' ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J.---Facts giving rise to this petition for leave to appeal are that Muhammad Yousaf petitioner agreed to sell the suit property to Nasir Ahmed respondent for a sum of Rs,7,04,000 vide an agreement to sell dated 31-7-1988. A sum 'of Rs,54,000 was paid to the petitioner in advance. The sale was to be completed/finalized by 1-2-1989 by which date, it was not completed. Respondent, therefore, brought a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement on 1-8-1989. The suit after trial was decreed in his favor on 15-6-1993 subject to the payment of the balance sale-price in the sum of Rs,6,50,000 which the plaintiff was directed to pay by or before 20-7-1983, failing which, it was directed, his suit shall stand dismissed. It is an admitted position that the decree of the trial Court was not appealed against. It appears that the respondent/decree-holder failed to deposit the aforesaid amount by or before the date specified in the decree and made an application in the trial Court on 29-7-1993 for extension of time to deposit the balance sale price. Trial Court dismissed the application holding that it spells out no cogent reasons on the part of the plaintiff for not depositing the amount within fixed time.
Furthermore it is an accepted principle of law that after passing the decree for specific performance, a Court became focus officio and as such, it cannot grant any extension it time of deposit of decrial amount---".
2. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent invoked provisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Learned Judge in the High Court by his judgment dated 27-1-1994 accepted the revision petition and permitted the respondent to deposit the balance sale-price in Court on or before 28-2-1994 with the observation "In default, the suit for specific performance shall be deemed to have been dismissed and the contract for sale of land between the parties shall be rescinded". The learned Judge has taken the view that the decree passed in the suit for specific performance was in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court passing it still had season over the matter. Trial Court, therefore, had the jurisdiction to extend the time notwithstanding the failure of the respondent to deposit the amount within the time specified in the decree and the default clause incorporated therein.
3. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition relying upon a judgment of Lahore High Court reported in 1992 M LD 31 has contended that in a case like the present one where the decree specifies the time for deposit of purchase money and further directs that in case of default of payment of purchase money within the time specified, the suit shall stand dismissed, the Court becomes functus officio after passing of the decree and is left with no power to grant extension of time on the application made by the decree-holder. It is submitted that by virtue of the default clause in the decree, the contract would stand rescinded automatically on the default having been committed.
' Learned counsel has pointed out that there exists divergence of opinion in the Lahore High Court on the question as to whether the trial Court becomes functus officio after passing the decree for specific performance of sale agreement. Reference in this behalf is made to the cases reported in 1985 CLC 478, 1987 CLC 1682 and 1992 M LD 31. Learned counsel further submits that there is no judgment of this Court on this issue which needs an authoritative pronouncement by this Court.
' To examine the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we grant leave to appeal in this case.