' The appellant, Taj Muhammad Khan, Inspector, Excise and Taxation was charged with two counts: firstly, that he did not comply with his transfer orders respectively dated 17-7-1989 and 22-7-1989 and secondly, that he remained absent from duty without any information. He refused these charges stating that he had not received his transfer orders and further that he was on medical leave.
2. Leaving all other things aside, it was pointed out that the Inquiry Officer vide his notice dated 5- 6-1990 called upon the appellant to appear before him within a week to answer the charge but without waiting for so much the period, he hurriedly submitted his report dated 7-6-1990 (Annexure 'K' ages 51-52) to the Authorised Officer. I have seen the original record reduced by the learned D.A.
And quite find that though the Inquiry Officer lowed the appellant a week to appear before him in order to answer the charge, yet he submitted his report just the 3rd day thereafter namely on 7-6- 1990, meaning thereby that he curtailed the period of 7 days which the appellant had a vested right to avail to answer the charge. Curtailment of this period on the part of the Inquiry Officer was in fact tantamount to denial to the accused of adequate opportunity as could not be easily over- looked.
3. One of the grounds urged before this Tribunal was that the appellant had been on medical leave.
If this were true, the Inquiry Officer should have followed the procedure laid down in Rule 7 sub-rule
(5) of the E&D Rules, 1975 to get the period of his illness certified by the Medical Board, which was supposed in the extreme conditions to have even gone to the house of the appellant. This .Aspect appears to have been totally ignored by the Inquiry Officer who rushed through the procedure in an unsavoury manner. He should have been rather careful in observing the procedure in order to avoid denial of adequate opportunity of defence to the appellant. It caused miscarriage of justice.
4. Other matters need not be discussed because of the abovementioned flaw appearing in the proceedings. It was however something technical which of course might not be allowed to be exploited to take undue advantage.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to stress that the so-called transfer orders were not communicated to him and that he was kept in the dark all along. It was a question of fact which had to be essentially determined by the Inquiry Officer who rather in unholy haste cut short a vested right of the appellant. It goes without saying that the appellant could always take the plea of having been kept in dark about his transfer, before the Authorised Officer, the Inquiry Officer and even the Authority. It will, therefore, be appropriate if these officers should first give their own views about the point. Nothing could be said about it at this stage particularly because it needs evidence.
6. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The appellant is reinstated and the case is remanded to the Inquiry Officer to proceed afresh (de novo) from the stage he omitted to observe the provisions of Rule 7 ibid. The nature of the intervening period shall be determined by the Departmental Authorities depending upon what ultimately comes out of the proceedings.