' MUHAMMAD AQIL MIRZA, J.---This appeal filed under section 96, C.P.C. Has been directed against the judgment and decree, dated 28-6-1993, whereby appellant's suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed for want of evidence.
2. Shamas-ud-Din plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of agreement dated 15-3-1992, where under the defendant agreed to sell his land measuring 98 Kanals, situated in village Dinar, Tehsil Shahpur, District Sargodha, for total consideration of Rs,3,50,000. It was averred in the plaint that a sum of Rs,3,00,000 was paid in advance on 15-3-1992 while the balance amount of Rs,50,000 was to be paid after one year at the time of registration of the sale-deed but in utter violation of the sale agreement the defendant wanted to sell the suit land to someone else. The defendant resisted the suit by straightaway denying the execution of the agreement and the receipt of the advance money. It was alleged that the agreement and the receipt had been forged. Many preliminary objections were also raised.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 24-5-1993:---
(1) Whether the plaintiff had got no cause of action and locus standi to file the suit? OPD
(2) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD
(3) Whether the suit had incorrectly been valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? If so, what was the correct valuation? OPD
(4) Whether the alleged agreement etc. Were outcome of fraud and forgery? If so its effect? OPD
(5) Whether a valid agreement of sale, dated 15-3-1992 had been arrived at between the parties for the sale of disputed property and the plaintiff had paid three lacs rupees to the defendant? OPD
(6) In case Issue No,5 is proved in affirmative, then whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for specific performance of the contract on the payment of Rs,50,000 or return of Rs,3,00,000 within interest at the rate of Rs,14%? OPP
(7) Relief.
4. The suit was adjourned to 16-6-1993 for the plaintiff's evidence. For this date only one out of the six summoned witnesses was served but he too did not appear on account of a death in his family.
The case was then adjourned to 24-6-1993 on which date the stamp vendor and the attesting witnesses were present but the deed writer was stated to be ill. The Sub-Inspector and the Magistrate were not present. The attendance of the Magistrate was not found to be necessary by the trial Court at that stage while the absence of the Sub-Inspector was considered to be justified.
The plaintiff did not examine his served witnesses in the absence of the questioned documents which were on the investigation file of the police. Accordingly, the plaintiff was ordered to requisition the relevant documents from the police file and the case was adjourned to 28-6-1993 with the direction to the plaintiff to produce his evidence at his own. The order passed by the trial Court is reproduced hereunder in extenso:--- "Present counsel for the parties. The stamp vendor along with attesting witnesses present. The deed-writer was stated to be ill. The Sub-Inspector and the Magistrate concerned, not present.
Attendance of the Magistrate, is not considered appropriate at this stage. As regards the sub- Inspector, he had shown his inability to appear in this Court because of his pre-occupation in another case in a different Court at Esa-Khel, therefore, the excuse appeared to be proper. The plaintiff shall requisition the relevant documents from the Investigation File through the Incharge of Police Station concerned, on the deposit of process fee. Learned counsel for the plaintiff had shown his inability to examine the other witnesses in the absence of questioned documents/in dispute, hence the witnesses are allowed to go unexamined. The plaintiff shall produce his evidence at his own on 28-6-1993."
5. On 28-6-1993 the plaintiff prayed for adjournment on the ground that the Investigating Officer who was in possession of the disputed documents had not come with the relevant record and, therefore, other witnesses could not be examined. This request, however, has been refused and suit dismissed in the following terms:--- "I have heard learned counsel for the parties with reference to the case record. Today was the 3rd opportunity given to the plaintiff for evidence which had to be produced on the onus of the plaintiff which was a matter of record. The plaintiff did not bother to get the summons issued for today nor the witnesses proposed to be examined were served. It clearly imported that the plaintiff was not interested in the early culmination of the case but was simply marking time. Learned counsel for the defendant, contended that the alleged agreement was a forged document. The plaintiff had no cause to bring the suit/case. Inasmuch as that the plaintiff by joining hands with other culprits forged the document to deprive of the poor defendant of an advanced age of his entire holdings of 98 Kanals, was issueless and at the death-door. His (the plaintiff) was the effort that the defendant may part with this world, then he will be out and out to usurp his property. He wondered that the plaintiff had claimed the sale in his favour for Rs,3,50,000 of which he claimed to have paid Rs,3,00,000 and a balance of Rs,50,000 had yet to be paid, which according to the plaintiff, the defendant had refused to recover and execute the sale-deed. How such a huge amount could be paid without the execution of a sale-deed (which was to be executed after a year); that it was not comprehensible at all; that the plaintiff had got any case to assert and is liable to be dismissed for want of evidence.
' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have also given my due consideration to the case and the case record and arguments so advanced, I am therefore, conscious that the plaintiff had got no evidence to substantiate his case and was simply marking time, therefore, the suit is hereby dismissed for want of evidence."
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no contumacious negligence on the part of the plaintiff to produce the evidence in support of his case. All the witnesses had been duly summoned for 16-6-1993 and 24-6-1993. For the last-mentioned date, Muhammad Shafi, Stamp-Vendor, Muhammad Khan, Muhammad Siddiq and Ch. Muhammad Yaseen, Magistrate had been duly served. The Stamp-Vendor and the attesting witnesses could not be examined because the Sub-Inspector who was in possession of the disputed documents was absent on account of his pre-engagement in another Court. The evidence of the Magistrate was found by the trial Court to be not appropriate at that stage. Accordingly, the case was adjourned by the trial Court for summoning the record from the police file. On these facts learned counsel contends that the learned trial Court has seriously erred in observing that the plaintiff had not availed of three opportunities for producing the evidence. It is further submitted that the case had not been adjourned previously at the request of the plaintiff or on account of any default on his part. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has acted in haste to dismiss the suit even without making a proper order for closing the evidence of the plaintiff. Learned counsel has strongly criticised the observations that the plaintiff had got no evidence to substantiate his case and was simply marking time."
7. We have examined the record ourselves. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant find support from the material available on the record. The reports of the Ahmad clearly show that the witnesses had been duly summoned by the plaintiff for 16-6-1993 to 24-6-1993. On the latter date three witnesses were present. They, however, were not examined by the learned trial Court on account of the fact that the Sub-Inspector who was in possession of the questioned documents had not appeared despite service. It appears that the learned trial Court refused to grant the adjournment to the plaintiff to produce his witnesses and closed his evidence under Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C. By taking the view that he did not avail three opportunities granted to him for producing the evidence. Evidently the learned trial Court was wrong in taking that view because the plaintiff had acted quite diligently in summoning the witnesses on two dates of hearing. On the last date of hearing the documents from the police custody could not be requisitioned on account of a short adjournment of three days granted for the said purpose.
8. In the instant case the learned District Judge had given a direction to decide the suit before the summer vacation. The learned trial Court appears to have decided the suit with undue haste in its anxiety to obey the direction of the learned District Judge. Indeed it is appreciable that the learned trial Court felt bound to decide the case within the time limit fixed by his superior Court, because to do so was a part of his duty. It should, however, be noted that special directions for expeditious disposal of cases are issued by the superior Courts for the purpose of expeditious decisions of cases in accordance with law. Hearing/trial of cases should be so managed that the parties may not be deprived of their right of reasonable opportunity of hearing. Care should be taken that justice is not sacrificed at the altar of expeditious disposal of cases. It must be clarified that direction by a superior Court for disposal of a case within a particular period of time is always directory in nature and such a direction should be followed as far as possible, keeping in view the interests of justice. Where the Court finds that consistent with the demands of law and justice it is not possible to decide the case within the directed time limit, a request can be made for extension of time. It has to be clearly understood that reasonable opportunity of hearing is the pivotal point of our judicial system. Every other consideration, however pious it may be, has to yield to the fundamental principle of law that fair opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the affected parties by every Court/tribunal. In the circumstances of the present case the learned trial Court should have adjourned the case for a few days to afford opportunity to the plaintiff to requisition the required material which was in possession of the police. We are sure if that had been done the plaintiff would have produced the witnesses as had been done on two earlier dates of hearing. We are further constrained to observe that the case was not adjourned on 26-6-1993 on the application of the plaintiff, therefore, penal provisions of Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C. Could not have been invoked to his detriment.
9. For what has been discussed above, this appeal is accepted and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court to decide the suit on merits after giving reasonable opportunity to the parties to adduce their evidence. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.