' This judgment shall dispose of the following connected civil revisions as they involve common questions of fact and law:--
(1) Civil Revision No,175 of 1996 "Mian Muhammad Rafiq Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. And another."
(2) Civil Revision No,176 of 1996 "M. Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce Interntional (Overseas) Ltd. And another."
(3) Civil Revision No,177 of 1996 "M. Rafique Saigol and another v. International Credit and Investment Co. (Overseas) Limited."
2. Briefly stated facts out of which these petitions have arisen are that Messrs Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited (In Liquidation) and International Credit and Investment Co. (Overseas) Limited (In Liquidation), the respondents before this Court, have instituted Civil Suits Nos.387/1, 388/1 of 1992 and 117 of 1993, for recovery of US$ 1,844,851.51 (equivalent to Pak Rs,47,966,139); US$ 4,267,533.51 (Equivalent to Pak Rs,110,955,858) and US$ 17,250,000.00 (equivalent to Pak Rs,470,235,000 approximately), respectively, against the petitioners, which had been entrusted to the Court of Mr. Ghaffar Jalil, learned Civil Judge, Lahore.
The suits have been contested by the petitioners by filing of independent written statements in all the suits. In the written statements, preliminary objections have been raised, which includes the objection of lack of jurisdiction reproduced as follows:-- "This Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. The plaintiffs being a Banking Company and transacting business in Pakistan cannot file suit in this Hon'ble Court.
' Also the defendant M. Rafiq Saigol does not live in Lahore. He is living at Islamabad having his business there."
' On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, on 22-7-1993, learned Trial Court framed the issues of law and facts in two suits i,e, C.S. Nos.387 and 388/1 of 1992 in presence of the learned counsel for the parties and in the third suit, issues had yet to be framed. Two suits wherein issues had been framed were set down for recording of evidence.
3. On 4-9-1994, the petitioners filed three applications in the above- referred suits under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Praying that the suits should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as there is a term in the agreement between the parties, on the basis whereof the suits have been filed, according to which the place for filing of the suits has been agreed upon to be the Courts of England.
4. These applications were contested inter alia on the grounds that the question of determination of jurisdiction will require recording of evidence even on merits of the suit, therefore, the applications are not maintainable, hence, the same may be dismissed. After hearing the arguments therein, learned Trial Court vide identical orders, dated 8-3-1995, dismissed the applications holding that the determination of questions of jurisdiction in these cases is a mixed question of law and facts, which can only be determined after recording of evidence on merits of the cases alongwith other issues.
5. These orders were challenged by the petitioners in re: Civil Revision Nos.793, 794 and 795 of 1995, which were dismissed by this Court vide order dated 29-5-1995, which order is reproduced as under:- "After arguing this matter at some length, learned counsel for the petitioner, under instructions from his client, states that the petitioner does not press this civil revision as well as application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Which may be dismissed as withdrawn. He further states that the petitioner would like to move an application for treating the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
2. In view of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that he wishes to withdraw the civil revision as well as application under Order VII, rule 10 of the C.P.C., this civil revision is dismissed as withdrawn. No order as to costs."
' These orders were not further challenged, and, hence, became final.
6. Subsequently, the petitioners filed applications in all the three suits under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C.
For treating the issue regarding jurisdiction as preliminary issue and to decide the same first. These applications were contested. During the pendency of the applications, two more applications were filed by the petitioners: one, under Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. Seeking amendment of the written statements and the other under Order XIV, rule 5, C.P.C. For amendment of the issues.
7. Arguments in all the applications were heard together. However, learned Civil Judge, who was the same person, who had earlier dismissed the application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C., vide orders dated 5-10-1995 accepted the applications under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. And directed that the issue of jurisdiction shall be treated and decided as preliminary issue and the other two applications i,e, application under Order XIV, rule 5 and Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C., however, were not decided and were kept pending. It may be mentioned here that in one suit even issues had not been framed as yet.
8. The respondents apprehended that the learned Civil Judge will not do justice in the case as he has unnecessarily kept the two other applications pending in spite of the fact that the arguments therein were heard together; that on the question of jurisdiction a contrary order has been passed by the same learned Judge, who had earlier dismissed the applications under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C., which orders have been upheld by the High Court and that even record has not been seen while passing of the impugned orders and the order has been passed even in a suit wherein issue of jurisdiction or any other issues have not as yet been settled, hence, the respondents filed applications seeking transfer of all the suits to the Court of some other learned Civil Judge, which were contested and accepted by the learned District Judge, Lahore vide order dated 18-10-1995, whereby the suits have been transferred from the Court of Mr. Zafar lqbal Khan, Civil Judge, Lahore to the Court of Mr. Muhammad Saleem Uppal, learned Civil Judge, Lahore. These orders have been challenged in three separate civil revisions.
9. Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioners, whereas Ch. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate assisted by Mr. Muhammad Raza Farooq, Advocate has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents.
10. Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended at the main reasons on the basis whereof the suits have been ordered to be transferred are that the learned Trial Court has passed an interim order against the respondents contrary to the one already passed in their favour while deciding applications under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C.; that he has kept pending two applications under Order VI, rule 17 and Order XIV, rule 5, C.P.C., although arguments were heard by him alongwith the applications under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. And that a short date has been fixed for recording of evidence on the issues of jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, all the three grounds are hardly sufficient in law to justify the transfer of a lis from a Court of competent jurisdiction.
11. Elaborating his argument learned counsel contends that a Court of competent jurisdiction can pass interim and final orders and if a person is aggrieved thereof, he has a remedy to challenge the same before the higher forum, hence, merely passing of interim order against a party is hardly a ground sufficient to create an impression that the justice shall not be done, justifying an order of transfer of the suit itself. It is further contended that earlier the same learned Civil Judge has passed the interim orders in favour of the respondents, which had been very happily digested by them, but strangely enough passing of an interim order against them has been made as a ground for transfer of the suits. Similarly there is nothing unusual that applications under Order VI, rule 17 and Order XIV, rule 5, C.P.C. Were kept pending although arguments were heard therein, for the cogent reasons that after the learned Trial Court had reached the conclusion that question of jurisdiction is to be decided as a preliminary issue, therefore, no unusual attitude stands demonstrated by the abovesaid lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Trial Court. It is next contended that fixing of a short date to decide the preliminary issue of jurisdiction should rather be commended than condemned and even otherwise it is the respondent-plaintiff who was pressing for short dates, which fixation is also in consonance of the previous practice in the cases as is clearly established from the order-sheet, copy whereof has been placed on the record of this case.
As regards passing; of similar order in the third suit, wherein issues had not yet been framed was just and inadvertent act, as the application in that case was also moved inadvertently, therefore, the grounds on the basis whereof the cases have been transferred cannot be said to be judicious in nature and, as such, the order passed by the learned District Judge is illegal and without jurisdiction. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the following cases:--
(i) Sameer Ehsan Ullah Makhzan and 3 others v. Muhammad Asif Zaman and 3 others PLD 1993 Lahore 554.
(ii) Mian Abdul Qadoos v. Faqirullah Minhas and others 1994 MLD 1153.
12. As against the above arguments,,Ch. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the same learned Civil Judge having earlier decided that the Court has the jurisdictions and that the issue of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and facts, hence, is to be decided alongwith issues of merits, could not have subsequently passed a contradictory order holding that issue of jurisdiction can be decided as a preliminary point particularly when the earlier order has been upheld by this Court. According to the learned counsel, it amounts to recall of the orders passed by this Court which jurisdiction is not vested in the Trial Court and that the three miscellaneous applications having been heard together there was no occasion/fun to keep the two applications pending and decide the application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. First and then to fix a very short date for decision of the issue of jurisdiction as. a preliminary Point which has naturally given a genuine apprehension in the mind of the respondents that they shall not get justice from the said Court. It is contended that justice is not only to be done but it should appear to have been done and as there are reasonable grounds justifying the apprehension that the respondents will not get justice at the hands of the learned Trial Court, the applications were moved on lawful grounds and have also been allowed for legally valid reasons, there fort.', no case has been made out for interference, with the discretionary orders passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, in exercise of discretionary revisional prediction of this Court.
Therefore, the revision petitions are liable to be dismissed. In support 9f his contentions learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases of Anwar and another v. The Crown (PLD 1955 FC 185); Chairman, Federal Land Commission and another v. Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 37 others (1985 SCMR 317); Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Akram Shaikh (PLD 1989 SC 689); Sharaf Faridi and 3 others v. The Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Prime Minister of Pakistan and another (PLD 1989 Karachi 404); Muhammad Aslam v. The State (1990 PCr.LJ 205); Snahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (PLD 19 70 SC 139); Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad Ali Khan (PLD 1972 SC 69) and Malik Khuda Bakhsh and another v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah (1981 SCMR 196).
13. I have considered the arguments addressed at the bar and have perused the record. There is no cavil with the law, declared in the cases cited at the bar, that justice should not only be done but should appear to have been done and that a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a litigant that he will not get justice from a particular Court can provide a cause to seek transfer of his lis from that Court to another Court of competent jurisdiction, but at the same time it is also a well- established legal proposition that justice is to be done without fear or favour, hence, the Presiding Officers are equally to be protected from frivolous transfer applications in order to achieve the transparent even-handed justice so that one of the litigants may not be in a position to overawe the Presiding Officer which may ultimately result in tilting the scales of justice under the fear of maligning. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction to transfer of cases from the subordinate Courts, a balan e has to be struck in order to ensure that the cases are not transferred mere y on the basis of suppositions, unfounded and conjectural apprehensions. In case of Sameer Ehsan Ullah Makhzan (supra), which is the judgment delivered by me, I have already held that merely an adverse judicial order passed against a party, will not solely be a sufficient ground directing the transfer of case from the said Court as the aggrieved person has a remedy to challenge the order before a higher forum. At pages 557 and 558 of the report, it has been held as under:-- "4. I have considered the arguments dressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also perused the covenants submitted by the learned Civil Judge. There is no cavil with the proposition that justice is not only to be done but it should appear to have been done and further that any genuine apprehension in the mind of the litigant which is based on valid and reasonable grounds that he shall not get justice at the hands of the Presiding Officer, will be a valid ground\i or transfer of a case from that Court. However, it is equally important that the Courts should not be unnecessarily harassed merely on the basis of baseless apprehension, of reckless litigant, which is result of whims, surmises and conjectures. Learned Judicial Officers who preside the Court have to be given a full protection against frivolous allegations in view of the onerous, noble and dignified they are performing while deciding the cases, and for performance whereof they are directly responsible to the Almighty Allah. They should not be allowed to be harassed and maligned unnecessarily by the litigants merely because they pass judicial orders against the said litigants.
5. In the case in hand, the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contentions that the suits should be transferred from the Court of Mr. Ghaffar Jalil, Civil Judge are frivolous and without any lawful basis and justification. If the learned Civil Judge is trying to decide the suits expeditiously in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court, the petitioners should have no actionable cause of grievance at all. Similarly if any judicial order passed by a learned Civil Judge is not considered lawful by the petitioners, they can challenge the same before a higher forum. This cannot be a ground for transfer of a suit. If transfer of cases is permitted on these flimsy grounds, a litigant who has started the litigation in a mala fide manner will not only prolong the agony of the parties to the suit but will also succeed in wasting precious public time and in shaking the confidence which necessarily is to be reposed in the Presiding Officer, who are ordained to administer justice freely without any fear or favour. The allegation of the petitioners that the cases should be transferred because the respondents are posing that they have some high officers in the Government, therefore, they shall approach the learned Civil Judge, is also 'baseless and is conjectural in nature. No person in his senses will adopt such a course. Learned Trial Court has specifically denied having even knowledge about the alleged - status of the respondents. Even otherwise, Judges should not be dubbed as so vulnerable and weak persons who can be influenced by the parties or their relations, without there being any basis for such an allegation.
Comments and report submitted by the learned Civil Judge that he has no objection if the suits are transferred is not at all valid ground for transfer of the suits. Admittedly there is absolutely no allegation against the learned Civil Judge with regard to his diligence, integrity and competency which have rather been testified by the learned counsel who are present in Court and who practise in the lower Courts and even the learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to deny this fact."
14. In all these cases the interim orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which have been filed and even allowed vide order passed today. Therefore, it cannot be said that because in opinion of the learned Trial Judge the issue of jurisdiction should be decided as a preliminary issue, he is interested against or in favour of a particular party. So long as an interim order on the face of it appears to be judicially passed, although may be illegal, it cannot give rise a reasonable cause of grievance to a litigant to move for transfer of the main cause itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner except establishing that the orders passed under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C.
Are not lawful has not been able to prove that the same have not been passed in bona fide exercise of jurisdiction for extraneous considerations.
15. As regards the passing of an order in the suit wherein issues have not as yet been framed, it appears to have been inadvertently passed as has been even conceded to by learned counsel for the petitioner who has conceded the acceptance of Civil Revision No,2457 of 195 filed against that order, which has already been accepted vide order dated 29-1-1996. However, learned Civil Judge should have been more careful particularly when he was dealing with connected cases of identical nature. At any rate this circumstance will not be a sufficient ground to apprehend that the learned Trial Court shall not try the suits independently strictly in accordance with law and with even- handed justice.
16. No other substantial ground or material has been brought on record on the basis whereof it could be said that the Trial Court is either prejudiced or biased against the respondents which may justify the transfer of the suits. Therefore, while passing of the impugned orders learned District Judge has exercised jurisdiction illegally and with a material irregularity.
17. Resultantly, I accept all the three chid revisions, set aside the impugned orders and direct that the suits shall be tried by the same learned Court i,e, Mr. Zafar Iqbal Khan, Civil Judge, before Whom they were earlier pending at the time of passing of the impugned orders. Parties are left to bear their own costs.