ABDUL MAJID KHANZADA, J,- This Civil Revision Application is directed against the order dated 19.3.1996 passed In learned District Judge, Karachi (South) in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1996 dismissing the uppcuLfilcd against the order dated 10.1 ,()% passed by Ilnd Senior Civil Judge.
Karachi (South) directing the defendants/petitioners to maintain status-quo on application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC Tiled in Suit No. 1364 of 1995.
2. Briefly staled the facts which lead to this Revision arc that the respondent/plaintiff Tiled a suit against the petitioners/defendants named above for declaration and permanent injunction, stating therein that the plaintiff who is an employee of the defendant No. 2 was appointed as Inspector of Income Tax on 30.9.1%? And through promotions he reached to his present designation as Deputy Commissioner of income Tax. He stated that his correct date of birth according to his .Service Book maintained by the defendants is 9.1.1938, but through gradation list published by the defendant No. 2 for the first lime in the year 1991, he came to know that his date of birth was mentioned in the same as 9.1.1936. He entered into correspondence with the defendants through the defendant No. 1 and by producing his School Leaving Certificate. Birth Certificate, issued by Municipal Committee. Resident Certificate issued by the Chairman, Union Council and other documents made representations that his correct dale of birth is 9.1.1938 and not 9.1.1936. Since he apprehended that on the basis of his incorrect date of birth i.e. 9.1.1936 he may be retired from service- at the age of 60 years w.e.f. 9.1.19% hence he filed the above suit and also made an application under Order 39. Rules I and 2 CPC', to which the defendant No. 1 filed his counter affidavit in denial of the claim of the plaintiff. He also slated that the Controller of Examination.
University of Sindh has confirmed that the actual date of birth of the plaintiff is 9.1.1936. The learned Ilnd Senior Civil Judge, Karachi (South) after hearing both the parlies advocates passed the order dated 1U.!.|'J% directing the dcfendanls/pclilioncrs *o maintain the status-quo which was existing oa the day when the present suit Was instituted, till .The final disposal id' 1he suit. Being aggfie^by the said order, Ike defendants/pe^itioners preferred appeal bearing M.C.A. No. 2 of 19% before the Dis(ri^ Judtfc?IUrach1 (Sowhl which also resulted in dismissal on 19.3.19%, against which the present Revision Application is filed in this Court, with a prayer that the Orders passed ty both the Courts below be set aside.
3. It shall not be out of way to mention here that before the matter was fixed for Katchs Peshi, on 26.5.19% the respondent with his statement dated 21.5,19% alongwilh copy of Office Memorandum dated 22.4.19 % from Finance Division, (iovcrmncnl .Of Pakistan addressed to Central Board of Revenue, in which the C.B.R, was directed to accept the plea of respondent regarding date of his birth without further litigation, in reply to C.B.R.'s letter dated 18.3.19%. For the first lime the above matter was fixed for Kutcha Peshi on 26.5.19%. When the learned advocate of the applicant Mr. Nasrullah Awan requested for time to verify the contents of the said Office Memorandum and with consent of Mr. Muhammad Naseem, Advocate for respondent, the matter was adjourned to does not automatically follow that she was compelled by any such reasons not to appear in public. No doubt, in the cases relied upon by Mr. Gilani, it has been held that the provisions of Section 132 CPC are mandatory in nature. However, it must first be established that the case of the applicant really falls within the purview of Section 132 CPC. Since, as just pointed out, the appellant has failed even to assert in her affidavit that either it was on account of any custom being followed by her family or for any other reason that the applicant was entitled to invoke Section 132 CPC, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, has rightly dismissed her prayer. We consequently find no force in this appeal.
4. In the result, this appeal is dismissed as no other ground has been urged by the learned counsel.
The parties are left to bear their own costs.