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1996 PLC (C.S.) 75

MUHAMMAD IRFAN and 5 others vs POST MASTER GENERAL and 5 others

Citation1996 PLC (C.S.) 75
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Constitutional Petition No, D-884 of 1992
Date1994-03-03
Judge(s)Wajihuddin Ahmed, Muhammad Aslam Arain
ResultPetition dismissed

1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---Some 16 petitioners have joined in this petition which is directed against the Post Master General, Karachi, Metropolitan Circle, respondent No, 1, and five others, all officials holding posts in relation to the affairs of the Federation. The petitioners maintain that pursuance to sub-rule (2) in rule 3 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, a Notification dated 8-11-1988, S.R.O. 1029(1)/88, was issued laying down the method, qualifications and conditions for' appointments to posts in BPS-I to VI attached with the Pakistan Post Office. The petitioners claim to have applied for such posts directly and through the Minister for Labour and the Minister for Communications and State that the applications were forwarded to the respondent No, 1 for doing the needful and for reporting compliance within 7 days. Annexure C-1 to C-16 are relied upon. Of these, it would appear that the names of Nisar Ahmed and Arshad Hussain were "recommended" by the Minister for Labour whereas Muhammad Javed was directed to be appointed on merit by the Minister for Communication; in each case the Chief Post Master, City, G.P.O., Karachi, being asked to do the needful, as required under the rules and report compliance within 7 days. There do not, on the record, appear to be any reference of such character about the remaining petitioners. Be that as it may, the petition proceeds to aver that, at the time, there was a Cabinet ban, as reflected in a letter dated 5-12-1990, on fresh appointments. In spite of this, it is complained that, on 26-11-1990, appointments of 29 persons were made, followed by the appointments of 14 plus 13 persons on 26-3-1992, of 13 others in the months of March and April, 1992 and then of an additional 37 persons, last of whom being outsiders, on daily wages in BPS-WI, in such background, it has been urged that the respondents Nos. 1 to 5, respondent No, 6 being the Secretary, Communications, have deprived the petitioners of their legal rights of appointment in accordance with law.

2. ' When we were examining this petition we found that such contained grounds A, B and H, which were followed by a specific prayer to the effect that this Court "be pleased to declare the impugned appointment letters (Annexures "F/1" to "F/13" and "H"), issued by the respondents Nos. 1 to 5, as illegal, void ab initio, without any lawful authority and of no legal effect" and be further "pleased to issue writs directing respondent No, 2 to appoint the petitioners on Posts of BPS-I to BPS-VII after adopting the proper legal procedure in the interest of justice". It is regrettable to note that in spite of the fact that appointment orders of a number of persons have been sought to be declared as without lawful authority and void the petitioners have chosen, for reasons better known to them, not even to join them as parties to these proceedings. When we pointed out this position to Mr. Suleman Habibullah, the learned counsel for the petitioners, he said that since the illegal appointees were large in number it was difficult to pick and choose from that number so as to make appropriate inductions in the petition. No question of pick and choose arises in a case when specific appointments, through an order in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, are assailed.

3. Such relief cannot be obtained by suing a random group in a representative capacity by invoking the principle incorporated in Order 1, rule 8, C.P.C. What is more, the persons, who were to be sued, have been specific and known and the position became self-evident when the learned counsel next urged that such persons may be allowed to be joined now. The petition is now pending since 26-4-1992 and a period of two years has already passed by introducing the element of lathes in its wake. It would be according premium on the conduct of the petitioners to allow the impleadment at this late stage. This is moreso because we are apprehensive that proper and indeed necessary parties were left out by the petitioners, possibly, on purpose and for mala fide reasons with a view to obtain orders in their absence.

4. ' At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner; apparently implying a reference to Order 1, rule 9, C.P.C., has contended that no suit can be defeated by reason of mis joinder or non-joinder of parties. We are not unmindful of that principle but such does not confer any free licence to a plaintiff or petitioner. All that is there involved is that in cases of mis-joinder and non-joinder the Court may deal with the matters in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The rule that if necessary parties are not joined the suit or petition, as the case may be, should fail is a rule of substantive law and remains unaffected by the principle incorporated in Order 1, rule 9, C.P.C. Of course the Court, under rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code, has the discretion to join due parties at any stage of the proceedings but the discretion is judicial and can be declined. We, in the circumstances, decline it here.

5. ' As to the merit of the petitioners' own pleas of appointments, they themselves concede that at the time there was a ban on fresh appointments. Some of them indulged in influence pedaling and obtained ministerial intercessions. That is how they were disposed and such should have sufficed for them. On principle, this Court does not interfere in appointments except to a very limited extent.

6. The pleadings and the prayers do not measure up to the exceptions in the rule.

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