' The appellant has been covicted by the Foreign Exchange Tribunal, Karachi for contravention of the Provisions of section 12(2) read With section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947- an offence punishable under section 23 of the said Act and he has been sentenced to undergo R. I.
For 18 months and to pay a fine Rs, 50,000 or in default to undergo further R. I. For six months.
2. The case against the appellant is that as Proprietor of Norwex Company, Karachi, he exported 150 bales of cotton yarn weighing 60,000 lbs. To Messrs Eastern International Corporation, Hong Kong, on 10-5-1962 per "s. s. Nishanmaru". The appellant had exported the cotton yarn against G. R. P. I.
Form No, 433341 declaring the value of the consignment to be Rs, 1,11,000. The appellant had signed the declaration on the said form undertaking to repatriate into Pakistan the full sale proceeds of the exported goods through Netherland Trading Society, Karachi as the authorised dealer. The appellant as sole proprietor of Norwex Company gave written instructions to the Manager, Netherland Trading Society Limited, Karachi per letter dated 12th June 1962 (Exh. 9), that the shipping documents pertaining to this consignment were to be delivered to Messrs Eastern Intenational Corporation, Hong Kong against 'no payment'. Since this would have been against the rules and instructions of the State Bank the shipping documents were actually delivered to the importers at Hong Kong against a "Trust Receipt" (Exh. 2). Messrs Eastern International Corporation, at Hong Kong through their Managing Director, Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad, however, repatriated only Rs, 5,797 through the Netherland Bank, Hong Kong Branch leaving a balance of Rs, 1,05,202 as outstanding. The Netherland Bank, Hong Kong insisted on full payment but they were informed by Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmed that under instructions received from Messrs Norwex Company, Karachi the payment of this amount had been directly made to them. The Netherland Trading Society, Karachi on further enquiry came to know that the Managing Director Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad of Eastern International Corporation Limited, Hong Kong was the real brother of the appellant. The State Bank of Pakistan meanwhile insisted can repatriation of the entire amount and the last extension was granted by the State Bank for the purpose till 25-6-1964. The appellant then managed to get bogus letters from Messrs Eastern International Corporation, Hong Kong intimating that they had paid the amounts of the sale proceeds to the Netherland Trading Society, Hong Kong. The Netherland Trading Society, Hong Kong on the other hand informed their principals at Karachi that they had called upon the Eastern International Corporation Limited, Hong Kong to make payment of the sale proceeds of the consignment but the Managing Director, Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmed stated to them that this payment could not be made on account of the fact that on instructions received from Messrs Norwex Company he had already made the payment directly to them. As this was against the Regulations, the branch of the Bank at Hong Kong gave 10 days time to Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad to make the payment and also sought instructions from the Principals at Karachi whether they were to engage a lawyer to recover the amount from Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad through the law Courts at Hong Kong. Meanwhile on the basis of the fake correspondence, the appellant instituted a Civil Suit against the Netherland Trading Society, Karachi for recovery of the sale proceeds said to have been paid to their agent in Hong Rong. This suit was dismissed though the Court judgment has not been filed in the course of these proceedings. The State Bank found the case to be complicated one and referred it for investigation to the Special Police Establishment, State Bank Division, Karachi on 13-8-1969. Inspector Ali Akbar Khan started investigation and seized all the relevant documents.
He made enquiries from Netherland Bank Karachi in this connection and seized the photostat copies of the letters written by the appellant to the said Bank. On completion of the investigation a report was forwarded to the State Bank for further action. The Bank then issued a show-cause notice to the appellant dated 9th February 1971, as to why legal action should not be taken against him under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant made a reply to this notice dated 9-3-1971 stating that he was suffering from T. B. And vomiting blood and since the matter was 9 years old, he had to trace the papers of the said transaction. The State Bank accordingly filed a complaint under section 12(1) and (2)/23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 in the Court of the Foreign Exchange Tribunal, Karachi. The Exchange Control Officer Mr. Abdul Satter, Mohammad Nabi Jan Accountant Bank of Netherlands and Mr. Akbar Khan the then Inspector, Special Police Establishment, Karachi were examined on behalf of the prosecution, while Wajihur Rahman, Exchange Control Officer, State Bank of Pakistan was called by the appellant in his defence. The version of the appellant as per his statement under section 342, Cr. P. C. Was that the exported goods were sold at Hong Kong and his agents there had deposited the amount with the Netherlands Bank, Hong Kong Branch, but they had failed to repatriate the amount to their principals in Karachi. The appellant admitted that the importer's firm, Eastern International Corporation at Hong Kong was managed by his own brother Mustafa R. Ahmad.
' It has first been argued by Mr. A. K. Brohi on behalf of the appellant that the appellant had followed the State Bank Regulations and sent the shipping documents to Messrs Netherlands Trading Society and authorised dealer and it was for the said bank to collect sale proceeds through its agent at Hong Kong within 4 months as per the undertaking given on the G. R. P. I. Form by them as authorised dealer and having failed to do so they rendered themselves liable for being prosecuted and the appellant could not be held responsible for the failure on the part of the authorised dealer to remit the sale proceeds to Karachi. However, the form in question (Exh. 3), contains a declaration signed by the Proprietor Norwex Company, Karachi that "I undertake that I shall deliver to the bank mentioned below the foreign exchange proceeds resulting from the export of these goods within 4 months of the date of shipment." The name of the bank through whom the proceeds should be received has been mentioned as 'Netherlands Trading Society, Karachi'. No undertaking signed by the said bank has been filed in this case. However, Mr. Brohi has relied upon the bank G. R. P. I. Form (Exh. 12) in for parts. The second copy on the back also contains a form of certificate by the authorised dealer in Pakistan undertaking within 4 months of the date of shipment that the proceeds would be received by them or in the event of non-compliance the reasons would be fully explained to the State Bank. A perusal of the Regulations and the Forms would, however, show that it is a primary responsibility of the exporter to deliver to the State Bank the Foreign Exchange proceeds resulting from the export of the goods within 4 months of the shipment and the bank selected by the exporters for this purpose as the authorised dealer only ensured that the proceeds would be received within the prescribed period and in the event of non-receipt of the sale proceeds they are required to state the reasons and circumstances of the same to the State Bank.
The Accountant-General, Netherlands Bank, Karachi has been examined as a witness in this case and he has explained that according to the declaration the appellant had to get back the amount in Pakistan within 4 months from the date of the export of the goods as per declaration signed by him on G. R. P. I. Form (Exh. 3). That the appellant had given them instructions to deliver the shipping documents to Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad, Managing Director of the International Corporation Limited, Hong Kong against 'no payment', but the Bank could not follow these instructions as they were in contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations ; that no document was to be delivered against no payment. They accordingly instructed their Hong Kong Branch to deliver the documents against 'trust receipt'. That this trust receipt was executed by Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad and the documents were released to him. Mr. Mustafa obtained delivery of the goods and he forwarded only Rs, 5,797.69 and the balance has not so far been received, that they insisted on their Hong Kong Branch to recover the balance I ut in reply they were told that Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad was not willing to pay the balance on account of the instructions received from Messrs Norwex Company as the payment had been directly made to them. Under these circumstances the Bank has explained the reasons why the balance could not be paid to the State Bank. The appellant had taken a false'stand that the Eastern International Corporation had deposited Rs, 1,07,000 with Netherland Bank at Hong Kong and the suit flied on the basis of a fake letter received from Mr. Mustafa R.
Ahmad was dismissed. Since the Netherlands Bank, Karachi had explained the entire position they could not be held responsible for not repatriating the sale proceeds in time. On the other hand the conduct of the appellant in forwarding instructions to the bank to make delivery of the shipping documents against 'no payment' etc. And the instructions claimed to have been received by Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmad with regard to the payment, showed that by these acts the appellant was responsible for the delay caused in non-payment of the balance amount.
4. It has been argued by the learned defence counsel that the appellant had discharged his responsibility after he had entrusted the task of repatriation of the sale proceeds in the prescribed manner to the scheduled bank, namely, she Netherlands Trading Society, Karachi and it was then for the bank to obtain this payment. The prosecution had, therefore, to definitely establish ,ens rea or guilty intention on the part of the appellant and the prosecution had to prove that the appellant had collusion with the consignee or foreign importer, and had done any act with intent to delay the sale of the goods or to obtain payment for the goods otherwise than in the prescribed manner.
That in the absence of such evidence the appellant could not be held liable, for contravention of section 12(2) of the said Act. The learned counsel has also pointed out that the responsibility for repatriation of the sale proceeds being of the Netherlands Trading Society, Karachi, any evidence of an officer of this Bank would be in the nature of an accomplice evidence and could not be relied upon without corroboration. That on the other hand any statement of Mr. Mustafa R. Ahmed would be in the nature of hearsay evidence as Mr. Ahmad has not been examined. That there is, therefore, hardly any evidence to connect the appellant with the aforesaid offence.
5. It has been argued by the learned Assistant Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State that the offence under section 12 read with section 23 of the said Act is complete as soon as there is any breach of the undertaking on the part of the exporter to repatriate the sale proceeds within the time prescribed by the State Bank under the rules, namely, 4 months in this case from the date of shipment; that the liability would be absolute irrespective of any mens rea ; that it was not necessary for the prosecution to establish by direct evidence that the exporter had by his acts delayed the repatriation of the sale proceeds.
6. This question which has been raised in these proceedings is not new and it has been considered by the Courts from time to time in various cases that have been decided under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The offence in this case is punishable with imprisonment for 2 years or fine or both. The term of imprisonment prescribed for this offence is thus a substantial one. Before imposing such punishment, the Court has to be satisfied that the mental attitude of the accused in doing this act was such as to render this punishment effective as a deterrent for the future, otherwise there would be no justification for imposing a sentence of imprisonment by way of penal discipline. A man is not, however, responsible for his acts in themselves but for his act coupled with the mens rea or guilty mind with which he does them, In case of criminal offence a person is held responsible for the crime, if he did not do his best as a reasonable man. To avoid the consequence in question. But in rare cases the law goes beyond this and holds a man responsible independently altogether of any wrongful state of mind or culpable negligence. These are wrongs of strict liability in which the mens rea is not required. The law tends to establish a form of strict liability, where the doctrine of mens rea would seriously interfere with the administration of justice, by reasons of the evidentiary difficulties involved. But to penal'se a man for unavoidable mistakes -or accidents is to fail to afford him a reasonable opportunity of complying with the law. On the other hand the difficulty of procuring the adequate proof of intention could be met by allowing the accused to shoulder the burden of proving that he acted neither intentionally nor through negligence and that the unfortunate result was for reasons beyond His control and, therefore, not culpable. It may also be pointed out that on these principles the wrongs of strict liability have been made punishable with certain amounts of fine only as the purpose in imposing the sentence of imprisonment is that it should serve as a deterrent The degree of punishment is, however, of no consequence where the wrong has been done not due to any character or disposition of the offender but due to circumstances beyond the reach of the offender himself. Ordinarily mens rea or guilty mind is an important ingredient of every criminal offence and has to be read in every statute of this nature unless the same is exclude expressly or by necessary implication. In the words of Lord Chief Justice of England (AIR 1947 P C 135) : "It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for protection of the liberty of the subject that the Court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law, unless he has got a guilty mind."
7. Taking an extreme case if a person exports goods of perishable nature to a foreign country, and after the goods are landed they are found unfit for human use and destroyed, would the exporter in that case be still held liable for contravention of his undertaking to repatriate the sale proceeds. It has been held in such cases that the goods must be proved to have been sold before a person could be held liable for breach of the undertaking to repatriate the sale proceeds. A question would then arise as to the nature of proof required in such cases and the question of burden of proof whether it should be on the prosecution to establish all the circumstances or for the accused to show that he had done all in his power to comply with the undertaking but for particular reasons the amount could not be repatriated. Before discussing this question I would quote the decisions arrived at by the superior Courts to show the general trend of such decisions. In Kalipada Saha v.
The State (1), the appellants were convicted by a Tribunal under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 for contravention of section 12. It was observed by Cornelius, J. :- "The facts as to the existence of a duty to repatriate the Foreign Exchange earned in this case as a condition of the export and the non-patriation are indeed so plain that there can be no question, in my opinion, of any prejudice being caused to the accused persons by the failure to charge them in these plain terms, and I conceive that the conviction under section 23 is fully sustainable upon the priciple that this is the offence which might and ought to have been charged against the accused persons at their trial."
' It was also observed in that judgment that the failure of this major condition to repatriate the sale proceeds within 4 months of shipment was a clear offence irrespective of any other act imputed to the accused persons, Thus in effect the condition to repatriate the foreign exchange and the fact of nonpatriation was considered sufficient to establish an offence under section 23 of the Act. But in a later decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Pakistan v. Mehboob-ur-Rahman (2). The position was clarified in respect of the mens rea or intention of the accused. In that case the accused exported hides to India from East Pakistan and arranged with a Pakistan Bank for realisation of export proceeds. Money was, however, lost to the exporter and no repatriation of Foreign Exchange could be made. There was no allegation that the accused intentionally caused any delay in sale of exported goods in realisation of sale proceeds or that he directly received the value of the bills. The accused had so placed himself in relation to the bank that the bank was to receive the Foreign Exchange proceeds directly without his intervention in formal way of trade. It was held that neither section 4 nor section 12 was attracted and that no offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation was made out and the High Court was right in acquitting the {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1959S C (Pak.) 322 (2) 1971 SCM R 642 {{FOOT NOTE}} accused. It was observed in that decision that the provisions of the Act had no application where no Foreign Exchange was acquired.
8. Then there are number of reported cases of Dacca High Court in which it has been laid down that the prosecution must prove that there was collusion of the exporter with the foreign buyer or that the exporter by his conduct rendered himself liable for intentionally delaying the receipt of the sale proceeds. In M. A. Jabbar Chowdhury v. The State (I), it was contended on the authority of the case of Kalipada Saha and another v. The State that the offence was complete when repatriation was not made within 2 months from the date of export.
' It was, however held :- "The above subsection indicates that delay in repatriation would be an offence under section 23 of the Act provided It is intentional. In the facts of the present case the delay in repatriation has not been intentional so there has not been any offence under section 23 of the Act in the circumstances of the present case."
9. The above decision was then followed in the case of Tauheed All Sardar v. State (2). It was observed in that decision :- "Conviction under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act could only be based upon a finding that the non-repatriation of the export proceeds was intentional and deliberate. There cannot be any conviction under section 23 if the exporter was unable to repatriate the sale proceeds for reasons and circumstances beyond his control. This postulates honest attempts on his part to honour the undertaking. The immunity will not be available to him if his conduct is mala fide. Merely taking some steps to show that he made attempts at repatriation will not exonerate him from the liability of conviction. It is only when it is proved that the accused made bona fide attempts to repatriate the sale proceeds of the exported goods in accordance with the undertaking that he will be entitled to acquittal."
' Thus on the one hand the prosecution has to prove that the non-repatriation of the export proceeds was intentional and deliberate at the same time it is for the accused to show his bona fides by establishing that he made honest attempts to fulfil his undertaking but he could not do so for circumstances beyond his control. In Nauman Hussain v. State (3), it was observed : "It is true that in order to convict a person under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for non-repatriation of the sale proceeds it should be established that the non-repatriation was wilful and deliberate. This matter requires consideration on facts in each case. The question as to whether a non-repatriation is deliberate or intentional shall be decided by its own facts. Where the evidence on record showed that the accused did not repatriate the Foreign Exchange proceeds of the goods exported to India within the prescribed period or thereafter in spite of several notices issued him it was held that an offence punishable under section 23 of the Act was complete when the repatriation of the sale proceeds was not made within the prescribed period or the time extended by the State Bank according to law." {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1964 Dacca 20 (2) PLD 1969 Dacca 395
(3) 1969 P Cr. L J 1390 {{FOOT NOTE}}
10. Then there are decisions of or own Court on the same aspect of such cases. In the case of Abdur Rashid Mir v. The State (I), it was observed by H. T. Raymond, J, relying on the Dacca case PLD 1964 Dacca 20 that mere failure to bring sale proceeds of consignments to Pakistan within the prescribed period does not amount to an offence envisaged by section 12. That there was nothing on record to show that the accused had done or refrained from doing any act with intent to secure delay in sale of goods or in repatriation of sale proceeds. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside and the accused was acquitted. In State Bank of Pakistan v. Ismail Usman (2), it was held that condition precedent, to repatriation of sale proceeds was the .Actual sale of goods in foreign country. It was contended that the goods could not be sold having deteriorated to such an extent that no sale could be effected. It was argued on behalf of the State Bank by Mr. H.
Hayat Junejo that the provisions of section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 imposed an absolute liability upon a declarant granted permission to export goods from Pakistan to comply with the terms of his declaration and in accordance therewith to bring back into Pakistan an amount representing the full export value of the goods within the period prescribed therein. Mr. Hayat contended that having obtained the permission for export of the goods on the strength of such undertaking the exporters were bound by the terms of the undertaking and were under an obligation to bring back into Pakistan the full export value of these goods regardless of whether such Foreign Exchange has or has not been earned through the sale goods. In support of this contention Mr. Hayat relied upon PLD 1959 Dacca 723 and PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 322. It was, however, held that a mere declaration of that nature could under no circumstances bring the exporter within the purview of section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The acquittal appeals were accordingly dismissed. In a recent case of Jamilur Rahman v. The State Bank (3), goods were exported to foreign country and undertaking was given by the Managing Director of the exporting firm to repatriate export value within 4 months but this was not done. It was observed by Ghulam Rasool K. Sheikh, J, that mere non-repatriation of export value does not render the exporter liable-the offence would, however, be committed if Foreign Exchange, though earned, was not repatriated wilfully or dubious tacticts were adopted to defer or avoid repatriation within the time allowed. One member of the firm himself went and received the entire stock in foreign county without making any payment to the Bank. It was held that the accused had acted dishonestly to withhold sale proceeds to avoid repatriation.
11. Lastly I would quote a decision in Mohammad Anis Khan v. State bank of Pakistan Karachi (4).
The facts of that case were as under :- ' M' obtained permission of State Bank of Pakistan to export cotton waste to Dubai valued at Rs, 8,000. The permission was granted subject to condition that 'M' would repatriate the Foreign Exchange proceeds within 4 months of the date of shipment. 'M' himself had made a declaration 'I shall deliver the bank the Foreign Exchange proceeds within 4 months of the date of shipment'. The period of 4 months expired but the sale proceeds were not repatriated. Thereupon 'M' was tried and convicted under section 12/23 of the F. E. R. Act {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1968 P Cr. L J 830 (2) 1968 P Cr. L J 1053
(3) 1974 P Cr. L. J 601 (4) PLD 1974 Note 70 at p. 109 {{FOOT NOTE}} 1947. In appeals before the High Court it was argued that section 12' of the F. E. R. Act comes into play only when sale proceeds are actually recovered from the foreign power and that there could be no conviction unless default in repatriation was established by the prosecution to be intentional.
It was held that mere non-compliance with the directives of the State Bank, however, does not establish an offence under section 12/23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. There may be cases where an accused person is unable to collect the Foreign Exchange or where the circumstances disable the accused person from repatriating the same. In any case facts have to be established by the accused from which an inference of such a nature could be drawn. On failure of the accused to establish such circumstances it would be reasonable to infer that he had deliberately avoided to repatriate Foreign Exchange. Burden to establish the existence of such circumstances, however, lies on the accused. Under section 106 of the Evidence Act when a fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
' Thus section 23 of F. E. R. Act does not relate to a wrong of absolute liability in the sense that on breach of the undertaking to repatriate a foreign exchange within the period prescribed by the State Bank the offence is conclusively established irrespective of the defence of accused. The very fact, that before the filing of the complaint the show-cause notice has to be issued on the explanation offered by the accused has to be considered, would show that unless there is reason to believe that the accused has acted in collusion with the foreign importer and in some manner delayed repatriation of the sale proceeds, he could not be held liable for the offence. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct proof. But giving a false account of what had happened to the goods or a false reason why the sale proceeds could not be received may be treated as a strong circumstance against the accused showing his mala fides. It is difficult for the prosecution to establish affirmatively in such cases that the goods were sold and the sale proceeds were dispatched directly to the exporter or they were paid to him in any indirect manner.
The prosecution has, therefore, to establish a prima facie case in the first instance showing that there has been a breach of the undertaking on the sale proceeds have not been repatriated within the prescribed time for no apparent reason. It is then for the accused to show from facts within his special knowledge that the sale proceeds could not be returned for reasons beyond his control or that the goods were never sold or that the importer acted in a dishonest manner and misappropriated the goods or the proceeds. Under section 106 of the Evidence Act (Illus. (a)) when a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. It is true that the onus of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution and is not shifted by reason of section 106.
It is not until a prima fade case is established by the prosecution that the onus shifts on the accused. In other words prima fade evidence must be given by the complainant in order to caste a burden on his adversary. "When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts whether the proposition is an affirmative o negative one". Generally the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation made,, shifts from one side to the other according to the testimony. (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Volume 1, page 33). Thus it is not till the prosecutions has established a prima facie case, that the accused may be called upon to give an explanation, as in section 114, Evidence Act, Illustration (a) the burden shifts and falls on the accused when the fact in question is preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.
12. Applying the above principles to the present case, it may be said, that the prosecution no doubt established a prima fade case of breach of the undertaking and circumstances suggesting mala fides on the part of the appellant. The foreign importer was a brother of the exporter and this fact was admitted. The exporter sent written instructions to the bank to release the shipping documents to the importer without payment though this was in contravention of the State Bank directions. The appellant then tried to obtain bogus advice with regard to the payment to the Netherland Bank in Hong Kong and also filed a suit against Netherland Trading 'Society which was dismissed. The judgment of the suit has not been produced. The special facts would be within the knowledge of the appellant to show why the sale proceeds could not be repatriated. Obviously the allegation that the sale proceeds were misappropriated by the Netherland Bank at Hong Kong would be a false stand giving rise to an inference adverse to the appellant.
13. Lastly it has been argued that even the State Bank has not come with clean hands but the bank has slept over the matter from 1962 to 1969, when the matter was handed over for investigation to the special police or even till 1971, when the show-cause notice was issued. However, the filing of the civil suit against the Netherlands Bank and the allegation that the amount had been misappropriated by the bank would be partly responsible for long correspondence and the delays and subsequent reference of the case to the special police. It was for the appellant to show that his conduct had all along been above board and he had bona fide made efforts to repatriate the sale proceeds as early as possible. However, this theory of payment to the Netherlands Bank having been dismissed by the Civil Court, the appellant did not make any efforts to lead evidence to prove this payment in the course of these proceedings. I accordingly hold that the appellant by his conduct has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation, and he has not made any effort to establish what actually became of the sale proceeds in view of the allegation of the Netherland Bank Officer that the appellant had himself received the payment directly from his brother.
14. The only question that remains is, however, regarding the sentence. The incident is by now early 14 years old. The appellant had to face a protracted enquiry by the Special Police and he has stated that he has lost his health and become a victim of advanced stage of T. B. The appellant has thus already suffered in mental and physical health. It would not be proper to sentence him to a substantive terms of imprisonment, long after the incident in question.
15. I would accordingly maintain the conviction of the appellant but would reduce the sentence to that of imprisonment already undergone from 17th August 1973 to 21st of September 1973, and a fine of Rs, 1,00,000 (rupees one lac only) or in default simple imprisonment for 6 months ore. But for this modification in sentence the appeal is otherwise dismissed. . Sentence modified.