' NOOR MUHAMMAD MAGSI (MEMBER).---Appellant Maqsood Ahmed has filed Appeals Nos.228(L)/95 and 237(L)/95 against the impugned orders separately passed on 12-1-1994 whereby he was awarded punishment of withholding of increments, recovery of cost of cement alleged to have been misappropriated by him, and censured. Since both the appeals of the appellant involve identical question for determination, these are disposed of by this judgment.
2. Brief facts of the case are that while serving as Junior Supervisor F/S in Central Stock (MES)
Kharian under C.M.E.S. (Army) Kharian Cantt, the appellant was charged with Misconduct on account of misappropriation of cement from the Central Stock (MES) Kharian Cantt, tampering of record and negligence in performing his duty to point out the deficiency of cement rock. In consequence of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, b , was awarded punishment of withholding of 4 years' increment, recovery of cost of cement from his pay and allowances and was censured by separate orders both passed on 12-1-1994, against which his departmental appeals were also rejected. Having got no relief from the departmental authority, he approached this Tribunal by way of his Appeals Nos.228(L)/95 and 237(L)/95, filed on 15-6-1995 and 29-6-1995 against the impugned orders dated 12-1-1994 respectively.
3. Admittedly both the appeals are hopelessly time-barred. However, applications for condonation of delay have been filed in both the appeals. The Supreme Court of Pakistan while remanding the case to the Service Tribunal for deciding question of limitation and then disposing of the same, in Wapda v. Zahoor Ahmed (1993 SCM R 582) has held that "Service Tribunal was bound to first address itself to the question of limitation before entering into merits of the case." We, therefore, first propose to deal with the question of limitation. In the application for condonation of delay, it has been stated that the rejection orders of the appellant's departmental appeals were not communicated to the appellant due to mala fide of the certain colleagues of the appellant. It is also stated that, however, the rejection orders, dated 6th November, 1994 and 13th January, 1995 were conveyed to the appellant by one of his colleagues in the first week of June, 1995. Hence the appeals before the Service Tribunal filed on 15-6-1995 and 29-6-1995 respectively, are within time.
4. The reasons given in the condonation applications are not convincing particularly when the appellant could not prove mala fide of his colleagues causing delay in communication of the order of rejection of his departmental appeals. There is nothing to believe that the order passed on 6th November, 1994 was conveyed to the appellant in the first week of June, 1995 i,e, after a lapse of about 7 months, whereas we see from the record that the rejection orders were rightly sent to the appellant on his address given in his departmental appeal and there is no proof that these were returned undeliveied. Be that as it may, but even otherwise the appellant should have approached the Service Tribunal after waiting for 90 days statutory period provided by section 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 in case his departmental appeals were not responded to. But he failed to do so and was unnecessarily waiting for rejection order beyond the waiting period. And even on rejection of his appeals, he also failed to approach this Tribunal within 30 days of the rejection order. Therefore, we are not convinced that the appellant was pursuing his remedy delinquently rather he slept over for a long time and came to the Service Tribunal in June 1995 against the impugned orders passed on 12-1-1994. Alleging mala fide of his colleagues in late communication of the orders without any proof, is just to take shelter for condonation of delay.
5. For the reasons stated above, we find no cogent grounds for condonation of such a long delay.
The delay in Appeal No,237(L)/95 counted from the departmental appeal is more that 10 months and from the rejection order it is about 5 months, whereas in Appeal No,228(L)/95 the delay from the IA departmental appeal comes to more than one year and from the rejection order it is more than 9 months. According to rule each and everyday of delay is to be explained with cogent reasons. Thus, such a long delay in both the appeals could not be condoned on flimsy grounds stated in the condonation applications. The applications for condonation of delay are accordingly rejected and the appeals are also liable to dismissal on this ground.
6. We are of the view that appeal filed by a civil servant being patently time-barred, is liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation especially when civil servant had failed to give convincing circumstances for condonation of such delay. Our view also got support of well settled law by the Supreme Court in 1993 SCM R 582, whereby the Service Tribunal is bound to first address itself to the question of limitation before entering into merits of the case. And according to 1987 SCM R 92 wherein the Supreme Court has disapproved the remarks on merits of case, while disposing the appeal as time-barred.
7. The net result of the above discussion is that since both the appeals are patently time-barred and there is no cogent ground for condonation of delay, the appeals are liable to dismissal on limitation. As such appeals Nos.228(L)/95 and 237(R)/95 are dismissed. No order as to costs.