1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This petition for leave to appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court dated 30-1-1996, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner, herein, was dismissed.
2. ' The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the suit land was transferred through a registered sale-deed by Ghulam Nabi son of Shahab-ud-Din to Muhammad Hussain, defendant- petitioner. A pre-emption suit was instituted by Mst. Muniza Bi, plaintiff-respondent, in the Court of Sub-Judge, Dudyal. After trial, the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed on the ground that during the pendency of the suit, section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act was amended through an amending Act in the year 1993 and, thus, she lost her right of pre-emption; the appeal filed to the District Judge was also dismissed. However, on appeal to the High Court; the findings of the Courts below were reversed observing that the amendment brought in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act would not adversely affect the pre-emption suits which were already pending in the Courts before the aforesaid, amendment. Consequently, the High Court passed the decree on the basis of the right of prior purchase in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on payment of Rupees five lakhs plus the expenses which were incurred by the petitioner, herein, on the execution of the sale- deed.
3. ' We have heard the arguments and perused the file. Kh. Ali Muhammad, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued that the. High Court has committed error in relying upon the judgment of this Court reported as Fazal Dad v. Khadim Hussain (1995 MLD 1299). He has maintained that the facts of the aforesaid case are distinguishable and are not applicable to the case in hand. He has argued that it is well-settled principle of law that right of pre-emption must exist on three dates, i,e,, at the time-of execution 'of sale-deed, at the time of institution of the suit and at the time of passing the pre-emption decree in favour of the pre-emptor. The learned counsel has argued that this principle has not been departed from by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. According to the learned counsel as the plaintiff-respondent claimed the right of prior purchase as sister of the vendor, she had lost' the said right as a result of amendment in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act and no decree on the basis of the right of pre-emption could be passed in her favour because the ground of pre-emption ended before decree in her favour.
4. ' In reply, Ch. Muhammad Azad Khan, Advocate for the respondents, controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and has maintained that the dictum laid down in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above; is fully applicable to the case in hand. The learned counsel has maintained that in the said case the principle that a pre-emptor must possess prior right of purchase at three stages, i.e at -the time of sale-deed, at the time of institution of suit and at the time of decree of the Court in favour of the preemptor was not departed from but all the same a distinction Was made in the cases where right of pre-emption is taken away through a notification under section 6 of the Prior Purchase Act and in cases which were pending before the amendment was made in the Prior Purchase Act. He has argued that while a notification under section 6 of the Prior Purchase Act destroys the right of preemption in toto, an amendment in the nature of one made in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act would not adversely affect the pending pre-emption cases because the amendment has not been given retrospective effect. Thus; the pending suits would continue and be decided according to law which was in force at the time of the institution of the suit and not according to the amended provisions of the law. Therefore, the learned counsel maintained that the distinction drawn between the facts of Fazal Dad's case and the case in hand is artificial and has no substance in it because ratio decidendi in both the cases is same.
5. ' We have given our due consideration to the matter. It may be stated that various authorities were discussed in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above, and it was held that the amendment in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act would not affect the pending cases. There is no dispute that the case filed by the plaintiff-respondent was pending at the time when the amendment was brought in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act. As has been held in Fazal Dad's case, in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the pending pre-emption cases would be decided according to law which was in force at the time of the institution of those cases and not in view of the amendment made in the Prior Purchase Act. A distinction was drawn between the cases which were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in view of the expression, 'law shall cease to have effect' in the relevant law and cases which were pending at the time of the amendment in section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the expression ' shall cease to have effect' occurring in the relevant law has different connotation from one which would follow in case of 'repeal of law'. The relevant observation of the Supreme Court made in case reported as Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 291) is reproduced as under:-- "20. As has been seen the relevant provisions made in Chapter 3-A of the Constitution regarding the effect of the decisions thereunder,. Are extraordinary and special methodology and phraseology has been used in that behalf. It is not pari materia with the effect of repeal of a law as is provided in Article 264 of the Constitution nor the law becomes void as under Article 8. Moreover, these well-known words have been avoided. Instead, the law in question 'cease to have effect' not by virtue of enactment thereof by another law -- This result is achieved directly by the decision of the Court itself. The new law, if any, in pursuance of the decision is to be made by the legislative organs of the State normally, before the questioned law ceases to have effect, as discussed earlier, by virtue of Article 203-D (3)(a). In the so made law saving provisions can also be made; rather should always be made, so as to save the citizens from uncertainty and the Courts, from conflicts of judgments. Such provisions, besides being in the nature of saving clauses, could also deal with the interregnum so as to. Avoid absolute vacuum even of a short period. Such a course would also be in accord with the principle of equality before law. However, it is essential that such provisions are to be made in such a manner so as to avoid any conflict with the decision of the Court under Chapter 3-A on the one hand and with the relevant provisions regarding the effects of the continuance of the proceedings pending final decision, as are being determined in this judgment.
6. ' After discussing the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, this Court observed in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above, as under:-- "32. In Azad Jammu and Kashmir the situation is clearly of repeal, The situation which is under our examination has arisen out of the amendment carried out in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act through an Act of the Assembly known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act, 1993 through which section 14 has been substituted. Since we have held that amendment is the equivalent of repeal section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, becomes applicable and also possibly section 56-C of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act."
37. The result of the foregoing is that section 14 on which grounds Nos.(i) and (ii) of the plaint (being a ' Yakjadi' and 'ownership in the village') were based has been repealed but it continues to be operative for pending cases and the suit will be continued and decided in light of the repealed provisions."
7. It may be stated here that there is a ring of authorities in support of the proposition that if different intention does not appear in the amending law, the pending cases would not be adversely affected and would be decided in view of the provisions of law which were in force at the time of the institution of the relevant suit and not in view of the amended law. A reference may be made to the following authorities: ' In case reported as State of Orissa v. M/s. M.A. Tulloch & Co. (AIR 1964 SC 1284), it has been held that a statute which supersedes the previous law virtually repeals the same. It was further observed that when an enactment supersedes earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of law, it would tantamount to repeal of earlier statute unless there are indications to the contrary. It has been also observed that if the effect of supersession of previous enactment is repeal, the provisions contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply .Even if the word 'repeal' has not been expressly used. It follows from what has been stated above that in the instant case the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication curtails such rights in any manner.
8. ' In case reported as Bimila Prasad Ray v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1951 Cal. 258), it has been held that a right of appeal which is one of methods by which a decision can be challenged is not a procedural right but a substantive right, and therefore, an Act purported to take away the right of appeal can have no retrospective effect if it is not clear from the express words of the statute or cannot be inferred from its terms.
9. ' In Mahabir Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Union of India (AIR 1975 All. 239), it has been observed that where there is repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will folloW. Has been observed that in case of simple repeal, there would be hardly any room for a view contrary to one contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act but when repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject then the provisions of new Act may be considered for the purposes of determining as to whether a different intention from one contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act is indicated. The application of the rule incorporated in section 6 be ruled out only if there is intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
10. ' In case reported as State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (AIR 1955 SC 84), it has been observed that in case of simple repeal, there is hardly any room for the' argument that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to such a case. However, in case where repeal is followed by the s fresh legislation on the same subject, the Courts would . Undoubtedly have to look into the provisions of new Act only for the purposes of determining Whether they indicate a different intention. The line of inquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy the old rights. Thus, section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable despite the new legislation if an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of section 6 is not manifest.
11. ' Identical view was expressed in case reported as Muhammad Hafeez Khan v. Mst. Sabiha Khanam (PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K).1).
12. It is evident from the above authorities that if contrary intention does not appear in the relevant statute, the suits which were pending at the time of amendment of section 14 of the Prior Purchase Act would be governed by inamended provisions which were in force at the time of the institution of the ,uit and not in view of the amended law.
13. ' In the light of what has been stated above, we find no reason to allow the petition for leave to appeal and hereby dismiss it.