1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--- The above appeal with the leave of this Court is directed against the judgment of Federal Service Tribunal dated 22-6-1993. Leave was granted against the impugned judgment to consider the following legal contentions:-- "Leave is granted in the above petition to consider the following questions of law:
(1) -Whether the Service Appeal filed by the respondent before Federal Service Tribunal was not maintainable as the respondent had failed to avail the departmental remedy provided under the Service Regulations before approaching the Service Tribunal? And
(2) Whether the Service Appeal filed by the respondent in 1987 in. Respect of action taken by the petitioner in 1982 was time-barred? And
(3) Whether in view of the decision of this Court in case of Raziuddin v. Chairman, PIAC PLD 1992 SC 531 the Tribunal was not competent to A grant the relief asked for by the respondent?"
2. ' The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was hopelessly time-barred as the action impugned in the appeal before the Tribunal was admittedly taken in 1982 while the appeal was filed by the respondent in the year 1987. The second contention of the appellant is that in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Raziuddin v.
3. Chairman, PIAC PLD 1992 SC 531 the Service Tribunal was not competent to grant any relief in respect of a cause of action which arose to respondent in the year 1982 when the Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction.
4. ' We will first of all determine the effect of the decision of this Court in Raziuddin's case (supra), on the present proceedings. In Raziuddin's case, this Court held that the relationship between the employees of P.I.A.C. And the management is that of the 'master and servant and therefore, a dismissed employee of the P.I.A.C. Could not seek remedy by way of re-instatement in service although he could sue for damages for wrongful dismissal from service. The learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of the ratio in Raziuddin's case, contended that respondent could not file appeal before Federal Service Tribunal which was conferred exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the cases of violations of terms and conditions of service of a civil servant only. The ratio laid down in Raziuddin's case is not attracted in the present case. Firstly, for the reason that the appeal filed by the respondent before the Service Tribunal did not seek re-instatement of respondent in service.
5. Secondly, by virtue of Ordinance LIII of 1984 promulgated on 15-11-1984, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called as 'the Act' only), was amended and by section 2 of amending Ordinance, section 10 of the Act was re-numbered as subsection (1) and after that subsections (2), (3) and (4) were added which read as follows:-- "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) or any law, settlement or award for the time being in force, or any rules or regulations framed under this Act, or any rules, regulations, orders or instructions issued by the Corporation, or it the terms and conditions of service of any person employed by, or serving under, the Corporation, the Corporation may at any time retire or remove from its service any person without assigning any reason, after giving him an opportunity of being heard and not less than ninety days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of ninety days; and, subject to subsection (3), no such order of retirement or removal shall be called in question before any Court or Tribunal or other authority.
(3) Service under the Corporation is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan, and every person holding a post under the Corporation, not being a person who is on deputation to the Corporation, shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973).
(4) Nothing contained in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (W.P. Ordinance No, VI of 1968), or the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969)
6. (XXIII of 1969), shall apply to or in relation to the Corporation or any of the officers, advisers and employees appointed by it."
7. ' The newly-added subsection (3) of section 10 of the Act declared the service under the Corporation (PIAC) as the service of Pakistan and all persons holding a post under the Corporation, not being a person who was on deputation to the Corporation, were declared as 'civil servants' for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Amended) Act, 1989 (Act VII of 1989) which was promulgated on 2-11-1989, however, omitted subsections (2), (3) and (4) added in section 10 of the Act by Ordinance LIII of 1984, thereby restoring the status of the employees of PIAC to the same position as it existed before 15-11-1984.
8. Therefore, between the period from 15-11-1984 to 2-11-1989, the employees of PIAC enjoyed the status of civil servants and as such any dispute relating to the terms and conditions of their service was cognizable by the Federal Service Tribunal. The appeal filed by the respondent before the Federal Service Tribunal on 30-7-1987 therefore, was fully competent under the law.
9. ' The second contention of the appellant in support of the appeal is that the adverse order against the respondent was passed by the Corporation in the year 1982 and, therefore, the appeal filed before the Tribunal in 1987 was hopelessly time-barred. The learned Tribunal repelled the contention as follows:-- "(3) At the very outset the learned counsel for the respondents raised a question of limitation. It was contended that the cause of action arose to the appellant in 1982 when his juniors were promoted and, therefore, after exhausting the departmental remedy, he should have come to this Tribunal within 120 days but he did not vigilantly pursue his case and thus the present appeal which is filed on 30-7-1987 is clearly time-barred and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was assured by the Department at Abu Dhabi that his case for promotion would be considered as and when he would return from there.
10. Consequently, on his return from abroad, he filed a representation on 10-3-1986 against his non- consideration for promotion and he was informed by the respondents on 4-6-1987 that his case was under process and that they will revert to him as and when final decision to this effect was arrived at. It was explained by the learned counsel that the decision regarding the appellant's non- consideration for promotion was for the first time communicated to him on 2-7-1987 and thus the present appeal is within time. The appellant has also filed an application for condonation of delay as a precautionary measure. We agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the assurance held out to the appellant in 1982 when he was in Abu Dhabi and was due, in terms of his seniority for promotion, that his name would be considered for promotion on return to Pakistan, provided enough solace, comfort and relief to him and there was thus nothing left to agitate and that it was only in 1985 when he returned to Pakistan that he felt disturbed or aggrieved when the PIA refused to honour its own word and that is was only in this background that he made appeal in 1986 as a real cause of action which arose in 1982 but would not be pursued due to the assurance of the Department that he would be promoted. In this view of the matter, we accept the explanation of the appellant and condone the delay, if any."
11. ' The above reasons given by the learned Tribunal for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal do not suffer from infirmity. The discretion exercised by the Tribunal in condonation of delay is based on sound grounds and is unexceptionable. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the grounds on which the learned Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal were imaginary and conjectural as no material was produced before the Tribunal in support of the grounds. The contention of the appellant has no force. The respondent in his memo. Of appeal before the Tribunal in para. (ii) of the grounds made the following assertion:- "(ii) That the appellant was due for promotion in August, 1982, when 45 of his juniors were promoted. But the case of the appellant was not then considered. Rather, he was informed by Telex that he would be promoted with effect from August, 1982, on his return from foreign posting."
12. The appellants in reply to these assertions made the following statement in their written objections filed before the Tribunal:-- "(i) to (vi) As has been explained earlier presumption of discrimination cannot be raised against the respondent as the appellant has failed to establish identity of interest and facts of the alleged officers to have retrospectively been promoted as to when they were posted and what were the regulations then applicable and how the appellants and their interest and conduct was identical.
13. ' It is too late now for the, appellant to challenge the penalty of censure which was not challenged in the Tribunal at any time before. The only prayer in the present appeal is for reconsideration of promotion with effect from 1982, which was not legally permissible then and is not so permissible even now as has been explained earlier. 1986 PLC (C.S.) 228 is not applicable to the employees of PIAC who have their own rules of service and promotion."
14. ' It is quite clear from the reply of appellant filed before the Tribunal that the assertion of the respondent that he was assured by the appellant that he will be considered for promotion from 1982 on his return to Pakistan, was not denied by the appellant and as such, the learned Tribunal rightly took these assertions of respondent into consideration for condoning the delay.
15. ' The appellant had also contended at the time of grant of leave in the case that the appeal before the Tribunal was not maintainable as it was filed without availing the departmental remedy provided under the Service Regulations. This contention was not pressed at the hearing of appeal by the learned counsel for the appellant and rightly so, as from the facts stated in the impugned judgment of learned Service Tribunal, it is quite clear that before approaching the Service Tribunal, the respondent did file a representation/appeal which was rejected and thereafter, he filed appeal before the Tribunal.
16. ' The learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that the direction of Tribunal 'to consider the respondent for promotion from 1982 ignored the relevant service rules of Corporation which provided that an employee of PIAC while on posting abroad could not be considered for promotion to higher group but on his return from foreign posting could be considered for promotion with effect from the date he was due for promotion but without monetary benefit and subject to the condition that his A.C.Rs, for the period of three years preceding immediately the date of his promotion contained above average remarks without any adverse remarks and punishment. The contention of the learned counsel has no force. The learned Tribunal simply directed the appellant to consider the respondent for promotion from 1982 which was the date when he became entitled to promotion in the higher Group. This direction of the Federal Service Tribunal undoubtedly has to be given effect to in accordance with the service regulations of the Corporation. There is no merit in the appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.