The Puniab Road Transport Board, through the Managing Director, has challenged the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, dated 6th October, 1973, directing that the award given by the Tribunal on an earlier date i.e., 8-11-1971, should be honoured and implemented. This direction h&: been given on a petition by four of the affected workers under section 38 (5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which authorised the Tribunal to punish for contempt of its authority as if it was a High Court.
2. The circumstances in which these proceedings came to be taken are that the Road Transport Corporation as it then was, dismissed after inquiry 38 of its workers on 9-4-1964. The Union submitted a list of demands to the employer on 28-8-1965 and one of the demands was for re- instatement of these dismissed employees. The industrial dispute which come into existence on this demand was taken to the Labour Court finally as Industrial Dispute No. 10 of 1970. The Labour Court directed the re-instatement of 19 out of the 38 dismissed employees but denied them the back wages on the ground that there was only a technical defect and that was of failure to serve a second show-cause notice. An appeal was taken by the Union to the Appellate Tribunal where 9 of the a dismissed employees were re-instated. They also declared entitled to back wages and a second inquiry into their guilt was shut out: The operative part of the order was, "but in the present case the dismissal orders were passed as far back as the years 1964-65 so it does not look appropriate that a fresh inquiry b., restarted by the employer against the re-instated workers. As the employer has been stopped from restarting the inquiry and removing the technical defects of inquiry and as none of them has been working for the respondent during all this period arid re- instatement is ordered on account of technical defects is the inquiry, we think that the workers are not entitled to the wages of period after the dismissal to the the of their re-instatement. These workers will be re-instated within one month from the date of announcement of this award." In respect of the nine whose claim was allowed, it was held, that "I hold that only those persons whose names are mentioned above are entitled to back wages from the date of their dismissal to the the of their re-instatement. This does not cover the case of the persons whose names are not mentioned above." 'The petitioner claims that the Union served on it a notice asking the implementation of this award on which a settlement subscribed to by the Union came into existence on 23-2-1972 where under all the nine persons who were granted full back benefits were to receive only 1/3rd of their pay and not the whole of it. They took up on such re-instatement the appointment. However four of the nine so affected moved a petition under section 33 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for getting the award dated 8-11-71 implement--ed as for getting the Managing Director punished for failure to implement it which succeeded.
3. The contention of the petitioner is that in view of the settlement arrived at between the employer and the Union reduced to writing in the form of a memo of settlement dated 23-2-1972, the employer was not under any obligation to implement the award dated 8-11-1671, nor could he be punished or directed to implement it.
4. The Representative of the Union while contesting this petition, has taken a number of objections some of them technical to the competency this petition. It is contended for example that under rules 8 and 14 of the Road Transport Rules the Chairman alone could institute or authorise the institution of petitions and this petition having not been so authorised, is not competent. Secondly, it is contended that so far as the orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal dated 27-1- 71 and 8-11-1971 are concerned, the petition suffers from laches. Finally, on the technical side it is contended that though the decision of the Labour court of air earlier date is challenged, the same has not been impleaded a; respondent. On merits, it is contended that an award could not be supersed--ed by a sort of settlement which is pleaded nor could on the basis of a settlement reduction of the secured wages take place and in any case the award bad to be implemented.
5. I am not satisfied with regard to the first technical objection i. e. The incompetence of the Managing Director to file these proceedings. The impugned order which is sought to be reviewed in these proceedings, was directed against the Managing Director as he was alleged to be the contemner. A grievance against, any order passed in such proceedings could certainly be voiced by him. Being a party himself and personally in that to the pro--ceedings, he could agitate against it even if assuming that he had no authority to represent the Board.
6. It is quite clear to me that so far as the writ petition seeks relief against the orders passed in 1971 by the Labour Court and the Appellate A Tribunal, it is barred by laches. There was a clear and positive award in favour of the employees so far as this issue of re-instatement and back wages was concerned. The employer was to honour and he could not even with the consent of the Union substitute it by a settlement particularly when it involved the reduction of the secured wages of the employees.
7. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the memo of settlement dated 2?-2- 1972 which is pleaded in defence of the proceedings under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, was not a settlement satisfying the requirements of the definition of settlement as contained in clause (xxiv) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It was not sent to the Provincial Government nor was it notified in the manner prescribed. All the same, he claims protection for it under section 39, subsection (2) of the Ordinance. It provides that "a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and a Trade Union otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement". In other words, the learned counsel for the petitioner claims for the settlement of 23rd of February 1912 not the status of a settlement but that of an agreement equally binding.
8. If the learned counsel were to claim the protection for the settlement dated 23-2-1972 not as a settlement but as an agreement then it binds only the parties to the agreement as the express words of section 39, subsection (2) lay down. It is admitted that the affected employees were not parties to the agree--ment and instead the Trade Union or the Collective Bargaining Agent has entered it into. By reference to section 22, an effort has been made to show that the Collective Bargaining Agent can in respect of individual grievances negotiated and if it has so negotiated an agreement reached as a reasult of such negotiation would, as much bind the Collective Bargaining Agent as the workers whom it represents. An agreement or the Settlement entered into by the Collective Bargaining Agent in accordance with law certainly binds every worker whom the Collective Bargaining Agent represents and for it the procedure of settlement, conciliation etc. Is to be followed. There is B no mention of the Collective Bargaining Agent in section 39(2) but if an employer and Trade Union and like any other agreement it would only bind the parties to the agreement and none else.
9. What is in this case of significance is that this agreement curtails the statutory guarantees secured for the workers under the award of the Labour Court. Such could not be the effect of an agreement or settlement. There was hardly any occasion to enter into such agreement. The only justification given for it is that the petitioner wanted to prosecute his remedies, against the order of the Labour Court dated 27-7-1971 and 8-11-1971, and in order to prevent it from doing so such a concession was offered by the workers. This is belied by the documents put in. The dispute which is said to have arisen on the service of a notice concerned the demand of the workers claiming re-instatement of the employees in accordance with the order of the Appellate Tribunal made on 8-11-1971. It was the workers who wanted to enforce it fully and it was the petitioner who wanted to avoid it. In such a situation there was no occasion for the petitioner to give up their secured rights.
10. The affected individuals cannot be said to have subscribed to the agreement simply because they took over their appointments and reported for duty. That had, in any case, to take place even if such an agreement or settlement had not been arrived at, because that was the award of the Labour Court. Therefore, by reporting for duty, and by taking up the appointment, they did not in any way, whittle down their rights arising out of the award given.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has alia challenged by this petition the orders of the Labour Court dated 27-7-1971 and of the Appellate Tribunal dated 8-11-1971 on the ground that in so far as the petitioner has been prohibited from holding a second inquiry when the first in jury was initiated on account of a technical defect the orders are without jurisdiction and lawful authority.
The objection of laches has been correctly taken up by the respondent which must be given effect to. Therefore, their own conduct in entering into an agreement with the workers modifying the award would not be helpful to the petitioner for explaining laches. They should have been under no doubt about their duty after the, award had been given as modified by the Appellate Tribunal, and having not questioned it, they cannot, in proceedings arising out of a different matter, come up to this Court, against it.
12. On the technical side the petitioner has contended that on a complaint under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, though the Appellate Tribunal bad the jurisdiction and authority to punish the defaulting party for contempt, it had no authority in law to direct the implementation of the earlier award. If the petitioner wants to be dealt with in accordance with law in the matter of the logical limits to which the powers possessed under section 38 of the Ordinance are concerned, then he has only to delay the implementation of the award for some the more and he will be dealt with as he wishes. A direction to do a particular thing in contempt proceedings is not outside the scope of the power for it affords an opportunity to the contemner to do what he has failed to do either under a mistaken impression of the law or of facts and if the failure persists certainly the more serious power action can be taken. Such a direction is a necessary adjunct of the power possessed.
13. I find that on none of the grounds this petition is tenable and is dismissed with costs.