1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.---This is an appeal under Article 185(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The appellants before us are Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Editor, and Said Ahmad Malik Reporter, Printer and Publisher of the Weekly Lail-o-Nahar. They have been aggrieved by an order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court dated the 18th of September 1975. Convicting them of contempt of the said High Court and sentencing them each to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,C00 each, and in default to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month, each.
2. It appears that an article appeared in the said Weekly in its issue of the 15th to 23rd of September 1975, entitled "Bench v. Bar" containing, inter alia, certain statements against certain lawyers related to certain Judges of the said High Court, and a reference to certain speech made by Sh. Shaakat Ali, President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association, which was the subject-matter of a contempt proceeding against him then pending before the High Court. The High Court, accordingly, issued a notice to the appellants on the 16th of September 1975, asking them to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of Court for having scandalized the Court and tried to bring it into disrespect and for having commented upon a matter which was then sub judice before the Court and which tended to interfere with due course of justice.
3. As the appellants did not file a written statement, they were examined by the High Court. The High Court on a consideration of the impugned Article and the statements made by the appellants found them guilty of contempt of the Court for scandalizing the Court and seeking to interfere with a pending matter, and convicted and sentenced them as already stated.
4. It may be stated at the outset that the authorship of the impugned Article and its publication have not been disputed by either appellants. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended before us firstly, that the publication in question was not at all a comment on any pending matter to the High, Court, secondly, it was a fair comment made in good faith and in public interest on the conduct of some Members of the Bar and not on any Court or Judge ; thirdly, that the show-case notice issued to the appellants did not specify the incriminating portion of the impugned Article that constituted contempt ; and fourthly, that the impugned Article was only a summary of the resolution. Of the High Court Bar Association passed in the year 1973, and repeated in its resolution dated May 1975, and this was not contempt.
5. As regards the first contention, it may be stated that a case being Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975 had been started upon as application of one-- Mr. A1-Habib Al-Kheiri made on the 6th of August 1975, upon which a --notice had been issued to Sh. Shaukat Ali, President of the Lahore High-- Court Bar Association on the 9th of August, 1975, to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of the Court for havin delivered an objectionable speech at the Rawalpindi District Bar Association on the 25th of July 1975, and the 22nd of September, 1975, had been fixed for the hearing of the matter. That the impugned speech of Sh. Shaukat Ali was then sub judice before the High Court has been admitted. It has, however, been argued that the offending publication made no comment on the said proceedings. A reference to the article in question, however, shows that the contention is not true. In the last two paragraphs of the article in question appear the following statements :---- It is evident from the above quoted passage that a clear reference was made to the subject- matter of the Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975 and that with reference to the memorandum put in by 42 lawyers of the Rawalpindi Bar it was said that Sh. Shaukat Ali had not said anything in the impugned speech which amounted to contempt of Court. The article sought to create an impression in the mind of the public that Sh. Shaukat had not said any--thing which could be regarded as contempt of Court. This not only prejudged the issue that awaited determination, but created an atmosphere which disposed the people not to readily accept a verdict of the Court to the contrary. Such a situation tended to undermine the confidence of the people in the administration of Justice by the Court. In the case of Advocate---General v. Shabir Ahmad (PLD 1963 SC 610), this court observed as follows :---- "it is now well-settled that all publications, which are calculated to of have the tendency to either excite prejudice against parties or their litigation while it is pending or to interfere with the due course of justice, will constitute contempt ---------------------------------but suffice it to say that any attempt to pollute the stream of justice before it has begun to flow or to interfere with its proper and unfettered administration will amount to a contempt."
6. In the case of Attorney-General v. Abdul Hamid and others (PLD 1963SC170), it was .Observed thus :- "From a review of these decisions it appears to us that the real test in such cases is whether the publication complained of tended or was calculated to interfere with the course of justice is any substantial or real manner, either by prejudicing a Fir trial or `by prejudicing the minds of the Public against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is finally heard'. In determining this effect neither the intention of the printers or authors nor the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the publication complained of is of any consequence, for. What we are concerned with is that we should not permit anyone `to poison the fountain of justice before it begins to flow'."
7. In the case of Saadat Khialy v. The Sate (PLD1962SC457), the following observations appear;--- ". . And if the article read reasonably and as a whole was calculated or had the tendency to prejudice mankind against one or other of the parties involved in the proceedings, it was enough to amount to an interference with the course of justice, for, the question in these cases is not as to whether the publication has, in fact, interfered or not or as to what was they intention of the author and or publisher, but whether it has the tendency to produce such prejudicial effect. The principle upon which this type of contempt is punished is to keep the stream of justice unsullied so that parties against whom litigations are pending in Courts of law should get a fair trial from the Courts and not be subjected in advance by a `trial by newspapers'.
8. The contention that the conviction is based on no evidence at all is without any substance, far, once the publication of an article is admitted the Court is concerned with ascertaining the effect that the article is likely to produce, and if upon a fair reading of the article the Court comes to the conclusion that the article could have such pernicious tendency, it can legally convict upon its own reading of the article, for, as already stated, it is not necessary in the case of a contempt of Court to ascertain in each and every cause as to whither the publication has, in fact, interfered with the course of justice by taking evidence upon the matter."
9. The publication of the article having been admitted, the High Court was concerned merely with ascertaining the effect the Article was likely to produce an the mind of the people. And the High Court found that the impugned Article did tend to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Court. I am unable to find any fault with this finding. The appellants, therefore, fell within the mischief of Article 204(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
10. As regards the second contention, a persual of the article in question .Leads to the conclusion that it sought to create an impression that the lawyers named therein prospered at the expense of more competent and experienced lawyers merely because they happened to be related to the Judges of the Court named therein. Thus there was an insinuation that the Judges concerned either favoured the lawyers related to them in their professional work or were' influenced in showing favour to them because they were related to the colleagues on the Bench. And all this appears to have been done merely on the basis of gossip and without any justification. It appears that according to the established practice of the High Court no relatives of Judges appear before them in the Court. The judgment of the High Court reveals that one of such lawyers ceased to practice since 1970, another was not even a law graduate, and yet another had joined a firm of lawyers, Surridge and Beecheno, as an employee, and did not practise on his own account. As regards another the High Court confronted respondent Saeed Malik with a list showing that during the previous year the Advocate had appeared in 28 cases only, out of which 15 were miscellaneous applications. Except a general statement about their unusual prosperity no facts and figures were supplied -to indicate the truth of the allegations. As a matter of fact no reliable source was even mentioned to justify their allegations. Nothing but gossip appears to be at the root of these wild allegations, and merely on such frivolous basis a yarn was woven round the judges of the High Court which undoubtedly tended to bring not only the particular Judges but also the entire High Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt. The impugned article thus polluted the fountain of justice which in the interest of administration of justice required to be kept pure and unsullied. This is the finding of the High Court and it is reasonable and based on the impugned Article itself and supported by the statements of the appellants recorded in Court. The impugned Article, inter alia, mentioned relations of Judges who had been doing extraordinarily well in the profession, and attributed their success to their relationship with the Judges mentioned therein. Appellant Manzoor Malik admitted in his state--ment that the Article did convey the impression that for being a successful lawyer in any of the Courts it was essential that one should be related to a Judge of the Court and that the profession of law was "Ejera Dari" of those who were related to Judges. He further admitted that the Article showed that there was a certain group of lawyers who were jealous of the success that their other colleagues had achieved in the profession, Appellant Saeed Malik took full responsibility for writing in the article about a certain lawyer and admitted that he did not try to verify what was his income. He admitted lack of personal knowledge about the allegations made against the lawyers He said that the lawyers in the Bar Association talked about those lawyers out of jealousy.
11. These wild allegations by no stretch of imagination fell within the description of a fair comment on any act or judgment of the Court as envisaged in Explanation to Article 204 of the Constitution.
12. They impute want of fair play and attribute bias to the Judges of the High Court par--ticularly those specifically named in the Article. The Article, read as a who and reasonably, tended or was calculated to interfere with the course of justice in a substantial manner by diminishing the dignity and authority of the Court and impairing public confidence in the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judges, and thus fell within the description of contempt under Article 204(2) (b) of the Constitution. It bas been submitted that the Article was designed to serve the interest of public by drawing the attention of the people to the evil inherent in the relations of Judges pactising in their Courts or Courts under their jurisdiction with a view to the elimination of the evil. The intention may be good, but it is immaterial for deciding,, whether contempt has been committed.
13. In the case of Sir Edward Snelson v. Judges of the High Court of West' Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 237), it was observed as follows :--- --------------------- in an ordinary case of libel, it is a complete defence that the defamatory imputation is true, but it` is otherwise in a case of contempt by scandalizing a Judge or a Court. Any attempt to justify the libel upon a Judge or Court is in itself a fresh contempt. ------ Equally, the defence; of fair comment is not available. For fair comment it is necessary that facts should be truly stated, it is not enough that there should be absence of malice, or that the expression of opinion was honest.
14. It is a fundamental rule in relation to libel that no forced construction in aid of the libeller shall be adopted, but the words shall be under--stood in their ordinary meaning, as if by men of ordinary reason."
15. The contention that the statements are merely based on certain resolution of the Bar Association itself is neither true nor tenable. None of the two resolutions named any lawyer or Judge. They only contained a general statement of the belief that relations of Judges were prosperous in the legal) profession merely by reason of their relationship or connection with some Judges. The authors of the Article even do not disclose the source wherefrom they got the names of the particular lawyers or Judges.
16. Assuming that the questioned statements are based on the said resolutions of the Bar Association if the latter fall within the mischief of the lave of contempt, both will be liable to punishment for contempt, for re-production of a contempt is also contempt. This disposes of the fourth contention.
17. As regards the third contention about the inadequacy of the show-cause notice, it may be stated that the notice mentioned the impugned article with reference to which both the categories of contempt, namely, scandalizing the Court and commenting upon a matter that was sub judice, were said to have been committed. The appellants never asked for further or better particulars.
18. They did not file any written statement. They were examined in Court and their statements clearly show that they fully understood the nature of the contempt they were asked to show cause against. The appellants were given full opportunity to meet the case against them. There is, therefore, no sub--stance in this contention.
19. On the question of sentence the only extenuating circumstance placed before the Court was that the appellants said that they bad no intention whatever to commit any form of contempt. They thought they were only referring to matters which had been mentioned in the two resolutions of the Bar Association and this in their view did not constitute contempt. Lack of intention or knowledge is material in relation to the penalty. It is notes unlikely that the resolutions might have given an impression that there was nothing wrong in writing about the contents of the resolutions. Having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case, I think the ends of justice will be met if the fine is increased to Rs. 2,000 and the sentence of simple imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone by them. In default of payment of fine they will suffer simple imprisonment for two months each, I would order accordingly.