G. H. Malik, J.- This application for execution of the decree passed on the 10th May, 1988, was filed on the 8th August, 1993, and the office called upon the counsel for the decree holder to explain how it is in time when the period of limitation for filing such an application is, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in PLD 1990 S.C' 778 and PLD 1991 S.C. 985, 3 years. The counsellor the decree holder filed his reply to the objections contending that the execution application having been tiled within 6 years from the dale of the decree is within time because, as held in the ease of STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN v. VVAJIHIJDDIN AND OTHERS (1991 C1C Note 81) (at page 64), the application is governed by Section 48 CPC and not by Article 183 of the Limitation Act.
For the judgment reported in PLD 1991 S.C.985, it was contended in the reply that case was concerned with the law as it stood before its amendment by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1 <5r?2, and that the effect of the amendment of Section 48 was not considered.
2. In consequence of the above reply of the counsel for the decree holder, the office has made this Referencer. When the Reference came up for hearing on the 13th February, 1994, the hearing was adjourned because the counsel for the decree holder was reported to be unwell. Thereafter, the Reference came up for hearing again on the 6th March. 1994, and the 27th March, 1994, but the counsel for the decree holder remained absent. He is absent again today.
3. The contention of the counsel in his reply that the execution application is governed by Section 48 CPC' is not. Correct. As held in the case of Mehboob Khan V. Hasson Khan Durrani (PLD 1990 S.C'.
778), the result of the change brought out by the Law Reforms Ordinance is that that only effect of set Cion 48 CPC' would be to provide a period of limitation for subsequent execution applications alter the first one and that if no application at all is made within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, ihi# execution application made thereafter would be barred by limitation and as such there would be no occasion to avail of the benefits of the extended lime provided by Section 48 CPC. The result of the above decision is that the first application for execution must be made within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and that Section 48 CPC would apply only to any subsequent application for execution.
4. In the case of MIAN AKBAR HUSSAIN v. MST. AISHABAI AND OTHERS (PLD 1991 S.C'. 985), the suit was decreed on the 19th January, 1966, by this C court and the application for execution of the decree was filed in October, 19'70. Since the execution application was filed before the promulgation of-the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, hie law prevailing before the amendment was applied and it was held that either Article 181 or 182 applied?o that the execution application having been filed beyond the period of 3 years was barred by limitation. It was further held, following the case of FIRDOUS TRADING CORPORATION AND OTHERS v. JAPAN COTTON AND GENERAL TRADING CQ.LTD. (PLD 1%1 Karachi 565) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of PROVINCE OF SINDH v. HAJI RAZZAK AND ANOTHER (PW1 S.C.M.R. 620) that Article 183 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is not applicable to applications for execution of the decree passed by this Court because while entertaining and trying Civil Suits, this Court is exercising District Court jurisdiction in contradistinction to the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. Article 182 has since been repealed by the Law j Reforms Ordinance, 1672.
5. Since Article 183 has been held not to apply to an application for execution of a decree of this Court and since Article 182 has been repealed by the I Law Reforms Ordinance, 1672, the only article applicable to the present case is I Article ISI which prescribes a period of3 years. Section 48 CPC, as slated above, Is not applicable because this is not a fresh application but a first application for execution of the decree. The Execution Application is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation and is, therefore, hereby dismissed.