' Through this Constitutional petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and decree dated 16-1-1996 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Khanewal whereby he decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiff for jactitation of marriage.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the above-noted petition are that respondent No,2/plaintiff filed a suit for jactitation/dissolution of marriage alleging therein that Nikah between the parties was performed on 30-8-1995 without the consent of the plaintiff when she was about 12 years of age; that on attaining the age of majority she had dissolved the Nikah by way of exercising her right of option of puberty and that despite the afore-referred repudiation petitioner-defendant was claiming himself to be the husband of the respondent-plaintiff which is not warranted in law and, therefore, a prayer was made that a decree for jactitation/dissolution of marriage be passed.
3. In terms of the respective pleadings of the parties the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:--
(i) Whether relationship of husband and wife is not existing between the parties? OPP.
(ii) Whether this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to try this suit? OPP.
(iii) Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to institute this suit in view of preliminary objection No,2 of the written statement? OPD:
(iv) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD.
(v) Relief.
' The learned Trial Court vide the impugned judgment decreed the suit on the following grounds:--
(i) That in the light of the evidence on record no Nikah is existed between the parties;
(ii) that the statement of respondent-plaintiff as also her father Saeed Ahmad who appeared as P.W.2 shows that the relations had turned sour to an extent that it was no longer possible for them to live as husband and wife;
(iii) that the statement of respondent-plaintiff (P.W.1) and her father (P.W.2) would clearly indicate that the respondent-plaintiff is living at Khanewal as she apprehended that she might be kidnapped.
5. In support of his petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the learned Trial Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case as respondent-plaintiff did not "ordinarily resides" at Khanewal; that she was 21 years of age at the time she made statement in Court and that there is nothing in evidence to show that she repudiated the Nikah during 16 to 18 years of age and that the learned Trial Court has not correctly decided the question of jurisdiction.
6. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments addressed by learned counsel for the petitioner and have also perused the evidence, certified copies of which have been appended with this petition.
7. Much stress has been laid by learned counsel on the point that the petitioner did not "ordinarily resides" at Khanewal and, therefore, in terms of Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, the Family Court at Khanewal had no jurisdiction. I am afraid, the argument of the learned counsel is not tenable for two reasons; firstly, the respondent-plaintiff in her plaint as also in her statement in Court had stated that she resides at a place in Tehsil and District Khanewal. In her statement in Court she explained that previously she lived at Channi Goth in Bahawalpur and as petitioner-defendant wanted to abduct her, her parents decided to shift to Khanewal. This is corroborated by her father who appeared as P.W.2. The petitioner-defendant did not produce any evidence in rebuttal so as to show that she resided at Bahawalpur. Even in his own statement, he did not say that respondent-plaintiff was not living at Khanewal. The arguments of the learned counsel that since she had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage earlier on at Bhawalpur and, therefore, it should be presumed that she was living at Bahawalpur is not tenable as she has herself explained the reason of shifting to Khanewal alongwith her father P.W.2.
8. Secondly, the expression "ordinarily resides" appearing in Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 means a place where the wife comes to stay at any place of her own choice and this has been enacted for the convenience of the female. The import of this rule came up for consideration before this Court in Mst. Shahnaz Kausar v. Muhammad Boota (PLD 1982 Lahore 350) wherein at page 352 it was observed as follows:-- "By this proviso the rigour of normal rule providing for territorial jurisdiction for trial of cases in Family Courts have been relaxed in favour of female filing a suit for dissolution of marriage or recovery of dower. It is clear that this has been done for the convenience of female upon whom the law has bestowed greater care. It would not, therefore, be wrong to attach more weight to the convenience of the female than to the convenience of the male while making order for transfer of cases as well."
The expression "ordinarily resides" does not necessarily mean that the residence should be long in point of time, residence for a few days is enough. The Court has to see the place where the female has chosen to stay regardless of whether she is a permanent resident of the place, whether she has property over there or the length of time she has resided there.
9. Neither in the written statement nor in his statement before the Trial Court, the petitioner disputed the fact that the marriage had not been consummated. The respondent-plaintiff had categorically stated that on attaining puberty, she had repudiated the marriage. This is corroborated by her father who appeared as P.W.2. That being so, the finding of the learned Trial Court qua. Issue No,1 is not open to any exception. It is conceded by petitioner-defendant that she was 14 years of age when the marriage took place. The factum of repudiation on attaining puberty has not been rebutted by the petitioner-defendant by leading any evidence tenable in law.
' For what has been discussed above, no misreading or non-reading of evidence is manifest on record. The judgment of the learned Trial Court does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect. This Constitutional petition, therefore, has no merit which is dismissed in limine.