This is an application for bail by one Muhammad Hashim who is facing trial in a case under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 which was registered against him at Police Station Chamkani vide F.I.R. No. 230, dated, 19-7-1994.
2. Bail is urged on the ground of statutory delay.
3. The F.I.R. Discloses that on the eventful day a police party headed by Nasirul-ul-Mulk, S.H.O. Had laid a picket at Haji Camp, near the Truck Stand Gate, pursuant to a tip-off that a particular person will transport a huge quantity of heroin from Bajaur Agency to Karachi in a truck. In the meantime the person whose description was given by the informer appeared on the scene carrying two black shopping bags. He was interrogated and heroin weighing 9 Kilograms was recovered from the shopping bags. The requisite samples were taken and made into separate sealed parcels and a Murasila was despatched to Police Station Chamkani on the strength whereof a case under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 was registered against the petitioner.
4. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was entitled to bail as of right as he was behind the bars since 19-7-1994 but his trial had not yet concluded.
5. The learned Assistant Advocate-General on the other hand argued that the plea of statutory delay was not available to the petitioner because he was not only a dangerous criminal but also belonged to the Tribal Territory and as such the possibility of his absconding in the event of bail could not be ruled out.
6. No doubt the petitioner is behind the bars for a continuous period exceeding one year and his trial has unfortunately not yet concluded but the concession envisaged by the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. Cannot be extended to him inasmuch as he appears to be instrumental in spreading the poison of heroin in the society, which is a worst type of social crime, and as such he is dangerous criminal within the contemplation of the fourth proviso to subsection
(1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. Which controls the third proviso. As regards the second contention raised by the learned Assistant Advocate-General it will suffice to say that it cannot prevail because refusal to grant bail on the ground of danger of absconding being linked with the discretionary power of the Court can have no bearing on the statutory right of an accused to be enlarged on bail under the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C.
For the foregoing reasons this application is dismissed.