' Brief facts are that the respondents purchased the suit land through registered sale-deed dated 31-1-1983. The petitioners/plaintiffs filed a suit for possession through pre-emption claiming themselves to be the co-sharers in the land. Written reply was filed on behalf of the respondents/defendants. Learned trial Court framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiffs have got a superior right of pre-emption? OPP.
(2) Whether the plaintiffs have waived their rights? OPD.
(3) Whether suit land has not been properly described, if so, to what effect? OPD.
(4) Whether the ostensible sale price of Rs,60,000 was fixed in good faith and actually paid? OPD.
(5) What was the market price of the suit land at the time of its sale? OPPs.
(6) Whether the defendants have improved the status of the suit land, if so, to what value? OPD.
(7) Whether the defendants are entitled to receive the purchase expenses over the suit land, if so, how much? OPD.
(8) Whether the suit has been incorrectly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, if so, to what effect? OPD (9.) Whether the suit is bad in view of preliminary objection No,6? OPD.
(10) Relief.
2. The learned trial Court decreed the suit of the petitioners vide judgment and decree dated 12-12- 1987. The respondents/defendants filed an appeal before the learned District Judge on 21-12-1987.
They have also filed an application to amend the plaint before the same learned District Judge.
The First Appellate Court dismissed the application of the plaintiffs. The appeal was accepted by him and as a result thereof the suit of the plaintiffs/pre-emptors was dismissed vide judgment dated 8-9-1988.
3. The petitioners filed an application under section 36. Of the Punjab Preemption Act before the first appellate Court for the restoration of the appeal. This application was accepted. The additional issues Nos.9 and 9-A were framed and the trial Court was directed to record the evidence and return its findings on the additional issues. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence on the abovementioned issues held that the plaintiffs/pre-emptors had failed to discharge the burden of the issues. The defendants/respondents filed an appeal which was accepted and the suit of the petitioners was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 24-4-1995.
4. It is evident that decree in favour of the plaintiffs/petitioners was passed for the first time on 12- 12-1987 after the crucial date i,e, 31-6-1986. It is now well-settled that no decree can be passed after the said date if the plaintiffs prove 'Talabs' in evidence. Admittedly in the present case the petitioners neither asserted nor proved the mandatory 'Talabs'; as envisaged in Islam. Reliance can be placed upon Barkat Ali v. Khan Muhammad and another (1988 SCM R 1800(1)), therein it was observed:-- "In this petition for special leave to appeal which arises out of a preemption suit so far no decree has been passed in favour of the petitioner, who is a pre-emptor. There is no assertion in the plaint that the ' Talabs' were made in the mode accepted by Islamic Jurisprudence. That being so, no decree can now be passed in his favour (see also Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali PLD 1988 SC 287).
This petition is dismissed."
' In Ghulam Qadir v. Nawab Din (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 701) the following observations were made:-- "In some cases which have come to our notice the learned counsel tried to make out case for '
Talabs' by relying on such phrases in the plaints, which were used to be filed, under the old law, like: {{URDU TEXT}} so as to convass that the plaintiff should be permitted to elaborate such assertions in the context of requirements of the Islamic Law. For obvious reasons such a position would be untenable. The learned Judge in the High Court in this case has correctly remarked that no question of Islamic ' Talabs' could arise in such-like cases. It has also indirect support of a very recent judgment of this Court on the Islamic Law of Pre-emption in another cotext. See Azizur Rehman v. Muhammad Nawaz (PLD 1988 SC 384).
' It may also be mentioned that in some cases, the learned counsel have tried to seek support from another short order passed by this Court in similar cases, where observation was made to the effect that no Talabs in accordance with Islamic Law having been made, the plaintiff could not succeed. The point sought to be made was that perhaps, by intendment the Supreme Court opened the door, for assertion being made that the relevant plaints were filed after making the Talabs; and, further that amendments could now be permitted. Such plea is also for obvious reasons untenable. When the Court observed that no Talabs were made, it was also meant to convey that in the context of the then existing pre-emption laws, the Talabs were not only unnecessary and thus were not made, but also, that they could not have been made due to the peculiarities and strictness of the relevant law in this behalf. Said order of the Supreme Court is: Sher Muhammad v. Allah Ditta (PLD 1988 SC 412). The following observations wherein fully demonstrate how we left about the frivolous claims regarding Islamic Talabs: 'It is admitted that so far no decree has been passed in their favour. It is not claimed that the requirement of ' Talabs' as in Islam was fulfilled in these cases. In C.P.S.L.A. No, 747 of 1983, learned counsel for the petitioners had not even heard of the expression ' Talab'. That being so, no decree can now be passed in their favour in view of the judgment of the Court in Sardar All v. Muhammad Ali (C.A. No, 203 of 1980, decided on 2-5-1988; PLD 1988 SC 287). These petitions are accordingly dismissed."