' The revision petition is directed against an order dated 20-1-1993, passed by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Goraya, Civil Judge, Sialkot, closing remaining evidence of Saif Ullah and Faiz Ullah sons of Muhammad Amin, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (amongst as many as 11 of them), civil suit for a declaration and. Permanent injunction having been brought against them by Muhammad Riaz and 7 others. Learned counsel for the petitioners has addressed preliminary arguments.
2. The suit was filed in October, 1988. Issues in the light of the pleadings of the parties were recorded on 6-3-1990. The plaintiffs concluded their evidence on 14-3-1991 and defendants Nos.1 and 2 were called upon to lead their evidence. They could not do so, over large many dates, and were burdened with costs, many a time. They were told more than once that the next one would be the last chance. The obstinate default, however, remained alarmingly unabated. On 12-5-1992, defendants Nos.3 to 19 were proceeded against ex parte. On 9-6-1992, on Muhammad Akram made an application, under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. For becoming a party to the suit. This was opposed by the plaintiffs, but not by defendants Nos.1 and 2. The application was, however, dismissed in default on 26-7-1992. Subsequently on 4-10-1992 an application for restoration of the aforesaid petition under Order I, rule 10 and C.P.C. Was submitted. This too was not opposed by defendants Nos.1 and 2, and was allowed on 25-10-1992. Once again, Muhammad Akram absented himself from the proceedings, and his application was dismissed in default on 7-11-1992. He again applied for restoration of his application on 1-12-1992. Defendants aforesaid did not put in contest, although the plaintiffs resisted. Since Muhammad Akram again was not in attendance to pursue his petition, the same was dismissed on 23-12-1992, when the defendants were afforded final opportunity for making their statements, as they had already on 12-5-1992 closed rest of their evidence. On the date fixed, i,e, on 13-1-1993, no one appeared in the Court on behalf of the defendants, and the Court kept on waiting for the arrival of the defendants and their counsel, throughout the working hours. Ultimately, penal provisions of Order 17, rule 3, C.P.C. Were applied, and the defendants were debarred from making their own statements as witnesses. It was however clarified on the subsequent date (20-1-1993) that the contesting defendants Nos.1 and 2's counsel having appeared, he would be entitled to take part in the remaining proceedings, although the defendants would be precluded from making their statements. He asked for another chance, so that he could prepare himself for addressing arguments. The case was adjourned for arguments to 30-1-1993, when final arguments in the case were addressed, and the case was adjourned to 8-2-1993 for decision.
3. Meanwhile, on 2-2-1993, the defendants preferred a revision petition before the learned District Judge, Sialkot, which remained pending before him, until there was a change in law and he returned the civil revision to the petitioners on 8-2-1994 for presentation in the High Court. It has been filed here on 14-2-1994.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that the civil revision had been admitted to regular hearing by the learned District Judge. That order, however, it will not be denied, is not binding on this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the impugned order is not sustainable in law, as the final date that was 13-1-1993 had been given by the learned Judge suo motu and in routine, and not on his request, and the default on the part of the defendants did not attract the provisions of Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C. He has placed reliance on PLD 1990 Lah. 180, Province of Punjab v. Zeenat Shaheen etc. PLD 1990 SC 1192 Jindwada etc. v. Abdul Hameed etc. And PLD 1991 SC 1109, Qutab-ud-Din v. Gulzar etc. I have gone through the reported cases. In the first case (Province of Punjab v. Zeenat Shaheen etc.) the Civil Judge had on no occasion imposed any costs or indicated to the party that the next one would be the final opportunity being given for his evidence. In the next case (Jindwala etc. v. Abdul Hameed etc.) the case had been received in the Court on transfer from another Court, on the previous date, and it had been adjourned for the evidence of the plaintiffs to a future date, without making them realize that they would be extended no further indulgence, and on the next date, when the plaintiffs failed to bring their witnesses, their evidence was closed. In the third case (Qutab-ud-Din v. Gulzar etc.) the plaintiff's witnesses were in attendance on a certain date, but the record, with reference to which they had to be examined, was not available, and the plaintiff's counsel had sought an adjournment. The learned Civil Judge closed the evidence by observing that as many as 6 opportunities had already been availed of, for the object, and there was no justification for yet another adjournment. The Supreme Court held that in such a situation provisions of Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C. Could not be pressed into service.
5. In the instant case I find that countless dates for the evidence of the contesting defendants were given, right from 9-4-1991 onwards, and at least on 6 occasions they were burdened with costs (on 21-4-1991, 7-7-1991, 8-3-1992, 11-4-1992, 24-5-1992 and 3-6-1992). Every time it was made clear to the learned counsel for the defendants, in the strongest possible terms, that they would be entitled to no further indulgence, as they had already availed of several chances. Actually, it appears, one Muhammad Akram had been put up by the defendants to ask for his impleadment. His application under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. Was twice dismissed in default and he applied for its revival. Neither the original petition, nor the subsequent two applications, were resisted by the defendants, with the result that Muhammad Akram continued to play hide-andsee with the Court. The application on first occasion, on 25-10-1992, was restored on payment of costs of Rs,150, and it was ordered to be argued on 2-11-1992, when an adjournment was sought by Muhammad Akram's counsel. However on the next date, i,e, on7-11-1992, Muhammad Akram again opted to disappear. His counsel also did not make appearance; and the application was dismissed in default, for the second time. It was again sought to be restored. Its revival was not opposed by the defendants, but because of absence of Muhammad Akram, on 23-12-1992, it was again dismissed for non-prosecution. At least 6 months thus were consumed, in disposal of this miscellaneous application, and owing to the unreasonable attitude of Muhammad Akram, with whom the defendants had apparently colluded.
It was made absolutely clear to the defendants, on 23-12-1992, when Muhammad Akram's application was finally dismissed in default, that they must make statements as their own witnesses on 13-1-1993, and this was the last chance being given to them for the purpose. When still they failed to appear, and their counsel also preferred to stay away, their evidence that remained to be recorded was closed under Order 17, rule 3 by the trial Judge.
6. It cannot be urged, in the circumstances, that there was no legal warrant or otherwise no justification for the action taken. Throughout the proceedings, ever since 14-3-1991, over a period of about 2 years, except on one date i,e, 12-5-1992, the defendants had failed to examine any more witness, stating always that they would confine their remaining evidence to their own statements; and it is indeed intriguing that the defendants did not find themselves inclined to appear in the Court for being examined as their own statements over such a long time. The reticence on their part is beyond anybody's comprehension; and the only understandable reason is that they were probably not sure about success of their cause, and were only interested in prolonging the proceedings, for as long as it was possible for them. The case could not be permitted to linger on over an indefinite period, for that would have been an act of hardship to the other side, the plaintiffs, besides being an incidence of injustice. It would tantamount to trying to be too technical, if it is urged that as in the order dated 23-12-1992 it had not been stated that the defendants were asking for another adjournment for their statements, they could not be penalized even when on the next date they had made it convenient not to appear in the Court. In the order dated 23-12-1992 it had very clearly been said that the next date would be taken to be the last opportunity for the statements of the defendants, who must finish their evidence, on the adjourned date, i,e, on 13-1- 1993. Even on the date next following, i,e, 20-1-1993, the learned counsel for the defendants was still in no mood to argue the case, stating that he had not been able to inspect the file.
7. The impugned order dated 13-1-1993 is unexceptionable and cannot be interfered with by this Court, in exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction. No material irregularity has been committed by the Court below in passing the order in question and no miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Indeed, ends of justice would have been frustrated, if yet another opportunity had been allowed to the defendants for their statements, and the Court had failed to take notice of the unending intransigence on their part. It is indeed a woeful story of dillying-dallying on the part of the defendants, who were out to abuse the process of law, and their delaying designs knew no end.
Viewed from any angle, the action taken by the trial Court cannot be taken exception to, and I would endorse it.
8. There is no force in the revision petition, which is hereby dismissed in limine.