the appellant. We accordingly hold that the appeal has no force and the same is dismissed in limine.