' The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to assail the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore dated 26-2-1995 whereby the learned Revisional Court dismissed the application moved for restoration of the revision dismissed for non-prosecution on 18-8-1992.
2. Brief facts are that the petitioner got lodged F.I.R. No, 325 dated 18-7-1987 with Police Station Naulakha, Lahore against present respondent No,1. After trial, the respondent was acquitted by the learned Magistrate Section 30, Lahore vide judgment dated 21-4-1991. Against the judgment of acquittal, the present petitioner filed a revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. On 18-9-1992, respondent No,1 was present but none appeared on behalf of the revision petitioner.
Again the case was called at 12-30 p.m. But none appeared on behalf of complainant. Thereafter third was called but the position remain the same. Accordingly, the learned Revisional Court dismissed the revision petition for non-prosecution. An application for setting aside the order dated 18-8-1992 was moved after about 11 months which too was dismissed vide order dated 26- 2-1995 hence this petition.
3. In support of the petition, learned counsel argued that the order for dismissal in default the revision petition was not a judgment, as such, the learned Additional Sessions Judge should have decided the case on merits instead of going on technicalities; the impugned order is non- speaking; the law of limitation is not known to the criminal jurisprudence and that the learned Revisional Court has violated the principle of audi alteram partem. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied on PLD 1961 Dacca 230 and PLD 1980 Lah.
201.
4. The petition was hotly opposed by learned counsel for respondent No,l.
5. The question involved in this petition came for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Allah Ditta and others 1982 SCM R 215 wherein the learned Judges were pleased to hold as under:-- "We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and considered the contentions raised as well as authorities cited by them. We agree with the learned counsel that there is no specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for the dismissal of a revision petition in default. But then neither is there any provision in this Code barring the Courts from doing so. It is an old and well-known practice that when no one appears to press them the Courts dismiss such petitions, or for that matter, many other types of applications and petitions, e.g. Applications under section 476 for initiating proceedings in case of offences committing during the judicial proceedings; bail applications under section 497 or 426, Cr.P.C.; applications for transfer under section 526. There appears to be cogent reasons for such a practice because where a party who has moved the machinery of the Court personally or through a counsel, he and his counsel are fully aware of the date fixed for its hearing, but deliberately or without reasonable excuse absent themselves on that date, the Court would be quite justified in dismissing the case in default of their appearance, rather than proceeding to enquire into the matter with a view to decide it on merits without the assistance of the party or his counsel and without even being sure as to whether the facts stated in the application or petition are correct."
' In the case in hand, copy of the application seeking restoration of the revision petition has not been filed for the reasons best known to the petitioner. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Revisional Court shows that the argument advanced was that the order dismissing revision petition was not sustainable in law. No explanation was whatsoever offered for non-appearance of the counsel or the petitioner on the date fixed for hearing. The application for restoration of the revision was also filed after a period of about 11 months and that too without any explanation for such a delay. Furthermore, it is by now well settled, that the cases dismissed in default in which the parties or their counsel fail to appear, in fact, amount to abuse of process of law.
' For what has been discussed above, I do not consider it to be a fit case for interference in exercise of extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction with the impugned order of the learned Revisional Court.
Resultantly, the petition fails IC and is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost.