' This is an application for cancellation of bail granted to respondent No,2 by this Court vide order, dated 13-11-1995 in Criminal Miscellaneous No,1674/B of 1995.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after the release of bail, respondent No,2 is issuing threats to the petitioner/complainant in the case and in tampering with the prosecution evidence. He further submits that he made efforts to report the matter to the police in this respect, but failed. It is argued that the respondent No,2 is a desperate and dangerous person. It was lastly submitted that in view of above the bail already granted to the respondent No,2 namely Sikandar may be cancelled.
3. The concession of bail was granted to the respondent No,2 on the ground of consistency. The complainant too had not opposed the bail _application.
4. It is settled that once bail is granted then exceptional grounds were required for its cancellation.
No evidence has been brought on the record to presume that respondent No,2 in fact issued the threats to the petitioner/complainant. Mere entries in the Roznamcha would not serve the purpose of supplying reasonable ground for the cancellation of bail. Reliance can be placed upon Abdul Rahim v. The State 1987 PCr.LJ 588. The bald assertion of the petitioner that he made the efforts to report the matter to the police regarding the C 4 threats issued by the respondent No,2 but he did not succeed was liable to be dismissed at once. The provision regarding the cancellation of bail is not available to the private party to wreak their vengeance. Reference can be made to Nazar Muhammad v, The State and others 1979 PCr.LJ 277 wherein it was observed:-- "The provisions regarding cancellation of bail cannot be made available to private parties to satisfy their grudges against each other or to use as a means of wreaking their vengeance. Of course in case where there is a , reliable evidence that the accused were misusing the liberty to divert the course of justice, the Court would be competent to deprive him of that privilege."
5. The bail order, dated 13-11-1995 whereby the petitioner was granted I E bail is neither capricious nor arbitrary.
6. Under these circumstances we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned order. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.