' KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-Abdul Samad (hereinafter called the plaintiff) filed a civil suit for a perpetual injunction against (1) Mohammed All ; (2) Mohammed Amin; and (3) Saghir Ahmed (hereinafter called the defendants) so as to restrain them from changing possession of property/ building No, S-38-R-207 situated outside Mori Gate, Lahore, which was the subject-matter of the suit. Defendant No, 3 Saghir Ahmed, it may be mentioned, was added as a party later on. In that suit the plaintiff filed an application under Order XXX1X, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) praying for a temporary injunction on the same lines meanwhile. A temporary injunction in the form of a status quo was issued by the learned Civil Judge on 10-9-1973. Later on due to certain complications, the details whereof are not necessary to be mentioned here, the learned Civil Judge on 11-10-1973 passed an order sealing the property in dispute under section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Against that order two appeals were filed; one by defendants 1 and 2 and the other by defendant No, 3 in the Court of the learned District Judge, Lahore, who assigned the same to the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore. The learned Additional District Judge on prayer of the appellants concerned treated and dealt with those appeals as revisions and for the reasons contained in his order dated 16-2-1974 set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge impugned before him. The plaintiff has come up in writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution against the last mentioned order of the learned Additional District Judge and his learned counsel has raised a number of points to which we will presently advert.
2. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner referred us to section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) where it is written that "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, "district" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil. Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court". And includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court". In section 2(8) it is similarly written that "Judge' means the Presiding Officer of a civil Court". He then referred to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is headed as "Revision". Subsection (1) of that section deals with revisional powers of the High Court whereas subsection (2) with those of the District Court and lays down that "the District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court". Reference was also made by the learned counsel to section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act X of 1897 which states that "in this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, "District Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". To the same strain is the definition of this word as contained in section 2(20) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act VI of 1956. However, in that Act section 2(21) defines District Court to mean "the principal civil Court of original civil jurisdiction of a district; but shall not include the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". After referring to these provisions of law, learned counsel argued that the Court of the District Judge was the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction and the power of revision under section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was conferred on that Court and that Court alone, and as such, the Court of an Additional District Judge which, according to him, was not a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction could not have exercised that jurisdiction.
3. At this stage learned counsel took us elaborately through the provisions of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), which was enacted on 8-1-1962 "to amend and consolidate the law relating to civil Courts in the Province of West Pakistan". Chapter II of this Ordinance (which comprises of sections 3 to 16) deals with "civil Courts". Section 3 which is headed as "Classes of Courts" states that "besides the Courts of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 1887, and the Courts established under any ether enactment for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of civil Courts, namely, (a) the Court of the District Judge; (b) the Court of the Additional District Judge; and (c) the Court of the civil Judge". Section 4 is headed as "Civil Districts" and states that "for the purposes of this Ordinance, Government may. By notification, divide the Province into civil districts, fix the limits of such districts and determine the headquarters of each such district". Section 5 deals with "District Judges" and lays down that "Government shall, in consultation with the High Court, appoint as many persons as it thinks necessary to be District Judges and post a District Judge to each district: Provided that the same person may be appointed to be District Judge of two or more districts". Section 6 deals with "Additional District Judges" and states that (1) Government may, in consultation with the High Court, appoint as many Additional District Judges as may be necessary. (2) An Additional District Judge shall discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge".
Section 7 deals with "Original jurisdiction of District Judges in suits" and states that "except as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, the Court of the District Judge shall have jurisdiction in original civil suits without limit as regards the value". Sections 8 to 13 deal with Civil Judges. Section 14 is headed as "Control of Courts and Presiding Officers" and lays down that "(I) all civil Courts in the areas to which this Ordinance extends shall be subordinate to the High Court, and subject to the general superintendence and control of the High Court, the District Judge shall have control over all civil Courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction. (2) The posting of Civil Judges shall be made by the High Court". Section 15 is headed as "Power to distribute business" and states that "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, every District Judge may by written order direct that any civil business cognizable by his Court and the Courts under his control shall be distributed among such Courts in such manner as he thinks fit: Provided that no direction issued under this section shall empower any Court to exercise any powers or deal with any business beyond the limits of its jurisdiction". Section 16 deals with "Delegation of powers by District Judges" and lays down that "a District Judge may, with the previous sanction of the High Court, delegate, in respect of any specified portion of the district, to any Civil Judge in the district, his powers under sections 14 and 15 of this Ordinance and the powers of the District Court under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and such powers may be exercised by such Civil Judge subject to the general control of the District Judge". Chapter III, which comprises of sections 17 and 18 deals with "Jurisdiction in Civil Appeals". Section 17 pertains to "Appeals from District Judges or Additional District Judges" and lays down that "(1) Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction shall lie to the High Court. (2) An appeal shall not lie to the High Court from a decree or order of an Additional District Judge in any case in which, if the decree or order had been made by the District Judge, an appeal would not lie to that Court". Section 18 deals with "Appeals from Civil Judges" and lays down that "(1) save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge, shall lie-(a) to the High Court if the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made exceeds twenty-five thousand rupees: and (b) to the District Judge in any other case. (2) Where the function of receiving any appeals which lie to the District Judge under the last preceding subsection has been assigned to an Additional District Judge, the appeals may be preferred to the Additional District Judge. (3) The High Court may, by notification, direct that appeals lying to the District Judge from all or any of the decrees or orders passed in any original suit by any Civil Judge shall be referred to such other Civil Judge as may be mentioned in the notification, and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly, and the Court of such Civil Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purposes of all appeals so preferred. Chapter IV is headed as "Supplemental provisions" and comprises of sections 19 to 28.
Section 21 deals with the "temporary vacancy of office of District Judge" and lays down that "in the event of the death of a District Judge or of his being prevented from performing his duties by iillvess or other cause, the Additional District Judge, if any, or in the absence of the Additional District Judge from the district, the seniormost of the Civil Judges at the headquarters, shall assume charge of the district without interruption of his ordinary jurisdiction, and while so in charge shall perform the duties of the District Judge with respect to the filing of suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes and the like and shall be designated Additional District Judge or Civil Judge, as the case may be, in charge of the district and shall continue in such charge until the office of the District Judge has been resumed or assumed by an officer duly appointed thereto". Section 22 is headed as "Delegation of powers of the District Judge" and states that "any District Judge leaving the headquarters and proceeding on duty to any place within his jurisdiction or in the event of his absence from the district on leave, may delegate to the Additional District Judge or in the absence of an Additional District Judge to the seniormost of the Civil Judges at the headquarters, the power of performing any of the duties enumerated in section 21 that may be emergent; and such officer shall be designated Additional District Judge or Civil Judge, as the case may be, in charge of the district".
4. After referring in detail to the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance learned counsel made out the following points..
(a) that section 3 of the Ordinance itself contemplates that the Court of the District Judge is different from the Court of the Additional District Judge, inasmuch as, both these Courts are separately mentioned in the aforesaid enactment ;
(b) that sections 3, 4 and 7 suggest that in a civil district it is the Court of the District Judge alone which shall have jurisdiction in original suits without limit as regards the value. From that point of view, it was argued, that the Court of the District Judge alone shall be the civil Court of original jurisdiction;
(c) that section 14 indicates that all civil Courts (i,e, Court of the District Judge, Court of the Additional District Judge and the Court of a Civil Judge) shall be subordinate to the High Court, and subject to the general superintendence and control of the High Court, the District Judge shall have control over the civil Courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction. Learned counsel argued that this shows that the Court of the Additional District Judge is rather under the control of the District Judge and not in its own nature Court of the District Judge itself, and from that point of view, also is not a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction ;
(d) that similarly section 15 authorises that every District Judge may by written order direct that any civil business cognizable by his Court and the Courts under his control shall be distributed among such Courts in such manner as he thinks fit. According to the learned counsel this also shows that the principal civil Court of origin jurisdiction remains the Court of the District Judge and that the Court of the Additional District Judge is simply a recipient of such business of the Court of the District Judge which may be distributed to him ;
(e) that whereas section 16 authorises a District Judge to delegate his powers under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to, any Civil Judge, there is no such authority for delegating powers, of section 115(2), Code of Civil Procedure to any Additionali District Judge;
(f) that similarly section 17(1) and section 18(2) suggest that the Additional District Judge might exercise original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction, but there is no indication that he can exercise revisional jurisdiction also under section 115(2), Code of Civil Procedure. Again whereas under section 18(3) in certain cases Court of a nominee Civil Judge may be deemed to be a District Court, there is no such deeming fiction to treat the Court of the Additional District Judge as a District Court. The same, it was submitted, was the corollary of section 21 and section 22 where in case of a temporary vacancy of the office of a District Judge, or when he is absent, an Additional District Judge may assume charge of the district and perform duties of the District Judge with respect to the filing of suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes and the like. Learned counsel submitted that there is no mention in this section of the revisional functions under section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the result that those functions in no case can be exercised by an Additional District Judge.
5. We have given due consideration to the above submissions and are prepared to agree that "the Court of the District Judge" as it is so described in section 3 of the Ordinance read with section 7 is the principal civil, Court of original jurisdiction, and as such, is the "District Court", but we do not endorse the plea that the Additional District Judge (or to be more precise the Court of the Additional District Judge) was not authorised or competent to hear or dispose of a revision under section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure when the same was assigned to him by the District Judge. Before proceeding further, we may refer to a case reported in Behar' Lai Bulaki Ram v.
Kundan Lal and another (1) (this, case is also reported in AIR 1922 P C 361 but the facts in that report are scanty which quotes a wrong section of the Companies Act and is misleading therefore, we have made reference to 27 C W N). The said case pertains to the Indian Companies Act VI of 1882 and the Indian Companies Act VII of 1913. The provisions of both these Acts, as pointed out by the Privy Council, were quite similar on the subject. We have noticed that in section 3 of Act VI of 1882 it was written that "Court" means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction". It was further written that "District Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, but does not include the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction". Part IV of that Act which comprised of sections 124 to 219 dealt with winding up of companies and sections 128 to 140 dealt particularly with winding up by Court. In section 130 it was written that "the expression "the Court" as used in this Part of this Act shall mean the principal Court having original civil jurisdiction in the place in which the registered office of the Company is situate, unless in the regulations for the management of the Company it shall be stipulated that the Company, if wound up, shall be wound up by the High Court of judicature at Fort William, Madras or Bombay (as the case may be), or by the Chief Court of the Punjab, in which case the word "Court" shall mean the said High Court or Chief Court (as the case may be) in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction " A company by the: name of Diamond Jubilee Flour Mills Company was wound up by the
(1) 27 C W N 509 ' learned Additional District Judge, Delhi on 31.7-1914. Thereafter some other orders regarding disposal by sale or otherwise of that company were passed by the Additional District Judge on 15- 3-1920. From that decision an appeal was made to the Punjab Chief Court which was heard by Shadi Lal, J., who set aside the relevant sale order. At the conclusion of his judgment, the learned Judge of the Punjab Chief Court observed as follows:- "Some doubt has been thrown upon the competency of an Additional Judge to exercise the special jurisdiction conferred by the Indian Companies Act, the reason of the doubt being that the statute confers the jurisdiction upon the District Court and does not contemplate an assignment of proceedings by the latter to the Court of an Additional Judge. It is unnecessary to make a pronouncement upon the subject, but it is desirable that the validity of the proceedings should no longer be open to doubt. Accordingly, I order that the proceedings in the liquidation of the Diamond Jubilee Flour Mills Company be hereafter conducted by the District Judge, Delhi."
' Against the judgment of the Punjab Chief Court the matter went up in appeal to the Privy Council who dealt with the subject in hand and held as "This is an appeal from an order of the Chief Court of the Punjab made in the matter of the winding up of the Diamond Jubilee Flour Mills Company, and reversing an order of the Additional District Judge at Delhi.
' In the course of the proceedings in the Chief Court a point was raised which the Judge thought it unnecessary to decide, but which in their Lordships' view should be decided. It was contended on behalf of the creditor objecting to the order in question, that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction, and that all orders made in the winding-up of a Company must be made by the District Judge. Their Lordships think that this is not so.
When this matter began, the Indian Companies Act of 1882 was in force, but as it progressed the existing Act, being the Indian Companies Act, 1913, came into operation. For this purpose, however, the two Acts are so similar that no distinction need be made.
' It is not disputed that under the Act the District Court has jurisdiction, the only question is whether that jurisdiction is confined to the District Judge or can be exercised also by an Additional District Judge.
' This matter appears to be settled by the Punjab Courts Act, 1888, which by section 6 provides as follows `The following section shall be added to the Punjab Courts Act, 1884, namely:- 75.-(1) When the business pending before any Divisional Court consisting of one Judge, or before the Court of any District Judge, requires the aid of an Additional Judge for its speedy disposal, the local Government may appoint to the Court an Additional Divisional Judge or an Additional District Judge, as the case may be.
42) An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a Divisional Judge or District Judge, as the case may be, which the Divisional Judge or District Judge may assign to him, and .Shall, as regards the discharge of those functions and subject to the provisions of the next following subsection, be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be a Divisional Judge or District Judge .
' There is no doubt that the District Judge had assigned to the Additional District Judge all the functions of supervising this liquidation. He discharged these functions apparently without any objection for a considerable time and made many orders; and no point was taken till this appeal was made at an advanced stage of the liquidation. He had jurisdiction, and the question which remains to be decided is the propriety of the order which he made."
' Applying the ratio of the above precedent to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not disputed that "the Court of the District Judge" (being the District Court) had the jurisdiction to decide the revision. It is again not disputed that the District Judge was the Judge of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction who obviously was to perform functions of that Court Le. Of the District Court. Section 6(2) of the Ordinance indicates that the District Judge could assign his functions to an Additional District Judge who in the discharge of those functions shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Similarly under section 15 the District judge can by a written order direct that "any civil business cognizable by his Court and the Courts under his control" shall be distributed among such Courts in such manner as he thinks fit. No doubt the distribution is not to authorise a Court to which business is distributed to exercise any power deal with any business beyond the limits of its jurisdiction but while applying this limitation to an Additional District Judge when any business is so delegated to him it will mean that just as his powers will be the same as of the District Judge his limitation will also be the same. We are in no manner of doubt that to hear a revision under section 115(2) of the 4 Code of Civil Procedure is one of the "functions" of the District Judg within the scope of the word "functions" as used in section 6(2) of the Ordinance. Again the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115(2), Code of Civil Procedure by the District Judge i,e, the Court of the District Judge falls within the phrase any civil business cognizable by his Court".
It is not disputed that the Court of the Additional District Judge is under the control of the District Judge. Consequently he can safely assign this "function" and distribute this part of his "civil business" to an Additional District Judge and this distribution of civil business as laid down in section 15 of the Ordinance he can do notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was argued that section 15 deals with purely ministerial business of the District Court or District Judge. This is not correct. The terms "cognizable", "power" and "jurisdiction" rather show that it covers judicial matters and functions as well. This is a complete answer to any objection to the authority and jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge to decide the revision petition assigned, marked, sent or, distributed to him by the District Judge.
6. Section 6(2) of the Ordinance has been reproduced above in extenso. Careful perusal of that subsection shows that it makes two provisions viz -
(a) that an Additional District Judge shall discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him;
(b) that in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge.
The earlier portion contemplates that an Additional District Judge is to discharge so much of the functions of the District Judge as may be ' assigned to him. This is so far as what matters can be assigned to him. The latter portion then indicates as to what will be the powers of an Additional District Judge when he is discharging the so assigned functions of the District Judge. This latter portion, according to the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, could have two meanings. Firstly that he can exercise the same powers as the District Judge can or has in those matters. Secondly that while discharging those functions his 'status' shall be that of the District Judge i,e, he shall exercise the same powers as "the District Judge". This is so, according to the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, because, after the words "the District Judge" there are no such words as "can" or "has". We need not resolve this ambiguity, because, looked at from whatever angle the conclusion is inescapable so far as relevant for our purpose that the assignment of his functions is a matter within the discretion of the District Judge, because, the words "such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him" suggest that in that respect his choice is quite wide, and from that point of view, he would be quite competent to entrust cases of the kind in hand to an Additional District Judge especially when in the disposal of those cases there is to be no difference in the extent of the powers and jurisdiction of an Additional District Judge.
7. Reference at this stage may be made to section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:- "Section 24. General power of transfer and withdrawal.--(1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court. May at any stage-
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and
(1) try or dispose of the same; or
(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate. To it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or ' WO transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn.
(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under subsection (1) the Court which thereafter tries such suit may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn.
(3) For the purposes of this section, Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court.
(4) The Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this section from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes."
If this section is read with sections 6(2), 13 and 15 of the Ordinance, it further shows that a revision petition under section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure instituted in the Court of the District Judge being "other proceeding pending before it for disposal" (within the terms of section 24) may be transferred in the form of an assignment of the function of the District Judge or distribution of the civil business of his Court to the Court of an Additional District Judge, who thereupon under section 6(2) of the Ordinance in the discharge of those functions shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. This is particularly so, because, so far as the Court of the Additional District Judge is concerned, according to the scheme of the Ordinance, as explained by us later in paragraph 10 of this judgment he has no independent jurisdiction of his own and his jurisdiction arises only when any of the functions of the District Judge or any civil business cognizable by the District Judge is assigned or distributed to him and qua those functions and business then he can exercise the same powers as the District Judge.
8. Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is headed as "Savings" and lays down that "(1) in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in subsection (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a land holder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land". This shows that if there is any special or local law in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any law for the time being in force then the Code of Civil Procedure is not to overrule or affect the same. No doubt section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates institution in and hearing of revision petitions by the District Court functions whereof are to be performed by the District Judge, but the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962 in the provisions above referred to confers powers on the District Judge to assign any of his functions or distribute any of his civil business to an Additional District Judge with a clarification that in the discharge of those functions the Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. This is a special power, special jurisdiction and special procedure for the disposal Inter alia of the revision Petitions and is to override the bare text of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no specific provision to the contrary in the Code of Civil Procedure itself or anywhere else. In the face of this position of law, to raise any objection to the jurisdiction and power of the Additional District Judge in the matter of the disposal of the revision petitions, solely on the wording of section 115(2) is not justified. It is to be remembered that the Code of Civil Procedure by itself does not create the Civil Courts. See Dost Muhammad and another v. Rais Satik and another (1). These Courts, so far as relevant for our case, are created by the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962. That statute which creates civil Courts also makes certain provisions quite new and different from those of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of assignment of functions by the District Judge or the distribution of his business to Additional District Judge (on which the Code of Civil Procedure is rather quite silent or not comprehensive). In this state of affairs, to ignore that law or whittle down its efficacy by confining merely to bare wording of section 115(2), Code
(1) PLD 1962 Quetta 82 ' of Civil Procedure is not warranted. If section 115(2) talks of the "District/ Court" then we must see as to what is the meaning of this word; which statute has created that Court; who mans that Court and who is to perform functions and conduct business of that Court. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner which in reality refuses to take note of or accept the impact and effect of the other relevant provisions of the very Ordinance which created the Court of the District Judge is, with due respect, simply an incomplete approach on the subject.
9. When confronted with the above situation, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the case of Behari Lal Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lai and another there was an express provision in the relevant section of the Punjab Courts Act, 1884 as amended by Act of 1888, that an Additional.
District Judge 'shall as regards the discharge of those functions -(i,e, the functions assigned to him by the District Judge)-be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be District Judge". They argued that there was no such deeming fiction in section 6(2) of the Ordinance and, therefore, the present care is distinguishable from the case decided by the Privy Council. The difference pointed out is without any real effect, because, the wording of Ordinance II of 1962 is even otherwise quite explicit and wide on the subject. Rather the fact that the functions of the District Court to deal with liquidation matters were also considered by the Privy Council as assignable by the District Judge on the assumption that functions of District Court were functions of the District Judge goes against the plea raised by the objectors herein. As analysed above the Additional District Judge under Ordinance II of 1962 is not only recipient of the functions of the District Judge but also of his powers relevant in that behalf. The next distinction pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner from case decided by the Privy Council was that in that case an Additional District Judge could be appointed when the business pending before the Court of a District Judge required the aid of an Additional District Judge. They submitted that it was due to that contingency that Additional District Judge could be appointed in any District and it was for that reason that their powers and status was the same as of the District Judge but in Ordinance II of 1962 the apointment of an Additional District Judge or creation of the Court of an Additional District Judge was in consultation with the High Court and, therefore, here the powers and status of Additional District Judge would not be the same as under the aforesaid old law. The argument is without any substance and can hardly lead to create any difference in the powers and jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge or the Court of Additional District Judge.
10. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that all that subsection (2) of section 6 of the Ordinance means is that where an Additional District Judge is otherwise authorised or empowered to exercise any particular jurisdiction, then if a case of that nature, type or jurisdiction is competently pending before the District Judge and the District Judge otherwise assigns his functions in that particular case to an Additional District Judge, then the Additional District Judge may dispose of that case. I he jurisdiction and authority, it was argued, of the Additional District Judge should pre-exist independently of the assignment To elaborate the point it was argued that if for instance an Additional District Judge has independent jurisdiction to hear appeals then cases of appeals can be assigned to him by the District Judge and not cases of original civil jurisdiction or vice versa. In this way it was submitted that as the Additional District Judge was not a Court of principal original civil jurisdiction i,e, District Court, therefore, such functions which were peculiar to that Court i,e, the District Court could not be assigned to an Additional District Judge. We are afraid that on the construction of the particular provisions of Ordinance II of 1962 this plea cannot be accepted. To proceed with the example advanced, section 17(1) contemplates that District Judge and Additional District Judge both could hear cases in original jurisdiction, inasmuch as, it is written therein that "save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction shall lie to the High Court". This suggests that original jurisdiction may exist in Additional District Judge as well though there is no provision in the rest of the Ordinance independently vesting any original jurisdiction in him, and as our view is, it can be only by assignment of those functions under section 6(2) by the District Judge to him.
Similarly in section 18 it is written that "(1) save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge shall lie-(a) to the High Court if the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made exceeds twenty-five thousand rupees; and (b) to the District Judge in any other case;
(2) where the function of receiving any appeal which lies to the District Judge under the last preceding-subsection has been assigned to an Additional District Judge, the appeals may be preferred to the Additional District Judge. . . . ." This shows that though the functions of hearing appeals vest in the District Judge but when that function has been assigned to an Additional District Judge the appeals can be preferred to the Additional District Judge. All this shows that the scheme of Ordinance II of 1962 is quite different from the plea advanced and here assignment of functions by the District Judge to an Additional District Judge does not depend upon pre-existing independent jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge in those functions. Here rather the act of assignment by itself confers jurisdiction and power on the Additional District Judge. This assignment may be by way of transfer as well under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure as explained in Para. 7 of this judgment earlier so far as the Court of an Additional District Judge is concerned.
11. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 6(2) of the Ordinance talks of assignment of the functions of a "District Judge". They argued that there was a difference between the functions of a District Judge on the one hand and the functions of a District Court on the other hand. In section 115(2), Code of Civil Procedure the revisional function was of the District Court and not of the District Judge as such, and therefore, the same could not have been assigned to an Additional District Judge under section 6(2) of the Ordinance. The point is attractive but has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, inasmuch as, it does not represent a complete and comprehensive picture of the law on the subject. As above indicated in a civil district there is the Court of the District Judge -(see sections 3 and 4 of the Ordinance) and is called as "District Court" -(see section 2(21) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure). The "District Judge" - (see the definition of these words as in section 3( 5) of the General Clauses Act and section 2(20)' of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act) - is a Judge of the aforesaid principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. The functions of the District Court are thus obviously exercised by the District Judge. It is true that ex officio the District Judge may be repository of certain such other functions and jurisdiction which any law of the land may vest in or bestow on him. These may be in addition to his functions as a District Judge when exercising functions of a District Court. So while it is true that all the functions of a District Judge may not pertain to his functions as a District Court, but all the functions of a District Court would necessarily remain the functions of the District Judge being the Judge of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. As earlier elaborated in detail it was on this assumption that in Behari Lal Bulaki Ram v.
Kundan Lal and another the Privy Council upheld the assignment of the functions of the District Court by the District Judge when he did so in the form of assignment of functions of the District Judge to an Additional District Judge. This will show that when section 6(2) of the Ordinance authorises a District Judge to assign any of his functions to an Additional District Judge it embraces all the functions or sum total of all the functions of the District Judge both as a Judge of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction i,e, the District Court or as a recipient of other functions in addition thereto. What functions he has assigned to an Additional District Judge will, therefore, depend upon the nature of the functions concerned. If the District Judge is assigning his functions which are vesting in him as a Judge of the "District Court" i,e, the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction then the Additional District Judge shall also have the same power in the exercise of the functions so assigned to him. If, however, the functions assigned are any other than the scope of the powers to exercise those functions will be regulated by the nature of the powers relevant in that behalf. Again whether the aforesaid - (what are called) -additional functions of the District Judge can be assigned to an Additional District Judge will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the relevant text and the theory of persona designata if applicable, but so far as his functions as a Judge of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction I e. The District Courts are concerned, their assignment is fully warranted by section 6(2) of the Ordinance and also by transfer in section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure as explained earlier. Learned counsel at this juncture referred to an unreported decision of the Ex-Chief Justice of this Court in Executive First Appeal No, 40/1963 titled Riazur Rehman v. Director of Industries, Punjab, Lahore, decided on 12-3.1973 wherein it was held that it were the functions of a District Judge where he was to function only as a District Judge which could be assigned under section 6(2) of the Ordinance, but not his functions and powers as a District Court. With due respect we do not agree, especially when the various points or aspects of the matter as highlighted in our judgment were not brought to his Lordship's notice and also because the said case was not a revision under section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Again it was not noticed that in the Privy Council case reported in Behar, Lal Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lal and another actually it were the functions of the District Com t to deal with liquidation matters, as explained in detail in para. 5 ibid, which were held assignable under a provision of law which authorised assignment of the functions of the District Judge.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner then argued that West Pakistan Ordinance II of 1962 was promulgated on 8-1-1962 and when its section 6(2) talked of assignment of functions of a District Judge, it meant only those functions which on that date vested in him and such of the functions which were conferred on him or his Court thereafter, for example, under subsection (2) of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was enacted by Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972 on 14-4- 1972 they were not covered by the aforesaid provisions of law. The plea has no merit. Section 6(2) is not a stagnant provision of law and there is nothing to indicate anything of the kind which is being suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner In the whole of Ordinance It of 1962 in the context or on the subject band. Civil Courts Ordinance creates Civil Courts and is not aimed at restricting the functions of the Court of the District Judge on a particular terminus of time.
Reference may be made to the judgment of Waheeduddin Ahmed, J. In Syed Ahsan All v. Jaffar Ali and 4 others (1) where an additional function mentioned in that cage was considered to fall within the scope of his assignable functions to an Additional District Judge.
13. It was submitted that in some cases the assignment to the Additional District Judge was the assignment of a particular case instituted in the Court of the District Judge while in certain cases the very institution of revision petitions sometimes may take place in the Court of the Additional District Judge himself. It was argued that such cases which may be instituted directly in the Court of the Additional District Judge could not be considered to have been assigned to that Court. The objection has no force. There is no particular manner of assignment of functions by the District Judge. He may assign a particular case of revision or he may assign his functions in the form of a general order that revision petitions may be instituted in the Court of an Additional District Judge. It is not established or proved before us that there was no such general assignment in any relevant cose if the same was directly instituted in the Court of an Additional District Judge. The result is that the plea raised falls both on legal as well as factual plane.
14. The last point argued was that what the learned District Judge in this case assigned to the Additional District Judge were the appeals riled by the respondents concerned with the result that the Additional District Judge could hear those cases as appeals and not as revisions. The contention has no merit. It is not disputed that the District Judge could have converted or treated the appeals as revisions, and as such, when he assigned the appeal cases to the Additional District Judge the latter also possessed the same powers as the District Judge had in treating the appeals as revisions.
15. As regards the point raised in paragraph 4(e) of this judgment, it may be mentioned that section 16 of the Ordinance deals with Civil Judges and not Additional District Judges. As regards the points in paragraph 4(f) above, we would simply observe that the scheme of bestowing jurisdiction on Additional District Judges is by assignment of his functions to him by the District Judge and, therefore, the point raised with reference to sections 17 and 18 of the Ordinance is not apt. Similarly regarding sections 21 and 22 of the Ordinance they deal with different situations altogether and cannot affect the point under examination in this judgment. This disposes of the various objections and points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner generally and also in paragraph 4 of this judgment. No arguments were advanced before us on merits of the case otherwise.
16. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order of the learned Additional District Judge impugned in this case is quite valid and cannot be declared to be without lawful authority. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
17. This case was heard along with (i) Writ Petition No, 2032/1974 titled Syed Sadiq Ali Shah and another v. Mohammad Bashir and others (ii) Writ Petition No, 541/1976 titled Mushtaq Ahmed v. Ch. Mohammed Naseer etc. And (iii) Writ Petition No, 541/1976 titled Farid-ud-Din Masud v. Additional District
(1) P L 11) 1%4 Kra. 418 ' Judge, Lahore, etc. The case was mainly argued by Sh. Ahmed Saeed, Advocate and other learned counsel simply adopted his arguments. No additional arguments nor any argument even otherwise on the merits were addressed before us by any of the learned counsel in all these cases.
The result is that the aforesaid other three writ petitions are also dismissed with costs. We have passed relevant short orders in those cases with reference to the present judgment.