' M. JAVED BUTTAR, J.---The facts, in brief, leading to the institution of the present application are that the applicant/plaintiff Faqir Muhammad filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against Nazir Ahmad and 2 others before the learned Court of Civil Judge, Bahawalnagar, who decreed the suit in his favour on 21-5-1987. The defendants/vendees filed the appeal (RFA 74/87/BWP), in this Court which was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court on 4-12-1988 in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Nawab Din (PLD 1988 SC 701) holding that no decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff/pre-emptor on 21-5-1987 as he had not fulfilled the requirement of "Talabs". Resultantly the applicant's suit was dismissed. The applicant also instituted an appeal (Civil Appeal No,11/89) in the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was, however, dismissed as withdrawn on 26-3-1991. Thereafter the present application has been instituted under section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 for setting aside the judgment and decree, dated 4-12-1988, passed by this Court. Notice in this application was issued on 3-6-1991.
2. It is contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the applicant that his suit is saved under section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 as it was pending between the 1st day of August, 1986 and the 28th March of 1990. Section 35 of the abovementioned Act is reproduced below:-- "(1) Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, all the decrees, judgments or orders dismissing the suits of preemption,. Instituted or pending between the 1st day of August, 1986 and the 28th March 1990 (both days inclusive), in which the right of preemption was claimed as is available under this Act, shall be of no legal effect, and such suits, on an application made by the aggrieved person, within sixty days of coming into force of this Act shall subject to subsection (2), be decided afresh according to the provisions thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sections 13 and 30, in respect of the suits mentioned in subsection (1), the period of limitation shall be one year and it shall be sufficient if the pre-emptor establishes that he had made Talb-i-Ishhad' in the presence of two truthful witnesses.
3. The plain reading of section 35 produced above shows that the argument of the learned counsel is misconceived. Under this section new lease of life was given only to those suits which were instituted or pending between the 1st day of August 1986 and 28th March 1990 and in such suits any decree, judgment or order of dismissal of pre-emption suit had been passed and in such an eventuality this section declared that such a dismissal shall be of no legal effect and the suits can be revived within 60 days of the coming into force of this Act. The applicant instituted his pre- emption suit on 22-10-1983 and it was decreed in his favour on 21-5-1987 and, therefore, the saving clause as contained in subsection (1) of section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is not applicable to the facts of the present case because the suit was not dismissed but was decreed.
Furthermore, under this section only those suits have been saved in which the right of pre-emption was claimed as is available under this Act which means that plaintiff had to claim and exercise superior right of preemption as provided in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. It, therefore follows that the plaintiff had also made necessary Talabs". In the instant case the applicant/plaintiff admittedly did not make the necessary Talabs and, therefore, on this score also his suit did not fall within the four corners of subsection (1) of section 35 of the abovementioned Act. In Ghulam Hussain and others v. Mushtaq Ahmad and others (PLD 1994 SC 870) it has been held that requirement of 'Talabs' being a sine qua non for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption recognised by the Muslim Law, its non-compliance had the effect of extinguishing the pre-emptive right of all such pre-emptors. It was for this reason that the appeal was accepted.
4. The abovementioned shows that the plaintiffs' case does not fall within the four corners of subsection (1) of section 35 and as such the applicant cannot claim any benefit thereunder and the present application for the revival of his suit is misconceived which is accordingly dismissed with no orders as to costs.