' IHSAN-UL-HAQ CHAUDHARY, J.---The relevant facts for the decision of this Regular First Appeal are that the appellants purchased land measuring 182 Kanals, 12 Marlas situated in Chak No, 9/F, Tehsil Chishtian District Bahawalnagar, for a total consideration of Rs,3,00,000 through registered sale- deed dated 15-11-1980. Abdul Majid, General Attorney of the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit to pre- empt the sale wherein superior right of pre-emption was claimed on the basis of co-ownership etc. The appellants contested the suit. The Trial Court accordingly framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his conduct and act to bring this suit? OPD
(2) Whether the defendants have effected improvements over the suit property? If so, to what extent? OPD
(3) Whether the plaintiff has waived his right of pre-emption? OPD
(4) Whether the suit is for partial pre-emption? If so, its effect? OPD
(5) Whether the suit is incorrectly valued for the purposes of court-fee? If so, its effect?
(6) Whether the defendants are entitled to incidental charges of the sale? If so, the extent? OPD
(7) Whether the sum of Rs,3,00,000 was actually paid or fixed in good faith? OPD
(8) If the above issue is not proved, what are the market value of the suit at the time of sale? OPs.
(9) Whether the plaintiff has got a superior right of pre-emption? OPP (9-A) Whether Abdul Majid, General Attorney of the plaintiff was not competent to file the present suit? If so, its effect? OPD
(10) Relief.
' The learned Trial Court thereafter recorded evidence of the parties and after hearing the arguments decreed the suit vide judgment dated 7-1-1984, which has been assailed through the present appeal, which was admitted to hearing, notices were issued to the respondents but only heirs of plaintiff-respondent have appeared through Mr. A.A. Ansari, Advocate and contested the appeal.
2. The learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the finding of the Trial Court on Issue No, 9-A alone. It was argued that the plaint was signed, verified and presented by the General Attorney of the plaintiff, who had no authority. It is added that a suit to enforce superior right of preemption can only be filed on behalf of the pre-emptor by a person specifically authorised to do so. It cannot be instituted by an Attorney, who has not specially been bestowed the power to file a suit for pre- emption. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the cases reported as Gul Taj Begum v.
Lal Hussain Iqbal Hussain (PLD 1980 SC (AJ&K) 60) and Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi and 2 others v. Abdul Ghafoor (1987 CLC 2134).
3, On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that Abdul Majid was fully authorised to file the suit in accordance with the power of attorney. It is added that the wording of the power of attorney is comprehensive and covers the filing of the suit for pre-emption. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to portion consisting of last three lines at page 1 and first four lines at page 2 of the power of attorney Exh. D.13 (which has been reproduced in para. 4 of this judgment) and relied on the cases reported as Qadir Bakhsh v. Ghulam Moeen-ud-Din (1994 CLC 1949) and Rafaqat All Khan v. Fida Muhammad Khan (PLD 1986 Peshawar 50).
4. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The consistent rule of interpretation of documents is that the power of attorney must be construed strictly while ascertaining the authority conferred on the attorney. In this behalf we may refer to the cases reported as Muhammad Mehrban v. Sadar-ud-Din and another (1995 CLC 1541), Muhammad Aslam and another v. Mst. Inayat Bibi and 4 others (1995 CLC 1572) and Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Usman Sons Ltd. (PLD 1969 Karachi 123). Now coming to the case in hand. The power of attorney opens with the following wording:- {{URDU TEXT}}_ ' While the learned counsel for the respondents referred to the following portion of the power of attorney:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' It is clear from the opening part of the power of attorney that it was given in respect of specific property and from the second portion reproduced above and underlined by us made it further clear that all these powers are to be exercised in respect of the above property while the relevant portion of the power of attorney relied in Rafaqat Ali Khan's case reads as under:- "Know all men by these presents that I, Rafaqat Zaman of 24 Granley Gardens, S.W. 7 in the Country of London, England hereby appoint my father Muhammad Zeman Khan Tahirkheli of Salamkhand P.O. Ghazi, District Hamra, West Pakistan to act for me in every respect as fully and effectually as I could act in person concerning all my present and future affairs and all my present and future property rights and interests real and personal all of which I place in the unfetted control and discretion of my said Attorney with authority to bind me in relation thereto in any manner whatsoever including (but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing authority) power to conduct civil suits in the Courts of Pakistan to decide disputes, receive cash, give statements, make payments and transfer all manner of property both real and personal and for all or any of the above purposes to sign, seal, delivery and execute and do any deeds, transfers, documents, acts and things as effectually as I myself could do if personally present, and to employ and remunerate bankers, brokers, lawyers and agents. And I hereby declare that I purposely refrain from further particularizing and description of my affairs and my property rights and interests and the powers conferred lest by so doing I should be deemed to limit the intended operation of this instrument as a full and general power of attorney."
' The two power of attorneys reproduced above are poles apart in their effect, therefore, the case of Rafaqat Ali Khan is clearly distinguishable. The case of Qadir Bakhsh (supra) is also clearly distinguishable because in that case objection as to the competency of general attorney filing the appeal before the first Appellate Court was for the first time taken in second appeal in this Court.
Beside other points of distinction, the general attorney in that case simply continued the cause initiated by the pre-emptor himself. It is clear from the general power of attorney Exh. D-13 that it had been executed in respect of immovable property described in the opening passage of the document and powers in respect of this property alone had been bestowed, authorising the attorney to initiate all sorts of proceedings including the power to mortgage, sell, gift, exchange and file suits, claims, applications, appeals, revisions, review.
5. Before proceeding any further we may dispel the general misconception/wrong notion that all general power of attorneys are alike in scope irrespective of their text. It is not so. The instruments can be broadly divided into two groups keeping in view their scope. There is subtle but clear difference between the two types of general power of attorney. Firstly, where the executant has authorised the attorney to act on his behalf in all matters and in respect of all the present and future property. In plane words without limiting the authority by specifying the property or prescribing the actions. The classic example of this type of power of attorney is the one noted in the case of Rafaqat Ali Khan (supra); and secondly, where the executant appoints attorney in respect of specific property and authorises him to do acts in respect of such property or prescribed acts.
This is the common patron of general power of attorney in our country and the power of attorney Exh. D-13 as well as the power of attorneys in the cases of Gal Taj Begum, Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi and Muhammad Afsar Khan (supra) are leading examples of this type. The judgment in the case of Rafaqat Ali Khan (supra) on one hand and the judgments on the other hand in the cases of Muhammad Afsar Khan, Gul Taj Begum and Muhammad Ishaq Khan (supra) on their face seem to be contradictory. But if the same are studied closely in the above background then it would be clear that they dealt with different types of power of attorney. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the rule laid in these cases. This becomes further clear from para. 10 of the judgment in the case of Rafaqat Ali Khan which reads as under:- "Now placing the two general power of attorneys in juxtaposition, one would see that the former one was executed for a specified purpose but was styled as general power of attorney in order to vest full rights in the agent to perform the specified affairs. The latter instrument is all out a full and general power of attorney to vest in the agent all the present and future property rights and interest real and personal of the principal. It contains a recital that further particularization of the description of the affairs was purposely evaded lest by so doing he should be deemed to limit the intended operation of the instrument as a full and general power of attorney "
' While in the case of Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi (supra) the comparison of the powers of attorney was noted as under:-- "On the careful reading of the above judgment Gul Taj Begum v. Lal Muhammad with special reference to the contents of the ppwer of attorney reproduced above, the facts of the present case are quite identical with the facts given therein."
The proposition becomes further clear when we find that Abdul Majeed, General Attorney neither could have entered into an agreement to purchase property on behalf of the plaintiff nor could have instituted a suit for specific performance on the basis of power of attorney Exh. D-13. We may clarify here that even if the agreement to purchase was executed by the plaintiff himself still the power of attorney did not authorise Abdul Majeed to institute the suit for specific performance.
Therefore, how he could be deemed to have been authorised to institute the present suit to pre- empt the sale in favour of the appellant.
6. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that in spite of the preliminary objection to the competency of Abdul Majeed to file the suit and framing of Issue No, 9-A the plaintiff/pre-emptor had not cared to ratify or confirm the filing of the suit by his general attorney till today whereas in the case of Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi the pre-emptor executed another power of attorney to confirm the earlier document.
7. This is not all. The plaintiff has not even appeared as his own witness in the suit. This way, the case in hand is even on weaker footing than the case of Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind that the text of the power of attorney Exh. D-13 did not permit Abdul Majeed to institute the suit to pre-empt the sale in favour of the appellant.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the findings of the Trial Court on Issue No, 9-A are reversed as having not been filed by a competent person by accepting this appeal with no order as to costs and the suit of the respondent is dismissed.