1. ' By this petition the petitioner seeks to challenge the order date 1-12-1994 whereby he was dismissed from service of Regional Development Finance Corporation where he was working as an Assistant.
2. ' Briefly the facts of the case appear to be that while working as Assistant in the said Corporation the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 14-7-1994 legging misappropriation of Rs.500,000 and through said charge-sheet the petitioner was also informed of the constitution of 'a committee of inquiry consisting of three persons. He was further informed that he was "entitled to be resent during the course of inquiry proceedings and to be heard in person". Subsequently another charge-sheet dated 5-9-1994 was issued to the petitioner charging him with misappropriation of cash received from clients. Under this charge-sheet one Mr. Muhammad Ovais, Assistant Vice-President was nominated as Inquiry Officer and again the petitioner was informed that he was 'entitled to be present during the course of inquiry proceedings and to be heard n person". Enquiry seems to have been held in respect of the earlier charge sheet dated 14- 7-1994 but as the Management considered that the petitioner had ot been given proper chance of defence and opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, by memo. Dated 6-10-1994 he was required to submit his reply to the charge-sheet. In reply to this memo. The petitioner took several objections but voided giving reply to the charge-sheet on the plea that "At this stage to give reply of charge-sheet dated 14-7-1994 is not proper and according to law". This as followed by management's memo. Dated 16-10-1994 informing the petitioner of the appointment of one Major (Retd.) Muhammad Iqbal, Assistant vice President as Inquiry Officer to hold inquiry in respect of the said charge sheet dated 14-7-1994. The Inquiry Officer after intimation to the petitioner held the inquiry in which the petitioner participated.
3. ' The first contention of Mr. Manzar Alam learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the enquiry but before the dismissal order was passed the petitioner should have been given a final show- cause notice and supplied a copy of the enquiry report to enable him explain his position. This procedure having ot been followed, petitioner's dismissal stood vitiated. In this regard he placed eliance on the case of Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.-W.F.P Government through thief Secretary, reported in PLD 1981 SC 176. In that case while dealing with be case of a Government servant covered by the N.-W.F.P. Government servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, it was found that: "After giving our anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for parties, we have formed the view that in a case where a formal inquiry is held, it seems to be an implicit requirement of the relevant rules that a copy of the inquiry report should be furnished to the accused-official so as to enable him to offer his explanation with regard to the adverse findings, if any, recorded against him by the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, as the case may be.
4. Such a requirement cannot be brushed aside by saying that it would amount to a second show- cause notice."
5. ' In the aforesaid citation the Supreme Court was considering various provisions of N.-W.F.P.
6. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules and the above observation was with reference to these Rules.
7. ' In the present case, on our query, Mr. Manzar Alam categorically states that there are no rules in the Corporation and that the service of the petitioner is governed by the law of master and servant.
8. This being so, the above Supreme Court case would have no application to the petitioner. It is well- settled that in cases where the law of master and servant applies, even for wrongful dismissal or termination the aggrieved employee can claim only damages and not reinstatement to his post. If any authority be required for this, reference may be made to the case of Anwar Hussain v.
9. Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 194) where it has been observed: "Where a Corporation is set up by a statute but the Government does not reserve to itself the power to regulate the conditions of service of the employees under the, corporation and the statute itself also does not prescribe any condition but leaves the matter entirely in the discretion of the corporation who is given the power to frame' rules and regulations in that regard so that the employee is left with no protection under the statute itself, then the corporation must be held to be the sole arbiter in the matter of prescribing the terms and conditions of its employees and competent to deal with them in accordance with the terms and conditions so prescribed by it. In such situation the employee cannot claim to be a person possessed of any legal character within the meaning of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and in case of his wrongful dismissal from or termination of service, the principle of master and servant will fully apply. And he can only claim damages but not reinstatement to his post."
10. ' It was next contended that the action taken by the Corporation was mala fide and that there were numerous defects in the issuance of charge-sheet, holding of inquiry and in the procedure adopted by the management to dispense with the service of the petitioner, thereby invalidating the entire action of the management. These allegations are, however, not borne out from the documents before us, which show that charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner and he was offered opportunity to submit explanation thereto; then the inquiry was held in which he participated and was provided opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and produce evidence in his defence. In any case we do not propose to go into these factual aspects of the case in this petition.
11. ' Even otherwise on his own showing petitioner's employment was governed by principle of master and servant and for that reason too the reliefs for the setting aside of petitioner's dismissal and his reinstatement in service claimed in this petition cannot possibly be granted.
12. ' For the foregoing reasons we find no merit in this petition which we dismiss in limine..