' Brief facts leading to this Constitutional petition are that the petitioner/plaintiff filed a pre-emption suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Burewala. Both the parties produced their respective evidence and the matter was fixed for arguments by the learned Judge. Meanwhile the respondents filed an application for producing a copy of Jamabandi of their land as additional evidence on the ground that the same could not be produced because the Patwari was not available due to his transfer.
This application was rejected by the learned Civil Judge vide his order dated 2-4-1995. The respondents filed a revision petition in a Court of learned Additional District Judge, Vehari who set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge and accepted it vide his judgment, dated 29-11- 1995.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned judgment on the following grounds:---
(a) That the respondents had closed their evidence and were not entitled to produce the aforesaid document in additional evidence to fill up the lacuna.
(b) That the revision filed by the respondents was time-barred and the delay could not be condoned by the learned lower Court.
' Learned counsel has placed reliance on Muhammad Umar Mirza v. Waris Iqbal and others 1990 SCMR 964. He also relied upon Mutali v. Manzoora and another PLD 1994 Lah.
298.
3. Admittedly a copy of jamabandi was a public document and its authenticity could not be disputed. The respondents also furnished the reason for non-production of the said document at the relevant time. It may be observed that word "good reason" susceptible to the various interpretations and the Court should exercise its powers under the relevant rules benevolently unless it causes irreparable injury to the other party.
4. In Muhammad Umar's case no reason was furnished to the satisfaction of the Court whereas in Mutali's case the plaintiff had not produced a single witness when he filed an application under Order 6, Rules 1 and 2 and Order 13, Rule 2 read with section 151, C.P.C. For producing the document.
5. The object of Rule 1 of Order 13, C.P.C. Is to prevent fraud and not to penalise the parties for non- production of document in time.
6. In Lahore Improvement Trust v. Messrs Khuda Bakhsh-Meraj Din PLD 1956 Lah. 252 it was eminently observed by His Lordship Mr. Justice B.Z. Kaikaus, Judge Lahore High Court, as he then was:-- "A comparison of rule 2 with the other provision, which I have quoted above, will lend support to the view I take. As I have already pointed out if the document which is the basis of the suit is not produced in Court alongwith the plaint in accordance with Order VII, rule 14, the only restriction on its production later is that the leave of Court is required and there are no words limiting the grant of leave to cases where there is good cause for non-production at the time when the plaint is presented. Can there be any good reason for this distinction? Similarly, the power of Court to grant leave in cases where a document is not mentioned in the list is not in any way limited.
Statutes are to be interpreted with due regard to their objects. The object of O.XIII, rule 2, was to exclude forged documents and to expedite the trial and not exclude genuine documents. If there be no doubt as to the authenticity of a document and if at the same time its admission were not in any way to delay the trial of a suit, words of Rule 2 should not be allowed to bar its production.
' What then is the interpretation which can be consistent with the object of the statute and yet will not unduly strain its wording? It appears to me that the only reasonable construction of the words 'unless good cause is shown for the non-production thereof' is to construe them as meaning unless good cause is shown for reception in evidence in spite of such non-production'. In using in rule 2 of O. XIII, words 'unless good cause is shown for non-production' the legislature was emphasizing the need of considering the reason for non-production with a view to deciding whether the document may not be fabricated and did not intend to provide that the effect of non-compliance with Order XIII, rule 1, should be entirely different from non-compliance with other connected rules. The effect of the rule is only to make the reception of documents dependent on leave of Court. If the document be authentic and the delaying effect be negligible there should be no objection to its being produced.
' That it is permissible to depart from the literal meaning of words by reference to the object of a statute is well established. It is stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (page 85, Ninth Edition): Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effect of consequences which would result from it, for they often point out the real meaning of the words. There are certain objects which the Legislature is presumed not to intend, and a construction which would lead to any of them is, therefore, to be avoided. It is not infrequently necessary, therefore, to limit the effect of the words contained in an enactment (especially general words), and sometimes to depart, not only from their primary and literal meaning, but also from the rules of grammatical construction in cases where it seems highly improbable that the words in their wide primary or grammatical meaning actually expressed the real intention of the Legislature. It is regarded as more reasonable to hold that the Legislature expressed its intention in a solvency manner, than that a meaning should be given to them which could not have been intended. "Similar words will be found at page 55": the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view.
Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained.
' Although I am unable to find any case where the interpretation of the words "unless good cause is shown for the non-production thereof" may be discussed, there are a number of cases wherein it has been held that if the documents to be produced are public records about the authenticity of which there can be no doubt they should ordinarily be admitted in evidence in spite of non- compliance with a procedural provision relating to their production. Vide Ramaswani Chettiar and others v. Tyagaraja Pillai and others AIR 1928 Mad. 516, Chidambara Chettair v. Parvathi Achi AIR 1925 Mad. 744, Naraini Koer and others v. Gena Missir and others 1929 Pat. 314, Jagdip Pandy and others v. Mst. Taibunnissa and others AIR 1924 Pat. 208, Sm. Buchibai v. Nagpur University AIR 1946 Nag. 377, Kamod Singh v. Khemkaran AIR 1927 Nag. 269, Muhammad Tabarak Ali Khan v. Dalip Narain Singh Bahadur and others AIR 1927 Pat. 117, Narendra Narain Rooj v. Jnanada Dassi AIR 1937 Cal.
537. In almost all these cases documents were admitted at a late stage on account of their being authentic and without reference to the reasons for /non-production. In Naraini Koer and others v.
Gena Missir and others, Fazl Ali and Das, JJ. Had set aside the orders of the lower Courts refusing to receive documents which were rendered late on the ground that this was too technical a view and where the authentic was not doubtful documents ought to be accepted. In Muhammad Tabarak Ali Khan v. Dalip Narain 'Singh Bahadur and others, the learned Judges had held that the trial Court 'had complete discretion to admit documents though filed late". This would not be correct if the documents were to be admitted only on proof of good cause for earlier non-production. In Imambandi and others v. Haji Mutsaddi and others AIR 1918 PC 1, their Lordships of the Privy Council had said Rule 1, Order XIII, of the Civil Procedure Code requires the parties or their pleaders to produce at the first hearing of the suit all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power on which they intend to rely. But it does not exclude the discretion of the Court to receive any such documentary evidence at any subsequent stage'. There is no doubt that the precise question which is before me was not before their Lordship but the fact that their Lordships did not state any limitation on the discretion of the trial Judge, does support the view, I am taking.
AIR 1929 PC 99".
7. 'In Iqbal Ahmad and others v. Khurshid Ahmad and others 1987 SCMR 744 an application was filed to produce copy of Jamabandi which was rejected. Consequently the suit was also dismissed.
An appeal was filed before the learned Additional District Judge alongwith the application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. For permission to produce copy of Jamabandi to enable the appellants to establish that they were the owners in the estate and those had superior right of pre-emption but the application was rejected. However, the learned High Court allowed them to produce in evidence the aforesaid document. Leave was sought by the petitioners/defendants. Learned Judges dismissed the petition observing as follows:--- "We have examined the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and gone through the impugned judgment wherein the learned High Court Judge has observed that the authenticity and genuineness of the certified copy of Jamabandi, which was part of the record of rights duly prepared according to law by the Government officials, and which the appellant (respondent herein) wanted to produce to establish his superior right of pre-emption was beyond dispute; and that it is not understandable why the learned trial and the Appellate Court below declined to allow its reception in evidence. We are of the view that the impugned order is not exceptionable. However, the petitioner can rebut the evidence produced in this behalf by any cogent evidence; and can also challenge the authenticity of the document (Jamabandi) and shall be entitled to produce evidence in rebuttal. With this observation this petition is dismissed."
8. For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the first Appellate Court was lawful. This petition, therefore, has no merit and is hereby dismissed.