1. ' MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.---Petitioner Muhammad Anwar has sought leave to appeal against the judgment dated 18-6-1995 delivered by the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No, 823/93. Dated 17-7-1984. The trial Court dismissed the suit on 3-2-1987 on the ground that a pre-emptor cannot claim superior right of purchase on the basis of being owner in the estate. Said judgment and decree were set aside on 22-6-1987 by the District Judge, who remanded the suit to the trial Court after taking view that the suits filed before 31-7-1986, viz. The date of coming into force of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, were to be decided under the old law viz. Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. After remand the trial Court again dismissed the suit on 27-9-1988 on the ground that the petitioner had no right of pre-emption. Said decision was maintained in appeal by an Additional District Judge on 15-2-1989. The matter was taken to the High Court, which remanded the case to the trial Court.
2. After remand, the trial Court rejected the plaint on 21-7-1990. Such order was, however, re-called on 11-7-1991 by the successor Judge, who restored the suit. In the meantime, there was application for amendment of the plaint. Under an order dated 25-2-1992, the trial Court accepted the application for amendment except permitting the plaintiff to add the words about his having followed the requirements of Talbs. In this way the plaintiff/petitioner was allowed to add in his plaint that he was co-owner and co-sharer in the Khata and that his property was situated adjacent to the property in suit. Said order was challenged in Court of the Additional District Judge under Revision Application No, 65-14-A of 1992 filed by the petitioner and under Revision Application No, 66-14-A of 1992 filed by the contesting respondents. Under an order dated 21-12-1992, the Additional District Judge dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner and accepted the revision filed by the respondents, after taking view that the trial Court had illegally exercised the jurisdiction in partially accepting application for amendment. The petitioner took the matter to the High Court in Writ Petition No, 823/93 which was dismissed in liming under the impugned judgment. Hence this petition.
3. ' Mr. Sh. Abdul Aziz, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the suit was filed on 16-7-1985 when requirement of Talabs was not necessary for filing suits under Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and that after repeal of the said Act and enactment of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (hereinafter mentioned as the Act of 1991), it had become necessary for the petitioner to incorporate the fact that he had made Talbs for exercising the right of pre-emption under the Muhammadan. Law.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited the case of Bashir Ahmad v. Lal Khan (PLD 1991 SC 376).
5. ' Mian Nisar Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents 3 to 6, argued 'that in similar circumstances amendment was disallowed in the case of Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 287) which was a pre-emption matter.
6. ' The petitioner had filed suit for pre-emption on 16-7-1985 when the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was in for&. Said Act of 1913 was repealed by the Act of 1991, which came in force on 31-7-1986. The Act of 1991 was enacted to bring existing law relating to pre-emption in conformity with the It may be recalled that the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in the case of Government of N.-W.F.P. v.
7. Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) gave direction to the Provincial Governments of the Punjab and the N.-W.F.P. To enact till 31-7-1986 if possible, consolidated law of pre-emption or else the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 would be void and of no effect after 31-7-1986. In spite of repeal of Punjab Pre-emption , Act, 1913 by the Act of 1991, further proceedings in the cases and the appeals filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 in which judgments and decrees were passed before 1-8-1986 were to be continued in accordance with the provisions of said Act of 1913. No judgment or decree was passed in petitioner's suit till 31-7- 1986.And hence it was not covered by the saving clause of the Act of 1991. The case of Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1991. SC 376) cited on behalf of the petitioner, does not help him. In said case it was argued before a learned Bench of this Court that after repeal of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 by section 34 of the Act of 1991, it had become open for the pre-emptors whose cases fall within the saving provision contained in subsection (2) of section 34 of the Act of 1991, to plead the fulfilment of the condition of Talb-i-Ishhad. Dealing with the point raised learned Bench of this Court observed that there was very strong possibility of false pleas and false affidavits being submitted.
8. The point was not pressed further and it remained inconclusive.
9. ' In the case of Ghulam Qadir v. Nawab Din (PLD 1988 SC 701) the pre-emptor could not succeed before the High Court due to the pronouncements of this Court in the case of Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360), and in the case of Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287), and hence he moved an application in the High Court for permission to amend the plaint so as to include ground for claiming pre-emption right under the Islamic Law, namely assertion of co-sharership together with assertion of three well known Talbs. Said application was dismissed by the High Court, as the pre-emptor who appeared before the High Court was not aware of the very concept and the meaning of the word "Talb". Said matter was brought before this Court under Civil Petition No, 652 of 1988 which was dismissed on 31-7-1988 under the judgment reported in PLD 1988 SC 701. While dismissing the petition a learned Bench of this Court observed as below: " Without any exception, it has been demonstrated that the question of making. Talbs would not at all arise in those cases which were instituted under the Laws hit by the judgments of this Court in the cases of Said Kamal and Sardar Ali."
10. ' Aforesaid judgment is applicable to this case on all the fours and is binding on this Bench.
11. Consequently the petition is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused. "