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1977 P LC 587

AFZAL STORES vs SIND LABOUR COURT No. 5, KARACHI And 4 Others

Citation1977 P LC 587
CourtSindh High Court
Date-
Judge(s)S. A. Nusrat
ResultPetition dismissed

1. The relevant facts stated in this petition are that the respondent No. 3 was an empolyee of the petitioner while respondent No. 4 is alleged to be in the employment of the managing partner of the petitioner-firm. The respondents Nos, 3 and 4 (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) moved applications on 3-9-1974, under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before the Junior Labour Court No. 4 for their re- instatement in the service of the petitioner. They authorised respondent No. 5 to represent them in the proceedings before the said Labour Court. It is alleged that respondent No. 5 is neither a legal practitioner nor an office-bearer of any Collective Bargaining Agent and, therefore, had no legal authority to represent the respondents in the proceedings before the Labour Court. The petitioner objected to the authority of the respondent No. 5 to represent the respondents relying upon section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. However the Junior Labour Court overruled the objection by an order which is not dated. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi, by an order dated 4-11-1974. The petitioner through this petition has challenged the order of the Junior Labour Court and as well as the order passed try the Presiding Officer. Sinn Labour Court No. V, dated 14-11-1974 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.

2. The ground on which the two impugned orders have been challenged, as shortly stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that under section 49 of the Ordinance a workman, who is a party to an industrial dispute, can be represented only by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent, which Collective Bargaining Agent should also be the one belonging to the establishment to which the workman belongs. Mr. Suleman Memon, learned Assistant Advocate-General in reply to the above contention stated that the words used in the section should be interpreted according to their plain meaning while in order to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner something which does not exist will have to be read into the section. It is an admitted position that respondent No. 5 is not an officer of any Collective Bargaining Agent and, therefore, the only question which falls for consideration is whether not a Workman is entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Ordinance by a person other than an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The issue simply depends upon the interpretation of section 49 of the Ordinance which is reproduced below : - "Representation of parties.--(1) A workman whir is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent and subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and subsection (3) anyemployer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceeding by a person duly authorised by him.

(2) No party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Ordinance.

(3) A party to an industrial dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceedings before the Labour Court, or before an Arbitrator with the permission of the Court Dr the Arbitrator as the case may be."

3. It is therefore necessary to examine as to what is meant by the words "shall he entitled to be represented" occurring in the above-quoted section. The interpretation which is sought to be placed on tire above section would requite the reading of the section by omitting the words "entitled to be" occurring in subsection (1) which would after omission of the said words, read as under :-- "A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent."

4. It is a settled rule of interpretation that effect should be given to every part and every word of the statute and not to render the use of any word idle or nugatory. It is also an accepted principle that words in common use are to be given their natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning unless the same gave come to acquire any special or technical meaning. I simple dictionary meaning the word "entitled" as defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1952 Edition, means "as having a title to something". The word "title itself has been defined in the same Dictionary as "that which justifies or substantiates a claim a ground of right; hence, an alleged or recognised right". Accordingly, it is apparent that what the section confers upon a workman in regard to representation in any proceedings under the Ordinance is a right to be represented through as officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent but does not exclude representation through any other person duly authorised by him. There is thus a statutory sanction in favour of any officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent to represent a workman: in any proceedings under the Ordinance and the words shall be entitled" cannot be read to mean that a workman is not entitled to be represented otherwise than by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent. The right to be represented solely and exclusively by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent only, if it was so desired, should have been provided specifically as it is provided in sub--clause (2) of section 49 barring representation through a legal practi--tioner in any conciliation proceedings. This interpretation further finds support from the consideration that there may be cases where an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent may not at all be available, the absence of the existence of a Collective Bargaining Agent in an establishment, who is to be appointed on compliance and fulfilment of the conditions prescribed under section 22 of the Ordinance. Such a workman, thus, having howsoever a pressing grievance, would be left without a remedy even though it may be far a short-while. Such absurdity and hardship is to be avoided in interpreting a statute. Further on. a still narrower interpretation of section 49 it may also be possible to contend that a worker is not even entitled to represent his case personally because he "shall be entitled to be represented" only by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent. A clue to the interpretation of the words "'entitled to" is also found in subsection (12) of section 22 of the Ordinance. The said subsection with relevant sub-clause (b) reads as under :--- "(12) The Collective Bargaining Agent in relation to an establishment or group of establishments shall be entitled to- (a)

(b) represent all or any of the workmen in any proceedings; "

5. It will be noticed that according to above-mentioned clause (b) of subsection (12), section 22 a Collective Bargaining Agent may represent "all or any of the workmen in any proceedings". Since there existed no authority empowering officers of a Collective Bargaining Agent to represent an individual workman provision had to be made in section 49 conferring such a right on officers of Collective Bargaining Agent authorising them to assist an individual workman in seeking redress of his grievance in any proceedings under the Ordinance. The words "entitled to" used in sub-clause

(12) of section 22 of the Ordinance too cannot be taken to mean that it is only a Collective Bargaining Agent who has exclusive authority to represent all or any of the workmen.

6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, does not stand the test of legal scrutiny and is rebelled accordingly.

7. In the result the petition fails ant is dismissed. However since the issue involved in the; petition was one of law and also of general interest there shall be no order as to costs.

8. S.Q.

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