' Muhammad Aslam and four others filed a suit for possession through specific performance of agreement dated 13-5-1984, duly registered with Sub-Registrar Kasur, executed by defendant No,2 on behalf and in the name of defendant No,1 as general attorney, duly constituted by defendant No,1, under general power of attorney deed registered on 2-7-1969 at No,154 by Sub-Registrar T- Division-IV Karachi; defendants Nos.4 to 13 had allegedly fabricated agreement to sell in their favour and were claiming rights in the disputed property on the basis of said document.
2. Defendants were summoned by the Trial Court. Defendant No,2, on 19-11-1985 filed a consenting written statement in Court whereas defendants Nos.4 to 13 contested the suit.
3.
4. On 28-9-1985 while the matter was being heard by the Trial Court, Syed Sarfraz Shah, Advocate appeared and the following order was passed:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' An application for review of order dated 28-9-1985 was made which was resisted by the respondents, It was contended before the Trial Court that defendant No,2 was a duly constituted attorney of defendant No,1 who had filed written statement in Court on 19-1-1985 as such attorney on behalf of defendant No,1. The act performed by the general attorney was in accordance with the powers delegated to him by defendant No,1; the general power of attorney was irrevocable as defendant No,1 had received the consideration of the disputed land from defendant No,2 and the same was in the nature of an agreement and as such was not revocable. The said application was resisted by defendants Nos.4 to 13. Yet another application was made by the plaintiffs under Order XV, Rule 2, C.P.C. For decreeing the suit on the basis of statement admitting the claim made in the plaint. This application was also resisted by defendants Nos.4 to 13 and both the applications were disposed of vide order dated 25-3-1986 which is impugned in the present appeal.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given my anxious consideration to the facts and law involved.
6. The copy of revocation deed executed by defendant No,1 has been placed on the file of the appeal. In the said revocation deed of general power of attorney the following was the recital:-- "Whereas I have executed a general power of attorney in the name of Chaudhry Imam Din son of Mian Chiragh Din, Muslim adult, resident of Basti Chiragh Shah, Kasur, District Lahore registered on the 2nd July, 1969 at No,154 pages 57 to 62, Volume 8 of Book No,IV Additional in the office of Sub- Registrar, T-Division IV, Karachi dated 29-9-1969. And whereas I under the aforesaid power of attorney assigned certain acts and deeds to my aforenamed attorney in respect of allotment of agricultural lands against my verified claim/entitlement specifically mentioned in the aforesaid power of attorney."
' The above recital amounts to admitting the appointment and constitution of Ch. Imam Din son of Mian Chiragh Din, resident of Basti Chiragh Shah, Kasur as general attorney and delegation of powers to him with respect to the allotment of agricultural land against the verified claim so mentioned in the deed itself. The revocation deed was produced before the Trial Court on 2-2-1986 and appears to have been registered at No,297 on 6-6-1985. The written statement made by defendant No,2, who has been admitted to be a general attorney was filed in Court on 19-1-1985, decidedly before his powers to represent and act on behalf of defendant No,1 were not revoked and, therefore, the principal was bound by the act of the agent/attorney. Defendant No,2 was a recognized agent as mentioned in Order HI, Rule 3, C.P.C., as he was a person holding power of attorney authorising him to make and to do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of defendant No,1.
6. Reference may also be made to the provisions of Order VIII, C.P.C. Written statement, of course, is pleading by the defendants, as defined by Rule 1 of Order VI, C.P.C. Rule 14 of Order VI provides for signing of the written statement and Rule 15 thereof provides for verification of the same. It would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 14, Order VI to appreciate as to who may sign the pleadings and to appreciate as to the verification of pleadings. Rule 15 of Order VI also requires to be reproduced.
Both are reproduced as under:-- "14. Pleadings to be signed.--Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.
15. Verification of pleadings.--(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified (on oath or solemn affirmation) at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed.
As held supra the written statement/pleading on behalf of defendant No,1 was signed by defendant No,2 as her general attorney and verified on her behalf. It was entirely in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 and Rule 15 of Order VI, C.P.C. And as such was in order.
7. Whether a principal who revokes the authority can escape the liability created by the agent/attorney during the subsistence of such powers was the most important fact which I leave to be determined by the Trial Court which shall be bound by the contents of the general attorney deed executed and registered in the year 1969 by defendant No,1. Ordinarily a principal is bound to ratify the acts and deeds of the attorney and stands to indemnify the third person as against any claim regarding act or deed done by the attorney. In the present case an act was done i,e, an act of filing written statement in the name and on behalf of defendant No,1 who had, admittedly, delegated powers to defendant No,2. Whatever be the consequences of such admission, as observed supra, is to be determined by the Trial Court keeping in view the contents of the attorney deed.
8. Regarding contractual obligations the provisions of Contract Act shall always be available to both parties which govern validity and effectiveness of the agreements whereas the specific performance of the valid agreements is governed by the provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1877.
9. While hearing the arguments I had notified the learned counsel for both the parties regarding the suo motu powers of this Court under section 115, C.P.C. Vide order dated 28-9-1995 the Trial Court had granted an opportunity to defendant No,1 to file a new written statement and written reply. The order to that extent had foreclosed the rights of the plaintiffs to make any claim under the admitting written statement filed in Court on 19-1-1985. In my view the same amounted to a case decided. The Trial Court had acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally in allowing defendant No,1 to file fresh written statement and a fresh written reply to the application. The said order is, therefore, held to be without lawful authority and is set aside.
10. The plaintiffs and defendant No,2 claimed that the authority under power of attorney deed was not revocable as the done of the power had himself an interest in the property, is not without substance. Defendant No,1, having herself created in the disputed property, a right of defendant No,2 under the deed registered on 2-7-1969 could not revoke this authority. Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 was applicable and illustration (a) applied, to the facts of this case with full force. The contention of the appellants that the condition was void was not tenable.
11. The Court is to proceed on the basis of written statement filed by defendant No,2 on behalf of defendant No,1 during the time that powers delegated to him were still subsisting ex facie.
Revocation deed executed by defendant No,1 related to the revocation of registered power of attorney, and therefore, was to take effect from its registration and the date of registration of the revocation deed was 6-6-1985. Defendant No,2 as held (supra), had all the powers delegated to him to represent defendant No,1 and as defendant No,2 had filed a written statement during the subsistence of the said power, defendant No,1 was bound to ratify such act of defendant No,2 performed by him as attorney on her behalf.
12. In view of what has been discussed above the appeal has no force and the same is dismissed.
13. The suit was filed in the year 1984 and it is almost 12 years that the same is pending at preliminary stage. The Trial Court is directed to finally decide the suit, in accordance with law, on or before 20-12-1996.
14. As the point involved related to a question of law, there shall be no order as to costs.