' ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 7-12-1991.
2. The facts in brief are that on 5-2-1980 the respondent brought a suit for cancellation of Agreement dated 12-11-1979 on the ground that the same was executed by him under coercion and undue influence. The appellants, on 21-2-1980, filed a suit for specific performance of the Agreement dated 12-11-1979, on the ground that the respondent refused to recovery the land in dispute to the appellants as per agreement. They are in continuous possession of the suit land. The Agreement dated 12-11-1979 was the subject-matter of the two suits. According to this agreement, the respondent would recovery the suit land to the appellants in the form of sale for a consideration of Rs,90,000, out of which a sum of Rs,34,000 was stated to have been received by the respondent. Both the suits were consolidated by the learned Trial Court and by a Single Judgment dated 1-3-1983 decreed the respondent's suit for cancellation of the agreement, but dismissed the suit of the appellants for specific performance. The appellants filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 1-3-1983. The learned Additional District Judge on 14-2- 1985 allowed the appeal of the appellants and dismissed the respondent's suit for cancellation of the document. A review application was made by, the respondent, but the same was dismissed by the Appellate Court on 15-5-1985. The respondent challenged the order of the Additional District Judge in a revision petition before the High Court, which was accepted vide impugned judgment.
The High Court confirmed the finding of the Trial Court that the agreement deed was executed under coercion and undue influence.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and gone through the record. He has raised a legal plea that as the learned Additional District Judge disposed of the appeal of the appellants on merits, the High Court should not have interfered with the said judgment in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. The High Court, under section 115 C.P.C., can interfere with a finding of fact, if the same is based on misreading of evidence or arrived at by ignoring some material evidence. This legal proposition is now well-established. In Umar Dad Khan v. Tila Muhammad Khan (PLD 1970 SC 288), this Court has observed that "the Court appreciates the anxiety of the Judges to correct an error which had occurred in the Trial of a suit. This, however, does not justify transgressing the boundaries of their jurisdiction vested by law". In Kanwal Nain v.
Fateh Khan (PLD 1983 SC 53) it has been observed that "revisional powers under section 115, C.P.C.
Are primarily intended for correcting errors made by subordinate Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction. Also ordinarily erroneous decisions of fact are not revisable, except in cases where the decision is based on no evidence, inadmissible evidence or is so perverse that grave injustice would result therefrom". In Shah Gul v. Shamim Akhtar (1990 SCM R 110) this Court reiterated the same principle.
4. The learned Single Judge in Chamber accepted the revision petition and observed as under:-- "In the circumstances, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the agreement deed was executed by the petitioner under coercion and undue influence. The learned Appellate Court had committed material irregularity in not taking into consideration the entire evidence on the record while reversing the finding of the learned Trial Court on the issue involving the petitioner's plea of coercion and undue influence."
The High Court has mainly relied upon the finding of the Trial Court who assessed the evidence of the parties. We see that the two Courts have misread the evidence and the High Court has not properly exercised its jurisdiction in - reversing the finding made by the Appellate Court. An objection was raised that as the appellants had not challenged the decree in respect of dismissal of their suit, therefore, the finding of the Appellate Court confined to the decision made in the suit of the respondent. Technically it may be correct, but the facts and circumstances of the present case bring 'us to the conclusion that the omission could be rectified by the learned Additional District Judge while hearing the appeal. In fact this mistake had occurred due to the fact that both the suits were consolidated, but the learned Trial Judge proceeded with the suit of Naazir respondent and recorded evidence in that case. Issues Nos.6 and 7, which relate to the real controversy between the parties, are as under:-- "6 Whether the impugned agreement dated 12-11-1979 is the result of undue influence and coercion? OPP.
7. Whether the plaintiff has received a sum of Rs,34,000, as earnest money towards the part payment of price of the suit property with agreement dated 12-11-1979?"
' Both these issues were decided against the appellants. According to the decision of the Civil Judge, the suit of Naazir was decreed and the appellants' suit was dismissed. Two decree-sheets were prepared. The appellants challenged the judgment of the Civil Judge before the Court of District Judge, which was disposed of by the Additional District Judge. In the grounds it has been specifically stated by the appellants that Issues Nos.6, 7 and 8 had been wrongly decided in favour of the respondent and the learned Trial Judge introduced irrelevant facts in the judgment. In the prayer clause it has been specifically stated that the appeal may be accepted and the impugned decree dated 1-3-1983 may be set aside and the appellants' suit for specific performance may be decreed. The appellants only filed the decree sheet in respect of the respondent's suit. The learned Appellate Court has noted that both the suits were consolidated. The two appropriate issues, namely 6 and 7, have been discussed by the Additional District Judge and then finally accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 1-3-1983. The Appellate Court did not deal with the prayer of the appellants that their suit should be decreed. The Appellate Court failed to note that the appellants in the memo. Of appeal has prayed for the decree of their suit for specific performance. The Court could direct the appellants to file copy of the decree sheet made in their suit. It could also direct for the payment of court-fee on the amount of Rs,90,000 which the appellants had to fix in their appeal. The mistake had occurred due to the consolidation of the suits. This Court in Siraj Din v. Rajada (1992 SCM R 979) has observed as under:-- "7 After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, we find that in fact as the memo. Of appeal filed before the ' District Judge shows at the very first opportunity the judgment in both the suits had been challenged. It was not an appeal in one case and not in the other. Copy of the decree-sheet of Civil Suit No,6 had been filed but not of Civil Suit No,7 of 1972. If at that stage by examining the memorandum of appeal corrective steps had been taken and appellants asked to file copy of the decree-sheet and judgment separately in Civil Suit No,7 of 1972 in order to bifurcate the composite attack, no such anomaly would have resulted. The failure here and at this stage was partly of the Court and its functionary. The parties should have known better. All such technical failures could be remedied if properly attended to promptly. Even at the argument stage, the District Judge should have deferred the decision in order to achieve the same and after allowing the opportunity to the parties to file the same. There was no question of treating the appeal to be one confining to Civil Suit No,6 of 1972 when in fact the substance of the appeal attacked the decisions in both the suits."
' The above observations also apply to the facts of the case in hand.
5. Adverting to the merits of the case we may observe that the Trial Court and the High Court have misread the evidence.'P.W.1 Maqbool Mahmood was the scribe of the Agreement dated 12-11-1979..
He was produced by the respondent. He does not say that the Agreement was the result of coercion or undue influence. He says both the parties came to his house and Exh. P/1 was written.
P.W.2 Muhammad Abdul Qadir was appointed as an Arbitrator by Naazir respondent. This witness admitted that there was a dispute between the parties and he was settling that dispute as an Arbitrator. He further states that at the instance of Naazir the agreement was written by the petition-writer. He also states that Naazir and the witnesses signed the document in his presence.
Naa it in his deposition admits that execution of the agreement was for return of the land. He also admits that he has written that Rs,34,000 have been received by him and the balance amount would be received at the time of registration of the Deed. Muhammad Afzal A.S.-I. (D.W.1) has denied that he put any pressure on the respondent for execution of the Agreement. He has further stated that in fact the parties themselves stated before him that they would settle the dispute through Arbitration. After the execution of the Agreement they came to him and produced the copy of the Agreement.
6. The analysis of the above evidence would clearly bring to the conclusion that the Agreement was executed with free-will of the parties. There was no coercion or undue influence on the respondent. The dispute was already before the Arbitrator appointed by both the parties. Therefore, we accept this appeal; set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Additional District Judge and also pass a decree for specific performance of Agreement dated 12-11-1979. The appellants shall deposit the court-fee on an amount of Rs,90,000 which was to be paid by them in appeal before the District Judge. As the appeal has not been contested, there would be no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.