Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 herein filed a suit on 17-11-1982 by which they claimed exclusive ownership of the pieces of land described in detail in the plaint, as the only heirs of Bagoo son of Allah Ditta, the original owner, and in this connection they sought declaration of validity of inheritance, Mutations Nos. 1261 and 2619 dated 21-2-1982, by which half of the suit land was given to Mst.
Rehmat, respondent No. 4 herein, as the brother's daughter of Bagoo deceased. The petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Abdul Razaq and Abdul Rasheed, claimed to have purchased the share of land from Mst. Rehmat and on their application were impleaded as parties. After the demise of the original vendees, the present petitioners were impleaded in their place as their legal representatives on 14-9-1987. Mst. Rehmat denied the claim of the plaintiffs while the present petitioners also separately contested the same by averring that they were bona fide purchasers from Mst. Rehmat and were therefore, entitled to be protected, even if there was some defect in the title of Mst. Rehmat. The rival pleadings led to framing of issues. After recording the evidence of the parties and appraising the same, the Trial Court dismissed the suit on 21-4-1991. Petitioner's appeal met the same fate on 20-9-1995. By way of this revision, the validity of the two judgments is being called in question.
2. In support of the revision, learned counsel has laid repeated empahasis upon one point only and that is that Allah Dad, one of the plaintiffs, was party to the mutations of inheritance and that he was instrumental in the sale of land in favour of the petitioners and as such he was estopped from challenging the validity of both. In this connection learned counsel has pointed out ' that the relevant evidence in. Support of these pleas has been disregarded by the Courts.
3. Both the Courts have concurrently found against Mst. Rehmat under issues Nos. 8 and 9 dealing with the validity of inheritance and the legal right of Mst. Rehmat to inherit from Bagoo, deceased.
Both the Courts have found that Mst. Rehmat being niece of Bagoo, was a distant kindred while the plaintiffs were the residauries and in the presence of residuaries, she was not entitled to inherit and stood excluded. This conclusion has not been seriously challenged by the learned counsel both in today's hearing and on 2-10-1995, when the case was adjourned to enable him to examine this question. Learned counsel, however feebly challenged the validity of the pedigree-table, but to the presence of the Material on record, there is no reason to differ with the conclusion reached by the two Courts. Even otherwise in paragraph 4 of her written statement, Mst. Rehmat asserted the correctness of the mutation thereby accepting that the plaintiffs were the residuaries. Reference to relevant provisions of Islamic Law as contained in the principles of Muhammadan Law, make it clear, and this has not been disputed by the learned counsel, that in the presence of the residuaries a distant kindred is not entitled to inheritance. Learned counsel was asked that if according to Mst. Rehmat, the pedigree-table was not correct, then in what capacity and under what status she claims to inherit from Bagoo, deceased, an, thus maintain the validity of the disputed mutations. Once again there was no satisfactory answer with the learned counsel. After going through the record and elaborately hearing the learned counsel, I have no reason to differ with the findings recorded by the two Courts under issues Nos. 8 and 9.
4. This being the conclusion and disputed mutation being void, Mst. Rehmat inherited nothing from Bagoo deceased and as such in law had nothing to transfer to purchasers from her. No question of estoppel arises in such a case, even if it be accepted that Allah Dad was present at the time of mutations and was also instrumental in the transaction between petitioners and Mst. Rehmat. If she got not title, the petitioners cannot claim to be better off than her. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is not a case of defect in the title of Mst. Rehmat. It is a case where Mst. Rehmat had no title at all. In the circumstances, the reliance of the petitioners on the sale-deed in their favour and upon section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1982, does not improve their case.
5. No other point was urged.
6. Finding no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgments and decree, I dismiss this revision in limine.