1. ' The plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of Rs,30,43,043.05 on account of various credit facilities granted by it to defendant No,1.
2. ' The case of the plaintiff, as stated in the plaint, is that its predecessor-in-interest, Bank of Bahawalpur, granted to the General Tractor and Machinery Co. Cash credit (Hypothecation Account) amounting to Rs,1,40,010.62; Cash Credit (Pledge Account) amounting to Rs,2,53,615.35; and loan against Import Bills amounting to Rs,5,26,229.28. It is alleged that defendant No,1 took over the assets and liabilities of General Tractor and Machinery Co. And, consequently, executed three promissory notes all dated 21st December, 1962, for Rs,1,40,010.62, Rs,2,53,015.35 and Rs,5,26,229.88, respectively in favour of the said bank; that the defendant No,2 executed a guarantee, dated the 19th February, 1963, as security for payment of the amounts due by defendant No,1 to the said bank; that the defendants have admitted their liability to pay but have failed to pay the amount due from them to the plaintiff in spite of various demands by the plaintiff. The defendants in their joint written statement have alleged that the suit is barred by limitation because the account pertains to the year 1962 and the business dealings of defendant No,1 with the plaintiff had closed in 1964; that the suit has been filed without lawful authority; that the promissory notes were signed in blank and have been filed in without giving any consideration; and that the guarantee is without consideration. They have also denied their liability to pay any amount to the plaintiff.
3. ' Upon pleadings of the parties, the following issues were, by consent of the parties, framed:--
(1) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(2) Whether the suit has been filed without any lawful authority?
(3) Whether the promissory notes were signed in blank and are as such not binding on the defendants?
(4) Whether the guarantee is without consideration and not binding on the defendants and is the same under stamped?
(5) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
4. ' The plaintiff has produced certain documents which have, by consent, been admitted in evidence, but none of the parties has examined any witness. They have agreed that the suit be disposed of on the basis of the record as it is without any oral evidence. I have examined the record and the proceedings and heard the learned counsel for the parties. My findings on the issues are as follows:- ISSUE No,1: ' Ms. Sofia Saeed, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submits that defendant No,1 had executed three promissory notes (Exhs.7, 8 and 9) on 21st December, 1962, made part payments on 9th January, 1964, 26th February, 1964 and 25th March, 1968; acknowledged its liability by letters, dated 29th August, 1966, 21st December, 1967, 15th February, 1968, 25th March, 1968, 20th June, 1969, 9th October, 1969, 12th November, 1970, and 10th August, 1972; and that the part payments made by the defendant No,1 on the 26th February, 1964, and the 25th March, 1968, have been acknowledged by it by its letters dated the 26th February, 1964 (Exh. 12) and the 25th March, 1968 (Exh.20) respectively.
5. She further submits that the above part payments and acknowledgements were made successively before expiry of the period of limitation and had the effect of extending such period so that the suit having been filed on the 2nd August, 1975, i,e, within three years from the letter, dated the 10th August, 1972, (Exh. 24) is not barred by limitation.
6. ' Mr. Ikram Ahmad Ansari, the learned counsel for the defendants, does not contest that the defendant No,1 has acknowledged its liability and made part payments as stated above except that, according to him, (i) the contents of the letter, dated the 10th August, 1972, have not been proved and, in any case, the letter does not amount to acknowledgment, (ii) part payment must be acknowledged in writing, and (iii) acknowledgments by defendant No,1 do not bind defendant No, 2.
7. ' With regard to the proof of the contents of the letter, dated the 10th August, 1972, it may be noted that it is specifically alleged in para. 6 of the plaint that the defendants by their letters, including the letter in question a copy whereof is Annexure "S" to the plaint, acknowledged their liability; and the defendant's reply, in para. 9 of their written statement is:-- "That the paragraph No,6 of the plaint as framed is denied. It is submitted that the said letters do not amount to an acknowledgment of the alleged debts and liabilities."
8. The first sentence of para. 9 of the written statement is entirely vague and meaningless and is, in fact, an example of the utter frivolity in pleadings which, unfortunately, has become prevalent and needs to be curbed. There is, however, no denial, in para. 9 of the written statement, of the signature on, and the contents of the letter of 10th August, 1972. The defendants must, therefore, be taken, in view of the provisions of Order 8, rule 5, C.P.C., to have admitted the signature on, and the contents of, the letter. That being so, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove either the signature on or the contents of the letter in view of Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which provides:-- "No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: ' Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions."
9. Notwithstanding the above position, the learned counsel chose, at the time of admission and denial of documents, to refuse to admit the contents of the letter "for want of knowledge", while admitting the signature of defendant No,1 thereon. This was indeed unfortunate, to say the least, because, in view of their admission in the written statement, the purported refusal, on the part of the defendants, to admit the contents of the letter was vexatious and inconsequential. Besides, there is nothing on the record to show why the defendants should not be bound by the admission in their written statement; and, indeed, in view of that admission, they are estopped from denying the contents of the letter.
10. Even otherwise, in my opinion the contents of the letter have been sufficiently proved. Article 72 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, read with Articles 75 and 76 thereof provide that the contents of a document must be proved by primary evidence unless secondary evidence is admissible for any of the reasons enumerated in Article 76, in which case such contents may be proved by secondary evidence; and "primary evidence" has been defined by Article 73 as "document itself produced for the inspection of the Court." Proof of "contents" of a document, primary or secondary, is, however, not proof of its genuineness or authenticity. It is, therefore, necessary, as provided by Articles 78 to 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, which apply to both primary and secondary evidence, that a document must be proved in the manner provided for in those Articles. Of those Articles, only Article 78 is relevant for the purpose of this case. It provides:-- "If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting."
11. Article 78 does not prescribe any particular mode of proof. A document may, therefore, be proved by any means recognised by Qanun-eShahadat, which, in the circumstances of the case, are considered by the Court, in its discretion, sufficient. Further, the authenticity of a document may also be proved by reference to the contents thereof; in other words, the internal evidence afforded by the contents is accepted as authentication e.g. When a document states facts and circumstances which are found to be accurate and which could have been known only to the person to whom the authorship is attributed. See Sarkar on Evidence, 13th Edn., Vol. 2, page 674. In Mobarik All Ahmed v. State of Bombay (AIR 1957 SC 857) the contention was that certain letters and telegrams were held, by the lower Court, to have been proved on legally inadmissible material; and it was held, at page 864:-- "Most of the letters from the appellant relied upon bear what purport to be his signatures. A few of them are admitted by the appellant. There are also few letters without signatures. Both the complainant and Jasawala speak to the signatures on the other letters. The objection of the learned counsel of the appellant is that neither of them has actually seen the appellant write any of the letters nor are they shown to have such intimate acquaintance with his correspondence as to enable them to speak to the genuineness of the signatures.
12. ' Learned trial Judge as well as the learned Judges of the High Court have found that there were sufficient number admitted or proved letters which might well enable Jasawala and the complainant to identify the signatures of the appellant in the disputed letters. They also jaid stress substantially on the contents of various letters, in the context of the other letters and telegrams to which they purport to be replies and which from the chain of correspondence. As indicating the genuineness of the disputed letters. Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question of proof. We are, however, unable to see any objection. The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document, being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.
13. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject-matter of chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship.
14. In an appropriate case the Court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the Courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at."
15. ' Following the above case, Bijayesh Mukherjer, J. Of Calcutta High Court held in the case of S.W.F.
16. Product (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sohanlal Bagla (AIR 1964 Cal. 209)--at p.213-- ".The consignment notes have not been proved in accordance with law: Section 67 of the Evidence Act, I of 1872. But that is of little consequence. Apart from their forming part of the admitted brief of documents... The transactions the consignment notes embody are admitted by both parties. So, the doctrine of authentication by contents comes into play and these documents are proved by internal evidence afforded by their contents found to be correct on evidence aliunde."
17. ' In the case of Agro-Marketing Corporation Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1982 Lahore 20), Muhammad Afzal Lone, J. Held that the proposition that the proof of signature on a document proves its contents as well was "too sweeping to be accepted" and that the circumstances of a case may not call for such an inference. He went on to observe that-- "It is always for the Court to see in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case, as to what weight are to be given to each piece of evidence and whether or not by the proof of the signatures, the contents of a document also stand proved."
18. The rule as to proof of a document, therefore, is that, firstly, the contents of a document must be proved by either primary or secondary evidence as provided by Articles 72 to 76 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat; secondly, that proof of 'contents' of a document is not proof of its authenticity or genuineness which must be proved, under Article 78, by proof of the signature and handwriting; thirdly that the genuineness or authenticity of a document may be proved by any of the methods recognised by Qanun-eShahadat or by reference to its contents or other evidence on record which the Court may, in its discretion, consider sufficient proof of its authenticity or genuineness.
19. ' The letter of 10th August, 1972, may now be considered in the light of the above rule. The signature on the letter has, of course, been admitted. The letter is concerned with the credit facilities given by the plaintiff's predecessorin-interest to defendant No, 1 and the giving of those credit facilities is not in dispute; and it is part of a chain of letters written by defendant No, 1 to plaintiff, the remaining letters being admitted, wherein the defendant No, 1 has admitted the transaction, i,e, the credit facilities, as well as its liability. Further, the letter mentions facts which could not have been known to any other person except the defendant as when it talks of the reasons for the failure of the defendant to repay the loans. Finally, the letter has been admitted in the written statement.
20. Therefore, in the words of Bijayesh Mukherji, J. In the Calcutta case cited above, "the doctrine of authentication by contents comes into play" and the letter is proved by internal evidence. It is also proved by other facts and circumstances on record mentioned above.
21. ' Mr. Ansari has cited the case of Muhammad Zaman and others v. Abdul Malik Khan and 7 others (PLD 1991 SC 524) wherein it was held that an acknowledgement has necessarily to be made in writing signed by the party against whom any property or right is claimed. In that case, on face, no such writing was available. The case, therefore, is of no assistance to Mr. Ansari.
22. It is, thus, clear that the defendants having admitted the letter dated the 10th August, 1972, its proof was not necessary and that, in any event, it has been sufficiently proved. The question whether the letter amounts to acknowledgement or not may now be examined. For facility of reference, it is reproduced below:-- "The General Manager, Bank of Bhawalpur, W.P.I.D.C. House, Moulvi Tamiz-ud-Din Road, Karachi ' Dear Sir, ' Apropos our verbal discussions held in your office on 9th August, 1972, in connection with payment of loans we deem it necessary to further clarify the position in writing. You would appreciate the delay caused in settling down the issue cannot wholly be attributed to our wilful negligence. It has rather happened per force of uncertain conditions prevailing in the country for the last several years. Though the conditions are not still established to help restoring the normal functions of everyday economic life yet we feel that our indomitable `will to survive' will not fail us and you.
23. ' The accumulative effect of disturbances, economic problems has miserably dragged the Company into economic shambles. The liabilities of the Company created in the ordinary course of business now look abnormally too big to discharge under the changed circumstances. In all fairness the solution lies in mutual cooperation. We take pride in extending our hand of cooperation first.
24. ' As you know the business was closed in the year 1964. At that time certain amount inclusive of normal interest was payable by us. How the dealings were closed in the year 1964?. It has become the story of the past and to narrate the details here will be of no use to any one of us. We now straightaway offer the following proposal to settle the issue:
(i) We offer to pay the outstandings inclusive of interest at the time of last transaction between us in 1964;
(ii) The arrears, whatever may be determined amongst us, at the time of our last transaction in 1964 shall be payable at the rate of Rs,1 lac per year. The first yearly instalment of Rs,1 lac will be paid in the month of February, 1973.
(iii) No interest whatsoever, shall be charged on the amount held payable throughout the entire period of repayment.
(iv) For the safeguard of the interest of the Bank we are prepared to get mortgaged the agricultural land in the name of the Company of the value of the liabilities referred above in favour of the Bank as a security. It would be an equitable mortgage without possession and usufruct.
25. ' Before we close this offer we have to appraise you of the situation that has come to such a pass as it is impossible for us to propose an offer better than the proposed one. We hope after considering all the circumstances you would very kindly accept the offer and oblige us.
26. ' Thanking you, Yours faithfully for GTMC Limited.
27. (Sd.)
28. (Sardar Rashidullah Khan), Director."
29. ' Mr. Ansari contends, relying on the case of Messrs. Yacoob Habib Kaliya v. Messs AA. Sattar (PLD 1958 (W.P.) Karachi 534), that the letter does not amount to an acknowledgement. In that case the buyer demanded from the seller certain amounts of money by way of damages and refund of deposit, for the seller's failure to deliver the goods, and the seller wrote in reply, inter alia,-- "As you have committed a breach of contract by not lifting the contract goods in spite of repeated requests both oral and written, you are not entitled to claim Rs,1,186-14-0 from my client. On the contrary you are liable to my client in. Damages for not taking delivery of the goods due to downward trend of the market."
30. ' Wajihuddin Ahmed, J. (as he then was) held that the letter did not amount to an acknowledgment and observed:-- "It seems to me that an admission in writing cannot be treated as an acknowledgment unless it is in the nature of an unqualified acknowledgment of a subsisting liability. The mere fact that a party has referred, while denying liability, to an agreement on the basis of which the dispute has arisen between them, will not render such reference an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act. The language of section 19 of the Limitation Act in this respect is very clear. It does not merely require that there should be an admission about the existence of contract but also requires that there must be acknowledgment of liability in respect of such contract."
31. ' The learned Judge further observed that Explanation I to section 19 of the Limitation Act-- "applies to such cases where there is an admission that a debt is due but the refusal is based on such grounds which don't amount to denial of liability."
32. ' Miss Sofia Saeed, on the other hand, contends that the letter of 10th August, 1972, is an acknowledgment and relies on Messrs M.G. Kadir & Co. v. Abdul Latif (PLD 1970 Karachi 708) and Harchandrai v. The Popular Metal Works (PLD 1971 Karachi 925) both of which were decided by Division Benches of this Court.
33. ' In M.G. Kadir's case, the suit of the respondent for recovery of Rs,20,500 with interest thereon, on account of loan given to appellant on 13th July, 1948, was held to be within the period of limitation on account of part payment and acknowledgment of liability. The appellant/defendant had written to the respondent/plaintiff, "you are no doubt correct in stating that there is a credit balance of Rs,20,500 in your personal account" but claiming that on taking into account various matters and accounts of their business it would be seen that "the net position would be a debt (sic) balance against you and not a credit balance in your personal account." It was held that the letter amounted to an acknowledgment because it expressly admitted credit balance of Rs,20,500 in the personal account of the defendant in the books of the appellant and proceeded to set off that balance against certain claims against the respondent. Noorul Arlin, J., speaking for the Bench, stated, upon exhaustive analysis of cases,-- "The expression 'acknowledgment' itself has not been defined in the Limitation Act but we may accept the definition followed by the Courts in England as well as by the High Courts in India and Pakistan, given by Fry, L.J. In Green v. Humphreys. According to this definition, an acknowledgment is an admission by the writer that there is a debt owed by him. Proceeding further, Fry, L.J. Observed that in order to take the case out of statute of limitation, there must, upon the fair construction of the letter, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, be an admission that the writer owes the debt. Next, some rules have to be observed in construing a document which is set up as an acknowledgment of liability. One principle is, that the Limitation Act being a statute in derogation of the right to sue, exceptions in the Act must be construed liberally. A writing claimed to be an acknowledgment must, therefore, be interpreted liberally, so as to maintain the right to sue rather than in negation or derogation of such right... Another rule which has to be kept in mind is that an acknowledgment, like any other document should be construed according to the intention of the parties but this intention is the intention as revealed by the language of the body of the deed. If the deed is ambiguous surrounding circumstances may be looked into...." and went on to hold that the test to determine whether or not a writing amounts to an acknowledgment is-- "(i) Whether there is an admission of liability or of jural relationship?
(ii) Whether the admission is relatable to a subsisting liability or jural relationship, so that, in the latter case, on ascertainment of facts constituting the jural relationship, as in the case of accounts between the parties, a debt or liability shall be found to exist against one or the other of parties?
34. ' This admission may be evident from the language of the writing itself, or may be inferred by implication, or by ascertainment from the surrounding circumstances if there is any ambiguity in the writing."
35. ' The decision in Kaliya's case (cited above) was not followed and was, in fact expressly dissented from.
36. ' The case of Harchand Rai was decided by a Division Bench consisting of Qadeeruddin Ahmed, C.J.
37. And Marri, J. In that case the defendant had written to the plaintiff-- "Our Income-tax Officer required some permanent evidence in support of the financial aid of thirty- five thousand given by your goodself for the construction of Shahbina Hotel last accounting year."
38. ' And asked him to send either his balance-sheet or a certificate in prescribed form, showing that he had given a loan of Rs,35,000 to the defendant. The letter, following the test laid down in M.G.
39. Kadir's case, was held to amount to an acknowledgment because it was evident from it that the defendant was conscious of existing liability against him and because, considered with other documents produced in evidence, it amounted to acknowledgment. The decision in Kaliya's case was not followed.
40. Applying the test to the present case, it appears to me that the letter, dated the 10th August, 1972, is an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act. It expressly refers to payment of loan and goes on to say that the delay in "settling down the issue" i,e, repayment of the loan was not due to wilful negligence of the defendant but due to uncertain conditions prevailing in the country. It proceeds further to say that the liability of the defendant had grown "to big to discharge" and that the solution lay in mutual cooperation between the parties; and having said that, it makes an offer to pay the outstanding as on the date of the last transaction in 1964. Quite clearly, it contains an admission of subsisting liability as well as of jural relationship between the parties. Besides, the previous letters of the defendant, referred to above, are all, admittedly, acknowledgments; and the letter in question is a link in the chain of letters containing acknowledgment of liability of he defendant No, 1.
41. 'Mr. Ansari submits that the letter is merely an offer to settle the matter of payment of dues of the plaintiff in the manner set out in it. It is true that the letter contains an offer to pay the amount outstanding as in 1964 but that does not detract from the clear acknowledgment of liability which, on the language of the letter, was larger than that outstanding in 1964.
42. ' Mr. Ansari then submits that part payment, in order to have the effect of extending the period of limitation under section 20 of the Limitation Act, must be acknowledged in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment; and relies on Nabodwip Chandra Podder and another v. S.D. Ahmed (PLD 1969 Dacca 629) and United Bank Ltd. v. Ali Muhammad B. Rajani (1994 CLC 173). There is no cavil with the proposition of law but the fact is that part payments made on the 26th February, 1964, and the 25th March, 1968, have been acknowledged by the defendant No, 1 by the letters which are Exhs. 12 and 20, respectively, whereby the defendant No, 1 had forwarded cheques to plaintiff.
43. ' It is finally submitted by Mr. Ansari, relying on the case of Commerce Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Crescent Paint Colour and Varnish Works, Ltd. (PLD 1975 Karachi 504), that acknowledgements and part payments by defendant No, 1 do not bind the defendant No, 2 and, therefore, cannot extend the period of limitation against him. Once again, there can be no cavil with the proposition of law but the argument overlooks the fact that by the guarantee (Exh. 10) the defendant No, 2 had undertaken to make payment "on demand" and it is not the case of the defendant No, 2 that any demand was made by the plaintiff, prior to the filing of the suit, for payment under the guarantee. It is an established law that the period of limitation in the case of a guarantee such as the one in this case begins to run from the date of demand for payment and that in the absence of any prior demand, the filing of the suit amounts to a demand for payment.
44. ' In the circumstances, the suit as against both the defendants was filed within the period of limitation. ISSUE NO. 2: 'This issue was admittedly decided by the order, dated 14th November, 1978. Mr. Ansari, therefore, does not press it.
45. ISSUE NO. 3: ' The burden of this issue lies on the defendants but they have led no evidence. The issue is, therefore, decided against the defendants. ISSUE NO. 4: ' The burden on this issue also lies on the defendants but they have failed to produce any evidence and no argument has been advanced by Mr. Ansari on the issue. In any event, the grant of credit facilities to defendant No, 1 is not in dispute. The guarantee was, therefore, evidently, for consideration. The issue is answered accordingly. ISSUE NO. 5: ' Mr. Ansari does not question the amount of money claimed by the plaintiff against defendant No, 1 except to say that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim penal interest because there is no agreement between the parties to pay such interest. However, Miss Sofia Saeed says that the plaintiff has not charged any penal interest and Mr. Ansari has made no attempt to show the contrary. The argument is, thus, without any substance.
46. ' As for the defendant No, 2, Mr. Ansari says that he has died. Miss Sofia Saeed says, in reply, that notwithstanding the alleged death of defendant No, 2, the suit can proceed against him because no intimation of his death has been given by the person nominated by him for the purpose under Order 8, C.P.C., nor has any application been made by any one to bring his legal representatives on record. In support of her submission she has relied upon a case reported in 1972 MLD 490. The submission of Miss Sofia Saeed is obviously correct and the death of defendant No, 2 is no bar to the decree being passed against him in the circumstances of the case. Mr. Ansari has further argued that the guarantee (Exh. 10) is only for Rs,10,00,000, whereas the claim in the suit is for over Rs,30,00,000; and that the decree against defendant No, 2 can only be passed to the extent of the amount of guarantee. It will be seen, however, that defendant No, 2 guaranteed to the plaintiff repayment of Rs,10,00,000 together with interest, commission, charges and other expenses connected therewith. The claim of the plaintiff is, in fact, for the amount of credit amounting to about Rs,10,00,000 together with interest thereon. The guarantor is, therefore, liable for the amount claimed against him in the suit. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the defendants as prayed. The suit is decreed accordingly.
47. ' Thus, hopefully, ends the saga which began 20 years ago in 1975 when the suit was filed. The summons was not served on the defendants till August, 1977 i,e, two years after the suit was filed.
48. Another year elapsed, apparently in connection with the proceedings for directions, before issues were settled on the 13th October, 1978, and it was ordered that the case would come up for hearing of preliminary issue on the 21st November, 1978. In the meantime, documents were admitted. On the 21st November, 1978, the case was partly heard and was adjourned to January, 1979 because the parties wanted to negotiate a settlement. On three occasions thereafter the hearing was adjourned at the defendant's request and then, sometime in April, 1979, the plaintiff made an application for amendment of the plaint. That application came up for hearing on eleven occasions between April, 1979 and September, 1981 when it was finally granted. The suit then came up for evidence for the first time on the 20th December, 1989 i,e, more than 14 years after it was filed; and in the meantime no mention was made of the preliminary issue. The hearing was adjourned on that date and on 12 subsequent dates until the 31st March, 1991, when the plaintiffs side was closed because it did not wish to lead any evidence except in rebuttal, if necessary. The adjournments were obtained on four out of 13 occasions on the ground that the parties were negotiating settlement out of Court.
49. The case then came up for the defendant's evidence on 2nd May, 1991, but was then and on subsequent dates of hearing adjourned until on the 19th November, 1991, the counsel for the defendants stated that he had no instructions; and, consequently, the side of the defendant closed.
50. Thus, a period of six months elapsed in an attempt to record the defendants' evidence, which, in the event, was fruitless.
51. ' The case thus entered the final stage of arguments and came up for hearing on no less than nineteen occasions between the 31st December, 1991, and the 19th April, 1995, when the hearing concluded. The hearings were more often than not adjourned during this period at the instance of one or the other of the parties.
52. ' To summarise, it took two years to have the summons served; another one year before the issues were framed; and two and half years to hear and dispose of the plaintiffs application for amendment. Thereafter, no proceedings took place for more than eight years. A period of 16 months was taken up for recording plaintiffs evidence and in the end the plaintiff chose not to lead any evidence; and another period of eight months was consumed for recording the evidence of the defendants without any result because they did not eventually produce any evidence and their side was closed. Finally, it took almost three and half years to hear the arguments.
53. ' The above record, I think speaks for itself and is a sad commentary on the present state of affairs which needs to be rectified before long. I would only observe, in this connection that the fault lies not so much with the system but with the way in which all concerned contribute to the delays most of which are not unavoidable.