' MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J.---This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of a learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court, dated 9-2-1995 whereby the sentences of imprisonment for life under section 302, P.P.C. On three counts, rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under section 307, P.P.C. Each on three counts, rigorous imprisonment for three years under section 148/149, P.P.C., fines awarded to and compensation to be paid by Muhammad Hayat and Fazale Rabbi, petitioners, by the learned Sessions Judge, Nowshera, has been affirmed.
2. The case of the prosecution sununarized in the impugned judgment is as follows:-- "The occurrence which took place on 11-7-1988 resulted in the murders of three persons, namely, Bahadar Shah son of Zaiwar Shah, Marfat Shah son of Zaiwar Shah and Hidayat Shah son of Bahadar Shah and injuries to three others, Akhtar Biland son of Sar Biland, Gul Habib son of Muhammad Gul and Rehm Shah son of Zargun Shah. The information about the occurrence was conveyed by Karamat Shah son of Zargun Shah to Umra Khan, A.S.I., outside the police station which was reduced into writing and the Mursila vas sent to the police station for registration. Of the case. According to the F.I.R. On the day of occurrence the complainant was present on the road side while on the bridge nearby Marfat Shah, Bahadar Shah, Hidayat Shah and Akhtar Biland, all residents of Kheshgi Bala, were standing and talking to each other when Niaz Muhammad, Yar Muhammad, Noor Muhammad sons of Ghafoor Khan, Fazle Rabbi son of Khushal, Parvez and Muhammad Hayat sons of Ghulam Said and Muhammad Rasan son of Muhammad Rasool, residents of the same village appeared on the scene armed with ' Topaks' and fired at the aforesaid four persons as a result of which Marfat Shah and Hidayat Shah breathed their last there and then whereas Bahadar Shah and Akhtar Biland received fire-arm injuries and an unconcerned person Gul Habib present in the premises of a saw machine was also injured by the firing. While the accused were decamping from the spot they met, fired at and injured Rehan Shah brother of the complainant. Besides the complainant Akhtar Biland, Sawab Shah and Feroz Shah were also cited as eye-witnesses. The motive for the offence was previous altercation between the parties which, it is stated, was never reported to the police but was compromised on the intervention of 'the elders of the village."
' All the accused including the petitioners had absconded after the occurrence on 11-7-1988. The petitioners were arrested on 19-8-1991 and they had thus. Remained in ascendance for more than three years after the occurrence.
3. The prosecution case primarily hinges on the testimony of four eyewitnesses, namely, Karamat Shah (P.W.6), Feroz Shah (P.W.7), Akhtar Biland (P.W.8) and Rehm. Shah (P.W.9). Of them, Akhtar Biland and Rehman Shah P.Ws. Bore on their person stamp of fire-arm injuries. The corroboration of the evidence of these witnesses was also sought from the recovery of blood-stained earth from the spot and the ascendance of the petitioners.
4. The defense of the petitioners before the Trial Court was by and large one of bare denial of the prosecution allegations. When asked as to how would they account for their ascendance both of them urged that they had not absconded and that due to relation with the absconding accused they got scared of the false charge and that they later on voluntarily surrendered to the police.
5. The learned Trial Judge as also the learned Division Bench in the High Court held that the eye- witness account of occurrence was worthy of credence as the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence could not be doubted particularly those of Akhtar Biland 'and Rehan Shah who had sustained gunshot injuries on their person. Both the learned Trial' Court and the learned Judges of the Division Bench were of the view that minor discrepancies regarding time of occurrence apart, which can be explained by magnitude of the tragedy and that the period of for years that had elapsed between the occurrence and recording of evidence the prosecution version had been consistent".
' According to the learned Judges, the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses may be sufficient for conviction although as a rule of prudence Courts insist on corroboration. In the present case, however, according to the learned Judges, there was testimony of Akhtar Biland who was not only disinterested witness but had also been injured in the occurrence and, therefore, the conviction could be based on the testimony of a gait disinterested witness. The learned Judges held that notwithstanding Akhtar Biland statement being absolutely believable still his statement was fully corroborated from the statements of P.Ws. Karamat Shah and Feroze Shah. The learned Judges reached the conclusion that the petitioners having remained absconders for. Over three years and, therefore, it lent sufficient corroboration to the testimony of the witnesses. The contention raised on behalf of the defense that some investigation was undertaken before the F.I.R.
Was recorded and that in such circumstances the F.I.R. Which is the foundation of the prosecution case shall be ruled out of consideration was repelled with reference to the dicta in the cases of Harsan v. The State (1989 PCr.LJ 809) and Kareem Bakhsh v. The State (1976 PCr.LJ 911) that such investigation by the Investigating Agency was an irregularity but by itself it was not sufficient to discard the prosecution case as false. The convictions, sentences of imprisonment for life and other terms, fines and the awarded compensation were thus affirmed.
6. Mr. Khawaja Muhammad Khan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that there was clearly delay of two hours in lodging the report which was indicative of preliminary investigation by the Investigating Agency and that, therefore, such managed delay adversely affected the prosecution case. Reference was made to Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others v.
The State and another (1995 SCM R 127). It was next contended that there was complete lack of motive for the offence which vitiated the convictions of and sentences awarded to the petitioners.
It was lastly submitted that mere ascendance was not corroborative piece of evidence and, therefore, the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the High Court had fallen into a grave error in flouting the law laid down by this Court on the evidentiary value of the . Ascendance of an accused person in the murder trial. Reliance in this context was placed on the cases: (i) Alam Khan and others v. The State (1984 SCM R 90) and (ii) Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain alias Mithus and 6 others (1994 SCM R 1928).
7. In Alam Khan's case (supra) the ascendance of the accused was not considered as a corroborative piece of evidence because no question was put to him on this aspect of the prosecution case. This case, therefore, is not of any help to the learned counsel for the petitioners.
Again in Muhammad Iqbal's case (supra) the question of abscondence was not involved for the corroboration of the prosecution evidence.
' The learned Judges have definitely found the ocular account of the occurrence to be completely worthy of belief. As a precaution they looked for confirmatory evidence and maintained the convictions and sentences of the ' petitioners as they were proved to have absconded after the occurrence. This circumstance though not of a conclusive nature was considered as sufficient corroboration of their participation in the assault resulting in triple murders and triple attempted murders. Reference may be made to the case of Gul Hassan and another v. The. State (PLD 1969 SC 89). In the precedent case of Muhammad Din alias Manna v. The State (1976 SCM R 185) Anwarul Hach J., speaking on behalf of the Full Bench, ruled that "ascension can be used as a corroborative circumstance against the accused and, besides the case of Gull Hassan (supra), also referred to the case of Syed Mushtaq Ahmad v. Siddiqullah (PLD 1975 SC 106). To the same effect is the case of Azam Khan v. The State (PLD 1984 Peshawar 238) wherein ascendance of the accused for five and a half years was taken to be a strong circumstance in corroborating the ocular version of the prosecution case.
8. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have exhaustively dwelt in paragraph 15 of the judgment on the objection of delay of two hours and for a very cogent reason have rightly not entertained it. The time of occurrence in the F.I.R. Is 'digarwela' which varied during the days of occurrence from 6-00 p.m. To 6-40 p.m. The time consumed to reach the police station was also noticed. In any case, the learned Judges were right to hold that the delay in reporting the occurrence per se was not enough of a reason to discard the prosecution case as false and further that the witnesses whose presence on the spot was natural could not be doubted on any hypothesis.
' The motive which the prosecution attributed to the petitioners in this crime is that there was previous altercation between the parties prior to the incident which was not reported to the police but had been compromised with the intervention of the elders of the village. The learned counsel for the petitioners as stated earlier, argued, firstly, that this was far too slight a motive for the present crime and; secondly, that it was far from proved. The law on the point of existence,, setting up, sufficiency and proof of motive is by now settled in The State v. Rabnawaz and another (PLD 1974 SC 87). Muhammad Gull, J., as his Lordship then was, speaking for the Full Bench laid down the law as under:-- "However, that may be, in criminal cases motive more often than not, remains shrouded in uncertainty. To the complainant, it is generally a matter of speculation, for it is a fact within the special knowledge of the accused. Even motiveless crime is not unknown. Therefore, the mere fact that the prosecution case as to motive has been disbelieved by the Courts below is no reason for disbelieving direct evidence on the main incident, which has to be judged on its own merits, and if such evidence is creditworthy, it can form a valid basis for conviction, obscurity of motive notwithstanding."
' Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., delivering the judgment on behalf of the ' Full Bench of this Court in Syed Mushtaq Ahmad v. Siddiqullah and others (PLD 1975 SC 160) observed as under:- "It is well-settled that the weakness of motive or even its complete absence would be wholly immaterial in a case where ocular testimony of an unimpeachable character is available in support of the prosecution case."
' The evidentiary value of motive came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Allah Bakhsh and others v. The State (1976 PCr. LJ 1272) wherein it was held that:-- "Moreover, it is settled law that the absence of motive or presence of weak motive does not provide reason for the Court to disbelieve direct evidence of the main incident if that evidence is otherwise worthy of credit and can form sound basis for conviction of the accused."
' Lastly in a monumental judgment in the case of Arbab Shah and 3 others v. The State (1976 P.Cr. LJ 40) Tufail Ali A. Rehman, CJ., had the occasion to examine the effect and significance of the motive in a criminal trial and observed as under:- "The motive which the prosecution attribute to the appellants for this crime is that there was, about fifteen days prior to the incident, an altercation between the first information and Dinal Shah, a brother of the appellant Arbab Shah, who worked on the weighment of the produce and this is glaringly referred to in the first information report where it is stated that two of the appellants said to the first informant that since he had insulted them on that occasion, they would kill his son.
Learned counsel for the appellant argues that this is far too slight a motive for the present crime but of course, where a motive is involved, it is difficult to say what kind of motive will be sufficient and that is why, as a matter of law, the prosecution are not bound to establish a motive. Having said so, however, I do feel that the question of motive cannot be brushed aside in all cases as entirely irrelevant. Much would depend upon the facts of each particular case. Where a motive is in fact attributed, it might be worth examination to see whether it could really be any incitement for the commission of the crime."
9. In the instant case, it has been urged that the motive having not been established by the evidence admissible under. Section 60 of the Evidence Act, the ocular account of occurrence which was interested in nature should be brushed aside. So far this Court is concerned, the law is settled that even if motive is suggested its weakness or even failure of the prosecution to prove it, is not necessarily. To be insisted upon, for, motive in criminal cases as held in the case of Rab Nawaz (supra) "more often than not, remains shrouded in uncertainty. To the complainant, it is generally a matter of speculation for, it is a fact within the special knowledge of the accused". Similarly, in Ahmad Nisar v. The State (1977 SCM R 175) it has been observed that:- "Generally speaking, motive, more or less, is a guess on the part of the prosecution witnesses. What truly motivates an accused person to commit a crime is best known to him and not to others."
Even otherwise, nothing turns on the weakness, if any, of the prosecution story or the motive. It is an established rule that absence of motive or failure of the prosecution to prove it does not, therefore, adversely affect the testimony of the eye-witnesses if they are otherwise reliable.
10. There is no cavil with the proposition laid down in the case of Zaab Din and another v. The State (PLD 1986 Peshawar .188) that merely because the P.Ws. Had stamp of fire-arm injuries on their person was not per se tantamount to a stamp of credence on their testimony.
11. After going through the record, we feel that the High Court had taken the correct view and followed the principles laid down by this Court for safe administration of justice. There was no delay in reporting the occurrence and, in any case, delay per se would not adversely affect the trustworthiness of the prosecution witnesses. The presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence is established at least in so far as two of them are concerned who had the stamp of fire-arm injuries on their person. The eye-witnesses were not interested witnesses in strict sense as held in Niaz v. The State (PLD 1960 SC 387) and Zar Bahadar v. The State (1978 SCM R 136).
Nonetheless, their evidence lends ample corroboration from the ascendance of the petitioners for Over three years which they had not been able to account for satisfactorily. The convictions under section 302/307 on three counts each read with section 148/149, P.P.C., fines imposed and payment of compensation awarded against the petitioners are justified and do not call for interference.
Accordingly, this petition is dismissed and leave prayed for is declined.