1. This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) is barred by three days.
2. Impugned ejectment order was passed by learned Controller, Karachi South on 29-3-1994, certified copy Was applied on 4-4-1994; copy was delivered on 11-4-1994 and counting a period thirty days after announcement of the order after allowing a period of six days in obtaining certified copy of the order appeal ought to have been filed before this Court on 5-5-1994 but the same was presented for the first time on 8-5-1994.
3. On office objection about limitation, appellant filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act on 8-8-1994 seeking condonation of delay on the ground of illness of the appellant. The office of the High Court pointed out that section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to rent cases in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in PLD 1982 SC 88. A number of adjournments were taken by the appellant and on his failure to appear, the appeal was dismissed for non- prosecution as well as being time-barred vide order, dated 5-10-1994. In C.M.A. No.1282 of 1994 seeking readmission of the appeal it was readmitted to original number vide order, dated 1-12-1994 where-after there have been three more hearings but the learned counsel sought time on each occasion.
4. Today Mr. S. Riaz Hussain Shah contrary to the rule laid down in the Supreme Court judgment referred to above has cited PLD 1973 Kar. 618 and PLD 1963 SC 147 in support of his argument that the time spent in obtaining certified copy of the impugned order has to be excluded in calculating the period for filing an appeal. There is no cavil with the above proposition and it would appear that I have already allowed six days' time, spent by the appellant in obtaining certified copy of the order but even then the appeal is belated by three days. Since section 21(2) of the Ordinance provides a period of 30 days for filing an appeal from an order of the Rent Controller which is a special law, it has been held by the Supreme Court that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to Rent proceedings. I have already taken this view in earlier cases and find no ground to deviate from the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court and followed by me in the earlier cases.
5. For these reasons, there is no power in this Court to condone the delay in filing this appeal which must fail and is hereby dismissed.