' The petitioner, a Public Limited Company, by these two petitions, namely Petitions Nos. 1288 and 1289 of 1975, has challenged the order dated 8-11-1975, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labor Court No, VI, Hyderabad, by which the petitioner was directed to re-instate Muhammad Qasim, respondent No, 3 in Petition No, 1288/75 and Abdul Qadir, respondent No, 3, in Petition No 1289/75, in their service with back benefits. This Judgment will dispose of both the petitions as the facts and the points involved are the same.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner sent a show-cause notice on 13-9-1972 to the above-said respondents calling upon them to explain their absence, from duty for a continuous period of ten days within three days of the receipt of the notice, or in default to face dismissal from service. These notices were sent by registered post acknowledgment due cards. On 18-9-1972, the services of the respondent No, 3 were terminated under section 15, clause 3 (e) of the Standing Orders, 1968. An intimation was again sent to them by registered post. Subsequent to this both the respondents made representations to the Labor Directorate and other Provincial authorities and on 13-8-1974 sent letters to the petitioners purport- in to be the grievance notices under section 25-A of the I. R.
0., 1969.
In these notices both the respondents stated that they had been arrested on 13-8-1972, and when they were released on bail they were not allowed to resume their duties and were kept on false promises till May 1974, although no order of termination was received by them. It was on 5.8-1974, only that they were verbally informed about their dismissal from service.
' This action was followed by the application under section 25-A of the 1. R. O., 1969, filed by both the respondents in the Junior Labour Court No, VI at Sukkur. In the written reply filed by the petitioner in that Court amongst others it was averred that the Management had dismissed the respond- dents from the service due to long absence on duty from 25-8-1972 to13-9-1972 and for which show- cause notices were given to them and they were dismissed on 18-9-1972 only when there was no reply from them. Besides this, the I. R. O, 1969 did not cover the grievance notice which were time- barred. The respondents also filed their affidavits and documents wherein 'the Junior Labour Court gave its award on 18-7-75, whereby the applications were allowed and the petitioner was directed to re-instate the respondent No, 3 in service with full back wages and benefits. While giving this award the Junior Labour Court examined the show-cause notices and the postal receipts and found that they had not been sent to the addresses of the respondent No,
3. It was, therefore, held that there was no service of the show-cause notice by the petitioner. Similarly, the postal receipts of the letters terminating their services disclosed some rubbings and over-writings and were therefore not reliable. Thus both the show-cause notices and the intimation of termination of services of respondent No, 3 were not found to have been proved. The petitioner appealed against this award before the Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabad, which resulted into the impugned order.
The Labour Court No, VII, Hyderabad, while considering the question about the point of time when the cause of grievance arose to the respondent No, 3, examined the record of the case I e, copies of the show-cause notices and the postal receipts and came to the conclusion that the same did not bear the correct address of the respondent No, 3, and that the petitioner issued dismissal orders on 18-9-1972, without waiting for the return of the acknowledgment receipts from the respondent No, 3, and that even the dates on the postal receipts under which the show-cause notices were sent were not legible and had obvious rubbing marks and finally held that the cause of grievance arose to the respondent No, 3 on 5-8.1974, which was amply borne out not only by their testimony but also by the documentary evidence that had been produced on their behalf.
3. The only point raised and argued before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Junior Labour Court as well as the Labour Court have erroneously held that the date of the cause of grievance to the respondent No, 3 was 5-8-1974 and not 18-9-1972, which was the date of the dismissal order. As this contention was based on consideration of evidence on record and involved the point of limitation, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Mst. Johan A ra Begum v. Bashfr Ahmad and others (1) wherein their Lordships while considering the question of limitation in an appeal which apparently was barred by four years but had been remanded to the Settlement Commissioner by the High Court, had been pleased to observe "In our opinion on the face of these clear facts on the record, it wan incumbent on the High Court to determine question of limitation itself instead of remanding the case for this purpose to the Settlement Commissioner."
' The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contended that in the light of the above observation it was necessary to examine the facts of this case also.
' Leaned counsel for the respondent No, 3, on the other hand. Submitted that the two Courts below had after due consideration of the merits of the case given a concurrent finding of fact, relating to the date on which the cause of grievance had accrued to the respondent No,
3. The finding being concurrent and by tribunals which were essentially concerned with facts, that could not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
' Furthermore, the observation relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner applied only to a case where the question relating to the jurisdiction of a Tribunal was erroneously denied, and that error was shown to be patent on the record.
4. It is true that in the case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the relevant observation applied to such a case. But the consistent view taken by the Courts in cases of errors on the point of jurisdiction, has been, that if a finding in a given case, deals with facts relatable to the question of jurisdiction, and such finding appears to be prima fade incorrect then the High Court itself would go into the question of that finding and also examine the facts which be the foundation of that conclusion. In exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction the superior Courts have go the unquestionable authority to correct such errors, which are touching th question of jurisdiction as they would in reality amount to errors of law.1 Ordinarily a finding of fact is not interfered with except in cases where I is based upon evidence that is inadmissible in law, or is the result of discarding evidence which might well be material to proper decision of a case, or by misreading of evidence, etc. , but in no case could it be said that a concurrent finding of fact, though erroneous for the same reason, could operate as a bar to an interference with the same by a superior Court. Distinction, however, is to be made in this respect between a decision which is merely incorrect or erroneous and the one which involves the question of the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal making the decision.
As the contention raised in this case was that the decision of the Junio Labor Court as well as the Labor Court, on the point of limitation, 15 though concurrent, was erroneous and was based not on a proper consideration of the facts on the record, all the relevant facts did warrant a recons deration for that limited purpose.
5. Now the grievance notice by the respondent No, 3, in this case bears the date 30-8-1974 and the application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which followed, was dated 9-10-1974. Obviously (1) 1975 SCM R 401 if the order of termination of services which is dated 18-9-1972 had been received by the respondent No, 3 at that time the grievance notice as well as the application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, would have been hopelessly time-barred. The finding of the Courts below was based on the examination of the question whether the show-cause notices and orders of termination of their services were in fact received by the respondents, and they came to the conclusion that there was no proof that any of them was actually served. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred first to two applications made by the two respondents' to the Chief Minister, Government of Sind which were dated 15-10- 1913, the making of which was not disputed. In these applications the respondent No, 3 had stated that they were sent to the jail in August 1972 on account of the involvement in false cases and that after their release, which was after a very short time, they went to the Mill to resume their duties, but they were not allowed to enter. These statements according to the learned counsel for the petitioner amounted to admission of the fact, that the respondents had the knowledge of the termination of their services by the petitioner, even in about August or September 1972. The responcients, therefore could not be beard to say that they had no notice ; and if the Courts below had taken proper account of this admission then the conclusion' reached by them on the point of limitation would have been different.
' This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner overlooks the legal requirement of proving the fact of communication, of the information about the termination of the services to the respondents, who were affected. The two Courts below have examined relevant documents including the postal receipts, and came to the conclusion that neither the show-cause notices nor the orders of termination of their services were actually communicated to them. This by no means appears to be a wrong conclusion. The order of dismissal of their services was issued admittedly after five days only, of the show-cause notices. This was done without waiting for the acknowledgment due receipts. The respondent No, 3, as it transpired, may well have been in confinement during this period. The addresses on the above-said notices were also not very clear.
There is nothing more on the record nor has anything been pointed out, to show that the finding of the Courts below on this point is erroneous.
' The Presiding Officer, Labour Court No, IV, Hyderabad, while deciding the relevant question of limitation had considered these two applications also, and had applied his mind to the contents thereof. He has rightly come to the conclusion that these applications do not show that the respondent No, 3 had the knowledge of their dismissal from services on 18-9-1972.
' As this does not appear to be a case of misreading or omission of considering any evidence on record, nor is it shown that the documentary evidence relating to the service of show-cause notices or dismissal orders could be said in any manner to he misconstrued, the conclusion reached by the Courts below appears to be quite logical and correct.
' The statements of the two respondents to the effect that they were orally informed about their termination of services only on 5.8-1974, cannot be discarded as unbelievable or untrue, for the reason that even the petitioner did not challenge the same by any cross-examination during the proceedings. The Courts below were, therefore, justified in holding the said statements to be the correct basis for calculating the period of limitation for filing the grievance applications.
6. No other point of fact or of law has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The findings in the impugned orders do not merit any interference by this Court. These petitions are, therefore, dismissed but with no orders as to costs.