' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan proceeds on the ground that the petitioner joined the respondent-Authority on 7-10-1953 as Patwari and was promoted as Qanungo on 1-3-1971. It is submitted that the petitioner was fully eligible for the post of Naib-Tehsildar in the year 1981 when the petitioner was given acting charge of the Naib-Tehsildar on 2-6-1981 instead of promoting him to the said post. The petitioner continued to work against the post of Naib Tehsildar from 2-6-1981 till the date of his superannuation/retirement i,e, 8-11-1994. The main grouse of the petitioner, as disclosed in the petition, is to the effect that although he continued to work as Naib-Tehsildar, yet he was not given the pay of the higher post. According to the petitioner, he has been representing, against the above-said treatment but in vain. It is added that after the superannuation of the petitioner, a letter was circulated by the respondent authority that the case of the petitioner was placed before the D.P.C. But the same was deferred on the ground that there was some inquiry pending against him. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the following relief:--
(i) The respondent Authority (L.D.A.) may be directed to pay the petitioner the pay of the post of Naib-Tehsildar from 2-6-1981 to the date of his superannuation i,e, 8-11-1994 inclusive of increments to which the petitioner is entitled.
(ii) The petitioner's pension papers may be prepared/calculated at the new rates of pay after inclusion of pay of the post of Naib Tehsildar against which the petitioner has been working since 1981.
(iii) The respondent may be directed to place the case of the petitioner for promotion as Naib- Tehsildar before the D.P.C. With a direction to consider the same keeping aside the extraneous matter i,e, the pendency of any inquiry/case etc. Which is beyond the control of the petitioner and that the petitioner be ordered to be promoted with effect from 2-6-1981 when the petitioner was assigned the acting charge of the post of Naib-Tehsildar instead of regular promotion.
2. Report and parawise comments were called for and the same were submitted on 12-12-1994 when the case was adjourned to 14-12-1994. Today, the case was argued at some length whereafter the learned counsel for the parties submitted that as they have already addressed the total arguments in the case, therefore, it may be treated as an admitted case and disposed of as such. Order accordingly.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the order dated 2-6-1981 wherein the petitioner was given the acting charge of Naib-Tehsildar. The said letter finds further support from another office order dated 1-3-1986 whereby the petitioner along with three other Kanungos were granted acting charge of the posts of the Naib-Tehsildars in BPS 14 with immediate effect and were further directed to continue to work as such till the posting orders are issued by the respondent authority.
By another office order dated 9-4-1990, the petitioner was intimated about the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee whereby his case was deferred on account . Of an inquiry/investigation pending against him. The petitioner has also placed on record the result sheet wherein he has been shown to have qualified the examination of Naib-Tehsildar as his name appears at Serial No, 51 of the said result sheet. The representation of the petitioner is available on the record which has been duly received in the office of the respondent-Authority on 12-2-1994.
Lastly, the petitioner has placed on record the opinion of the Legal Adviser of the respondent- Authority whereby he has opined/recommended that there is no legal impediment in granting pro forma promotion to an employee against whom a case has been registered by the police or by the Anti-Corruption Establishment subject of course to his suitability on other counts.
4. Relying on Federation of Pakistan v. Shahzada Shahput Jan and 2 others 1986 SCMR 1991 and Sarwar Ali Khan v. Chief Secretary to Government of Sindh and another PLD 1994 SC 233, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the person holding charge of the higher post is definitely entitled to the pay of the said post inclusive of increments. It is maintained that the petitioner has been working as Naib-Tehsildar since 2-6-1981 and this fact is not denied by the respondent- Authority. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the contents of the report and parawise comments filed by the respondent-Authority wherein it has been admitted, though indirectly, that the petitioner has been working as Naib-Tehsildar on or from 2-6- 1981 till the date of his superannuation. It was urged that since the petitioner continued to work on a higher post, therefore, he is entitled to the pay thereof irrespective of the nature of the charge i,e, whether it be acting or current.
5. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respondent-Authority had little or nothing to say. It was submitted that no doubt, the petitioner has been working as Naib-Tehsildar on or from 2-6-1981 till the date of his superannuation but on current charge, therefore, he is not entitled to the pay of higher post or the other benefits as admissible under the rules.. I am afraid, the argument is devoid of any force as the same is against the rule' laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above. The position of fact having admitted that the petitioner has been working as a Naib-Tehsild3r i,e, the higher post, or from 2-6-1981 till the date of his superannuation is definitely entitled to the pay of the said post inclusive of increments and also to the further relief that his pension papers be prepared at the rate of pay which was admissible to him as Naib- Tehsildar inclusive of increments. I am however, not inclined to grant the third part of the prayer that the petitioner's case may be ordered to be placed before the D.P.C. To consider the same for promotion to the said post for the simple reason that the petitioner has already superannuated and it would not serve any useful purpose to send his case to the D.P.C.
6. Since the main relief as prayed for in the petition has been g anted, the third relief is almost superfluous. In these circumstances, the petition is partly allowed in the terms noted above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.