1. ' NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, J.---The facts necessary for disposal of the Application No, 2822 of 1993 are as follows:- ' The respondent No, 2 United Bank Limited filed the Suit No, 93 of 1992 on 13-2-1992 against the petitioner and others before the Banking Tribunal, Karachi for Recovery of Rs,8,13,394.58. It appears that on 10-3-1993 the Tribunal directed the petitioner and the other defendants to furnish security for Rs,6,56,541 since security was not furnished, therefore, on 25-5-1993, the suit was decreed for Rs,6,56,541.
2. ' Subsection (6) of section 6 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 hereinafter called the Ordinance, which is applicable to these proceedings is as follows:- "(6) All suits filed in the Banking Tribunal shall be disposed of within ninety days of the filing of the plaint and, in case the proceedings continue beyond the said period, the defendant shall be asked to furnish a bank guarantee acceptable to the Banking Tribunal to the extent of the claim in suit and, on failure of the defendant to furnish such bank guarantee within a period of fifteen days, the Banking Tribunal shall pass a decree in favour of the Banking company as prayed for in the plaint: ' Provided that, where the claim of the Banking Company based on default of the defendant in payment of agreed instalments, the bank guarantee shall be to the extent of the amount of instalment in default: 'Provided further that, in case, the proceedings continue beyond a further period of one hundred and twenty days, the defendant shall deposit with the Banking Tribunal in cash the amount claimed in the plaint and, on failure of the defendant to make such deposit within fifteen days, the Banking Tribunal shall pass a decree in favour of the Banking Company as prayed for in the plaint."
3. ' On 24-5-1993 this petition was filed. It was admitted on 25-5-1993 and the operation of the impugned order viz; 10-3-1993 initially was stayed till 27-5-1993, which on subsequent dates was extended. On 28-9-1994, learned counsel for the respondent No, 2 submitted that the petition had become infructuous as the suit itself was decreed. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner sought time to make the statement after verifying the facts.
4. ' Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the stay order takes effect from the movement it is passed, and it being so, the suit could not be decreed by the Tribunal on 25-5-1993. In support of this contention, he cited (1) Karam All and others v. Raja and others (PLD 1949 Lahore 100 (2)
5. Persumal and others v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1960, Karachi 690, (3) Mst. Ramzan Bibi v. Mst. Amna Bibi PLD 1970 Lahore 371, (4) Surriya Bibi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed (1980 CLC 2091).
6. ' In Karam Ali's case, the scope of Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. Was considered and it was observed that the stay order, under Order 41, Rule 5, operates from the time such order is made and not from the time it is communicated to the executing Court. A distinction was also drawn in this case on the point of stay order and injunction. In Perumal's case also Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. Was under consideration and with reference to this order it was observed that an order passed by the inferior Court, during subsistence of a stay order made by superior Court, is an absolute nullity. In Mst.
7. Ramzan Bibi's case, which was petition, it was held that the Constitution gave ample powers to the High Court to give interim relief in respect of matter pending before it. Further, it was observed that the order of the High Court becomes effective the moment it was passed and even if it had not been communicated to the executing Court in time the proceedings taken in the ignorance of the order would have been held to have been without jurisdiction. In Surriya Bibi's case, two cross-suits were pending and High Court had ordered stay of proceedings of the both suits, but notwithstanding it an ex parte decree was passed in one suit. It was held that ex parte decree was ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
8. Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed, learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the fact that final decree in this matter was passed on 25-5-1993. He was asked a specific question if there was any material available on record to show that on that particular day whether first stay order was passed by this Court or the final decree by the Trial Court, and his reply was that he could not say anything on this point. It being so, it cannot be argued, nor so was argued, that first stay was granted and thereafter the decree was passed. Therefore, regard being had to the circumstances of the case, the legal presumption would be that the final decree passed by the Tribunal was proper and in terms of time was passed earlier than the Stay Order of this Court.
9. ' The case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable, to the instant case and is distinguishable. Order 41, C.P.C. Speaks about appeal from original decrees. Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. Deals with stay of proceedings and of execution and Appellate Court grants Stay in terms Of this Order. Since for the purpose of these proceedings this is not Appellate Court nor the question of execution of decree is involved, therefore, Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. Is not attracted in this matter. It is true that, while exercising the writ jurisdiction Stay can be granted, but its scope has to be determined with reference to the original proceedings. The Order dated 25-5-1993 of this Court at the most can be taken as an Injunction Order, which was admittedly not communicated to the respondents on that day.
10. The Ordinance is a Special Law and overrides the provisions of General Law. According to subsection (6) of section 6 of the Ordinance, quoted above, all the suits filed in Banking Tribunal are to be disposed of within 90 days of the filing of the plaint, and the defendant is to furnish Bank Guarantee till the proceedings continues beyond said period. According to this subsection, the Bank Guarantee is to be furnished within 15 days of the order. The Order for furnishing the Bank Guarantee, as mentioned earlier, was passed on 10-3-1993 and, at the most, it could be valid up to 25-3-1993. No stay could be granted beyond the statutory period. If the Guarantee was not furnished within a period of 15 days the Tribunal was required to pass the decree in favour of the bank. In this case, admittedly the security was not furnished till 25-5-1993. Therefore, the impugned order dated 10-3-1993 ceased to be operative after 25-3-1993 and, in any case, it stands merged in the final order when the decree was passed.
11. ' In consequence, the order dated 25-5-1993 passed on Miscellaneous Application No, 2822 of 1993 staying the operation of impugned order dated 10-3-1993 is recalled, and the said application is dismissed with costs.