1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The objections filed by the petitioner to an award given by the arbitrator in arbitration proceedings were dismissed by the trial Court as time-barred. The order dismissed by objections to the award as time-barred has been upheld by a learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court in F.A.O. No,12 of 1992. The petitioner is now seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of learned Division Bench of the High Court.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in terms of Article 158 of the Limitation Act, service of notice on the petitioner by the trial Court after filing of the award in. The Court was must.
2. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the eases of Muhammad Shafi v.
3. Muhammad Sabir PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lahore 591 and Mahboob Alam v. Mumtaz Ahmed PLD 1960 (W.P.)
4. Lahore 601. The first case cited above relates to the interpretation of Article 178 of the Limitations Act which prescribed the period for filing award by the arbitrator in Court. The period prescribed under this Article is 90 days which starts from the date of service of notice of making of the award.
5. In Muhammad Shafi case (supra) the learned Judge of Lahore High Court while interpreting the scope of Article 178 of Limitation Act observed as follows:-- "The brief history of the Arbitration law which has been given above clearly shows that the words 'the date of service of the notice of the making of the award' have a technical meaning. Attached to them and can only mean the notice provided by section 14 of the Arbitration Act, i,e, a notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. The mere fact that the parties had the knowledge of the fact that the award had been made or the fact that they had signed the award would not start the time running under Article 178 of the Limitation Act. This is the view which was taken in the Punjab authority referred to above as well as in Jai Kishen v. Ram Lal Gupta reported in AIR 1944 Lah.
398. I, quote with respect the observations made by Abdur Rahman, J.:-- ' The notice referred to in column 3 (Article 178 of the Limitation Act) is the notice mentioned in section 14(1), Arbitration Act, according to which an arbitrator is required to give a notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award, and therefore, limitation could have started only from the date on which that notice would have been served, and as such a notice could not have been given to the parties as both of them were present when the award was made. Column 3 of Article 178 was inapplicable."
6. ' The same view was taken in Jayantilal Jamnadas v. Chhaganlal Nathoobhai, AIR 1945 Bom.
7. 417."
8. ' It is not necessary to examine here the correctness or otherwise of the above view as in the present case the question involved before us relates to the interpretation of Article 158 of the Limitation Act which deals with the period of the filing objections to the award. The above case does not deal with the interpretation of Article 158 of the 'Limitation Act. The second cited case of Mahboob Alam v. Mukhtar Ahmed (supra) was decided by a Division Bench of Lahore High. Court which also related to the interpretation of Article 178 of the Limitation Act and section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act. However, the observations made in that case at page 606 relate to the interpretation of both subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 14 of the Arbitration Act, which were to the following effect:- "6. Coming now to the merits of this appeal, we will take up the objections under subsections (1) and (2) of section 14 together. Section 14(1) provides for a notice of the making of the award by the arbitrators. Section 14(2) provides that after the award is filed by the arbitrators the Court shall give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that in view of the use of the word ' shall' in either of these two provisions, it is necessary to comply with them, and in the absence of notice of the making of the award, or of the filing of the award, the award is as yet unenforceable and void. We see little force in these contentions when urged by a person who, after coming to know of the contents of the award, had filed objections to the award.
9. The object of the provision relating to notice of the making of the award is only to inform the parties that the award had been made so that they may file an application for the filing of the award. Such an application has to be filed within ninety days of the service of notice of the making of the award under Article 178 of the Limitation Act. Similarly, the object of giving notice of filing of the award is to enable the parties to file an application for the setting aside of the award. Such an application has under Article 158 to be filed within thirty days of the service of the notice of the award. Had there been involved any question of limitation as to an application for filing of the award, or as to an application for setting aside of the award, reliance upon the provisions to give notice would have been justified. But, in the present case, there was no application for filing the award at all and there was no objection on the ground of limitation to the application for setting aside of the award. No objection as to the absence of notice of the award or of filing of the award can be taken by a party who has filed an application for setting aside of the award and the application has been entertained without Any objection as to limitation. It is not contended that the appellant did not know of the contents of the award for he had filed objection after going through the award.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon judgments which lay down that the provisions of section 14(1) and (2) are mandatory. They may be mandatory and may form a strong basis for repelling any objections on the ground of limitation, but they cannot render an award void. Their effect would be that the Court would direct compliance with them but when the object of the provisions had been served and the parties have knowledge of the contents of the award as well as of its filing there in no need of any formal notice (though its absence may be pleaded in reply to an objection on the ground of limitation). Learned counsel for the appellant urges that as long as there is no notice for filing of the award objections cannot be filed at all. We asked him to refer us to any provision to that effect in the Arbitration Act and he was unable to do so. An application for setting aside the award can no doubt be filed within thirty days of the service of notice of filing of the award, but there is. No reason to suppose that even if notice has not yet been formally served, a party cannot put in an application for setting aside the award.. Suppose in the present case this application for setting aside the award had succeeded. Could the respondent urge, in the High Court that as notice of the award had not yet been served on the appellant, the whole proceedings were infructuous? He could not possibly be allowed to urge that. It is only the person on whom notice had not been served, who could make a grievance of it and he too could rely on it only in reply to a plea of limitation. We are at the same time of the opinion that the point under discussion can be decided even by reference to section 17 of the Arbitration Act, which runs:-- 'Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award had expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with, the award.'
11. ' In accordance with this section either the limitation for filing an application to set aside the award, should have expired or such an application should have been made and rejected, and if it is rejected the Court had to proceed to deliver judgment in accordance with the award. This section does not say That as long as notice of filing of the award had not been served, the Court is not to deliver judgment."
4. The above observations did not support the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provision with regard to service of notice under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act is a must and in case of noncompliance the period of limitation would not start running unless such notice is served. The learned Judge in Chambers in the impugned order has referred the case of Abdul Waris v. Javed Hanif 1983 SCM R 716 wherein the provisions of section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act were interpreted with reference to the period of limitation prescribed for filing of objections to .The award under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. In that case, the award was filed in Court on 31-3- 1981 in presence of the petitioner's counsel and the matter was adjourned to 5-5-1981 for filing of the objections to the award. As no objection was filed to the award, it was made rule of the Court.
12. The period of 30 days prescribed for filing of the award in that case was held to be applicable from the date when the award was filed in Court in presence of the counsel of the petitioner in that case.
13. In these circumstances, the order of learned Judge in Chambers holding that the objections to the award filed by the petitioner were beyond time and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration by the Court, is not open to any exception. This petition has no merit which is, accordingly, dismissed and leave is refused.