The above cited complaints, sixteen in number, have been filed under different provisions of I. R. O., 1969, calling for a penal action against the accused persons named therein by the aggrieved persons. A preliminary point to be determined in these complaints is whether in face of the provisions of 13(b) of the I. R. O., 1969, a criminal complaint can be filed in the Labour Court by an individual aggrieved person directly without the intervention of the Registrar of Trade Unions concerned or without his authorisation in this behalf. Previously the same point was decided by me in connection with a few complaints vide my consolidated order dated 5-7-76 in which the preliminary objection being allowed the complaints were dismissed as not having been filed competently in the eye of law. This view was adopted for the first the in the forum of Punjab Labour Court by following the view taken in similar situations by Sind & Baluchistan High Court, Karachi, in Constitutional Petition No. 258/1975 and by the second and 3rd Sind Labour Courts, Karachi, in connection with criminal complaints dismissed by them vide orders dated 20th and 3rd April, 1976, respectively. The present complaints were put together and their complainants given a further chance to address the Court so as to either maintain the view already given vide order dated 5-7- 1976 or to come to a different conclusion In due course after hearing the elaborate arguments on both sides. No fresh argument or any new point could be urged regarding the entertain ability of the complaints. However, for the sake of precision and logical conclusion I reiterate the possible objections to be urged on behalf of the complainants.
2. It is said that in criminal cases it is a right of an individual to come to the Court to seek the imposition of suitable penalty against the accused persons for the relevant contravention of law. In support of the contention the provisions of section' 22(a) (9) and section 25-A (9) of the I. R. O., 1969, have been referred to. Under the first provision it is said that the learned National Industrial Relations Commission may on the application of a party take up prosecution or trial of proceedings without intervention of Registrar of Trade Unions and on that analogy a Labour Court was also supposed to adopt the same course. Under the second provision it is urged that a right has expressly been given to an individual to move the Labour Court to take up a proper action against person defying a direction of the Labour Court passed under section 25-A. But these contentions have no substance. Before taking up the discussion on these points the relevant provision of sections 13 of the I. R. O., 1969, are re--produced here under :- "Section 13. Powers and functions of Registrar. --The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar -
(a) The registration of trade union under this Ordinance and the maintenance of a register for this purpose;
(b) to lode, or authorise any person to lodge complaints with the Labour Court or Commission for action, including prosecution against Trade Unions, employers, workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provision of this Ordinance or for expanding the funds of a Trade Union in con--travention of the provisions of its constitution
(d) such other powers and functions as may be prescribed."
An ordinary reading of these provisions reveals that it is only the Registrar of Trade Unions who has been soley entrusted with the function of lodging or authorising any person to lodge any criminal complaint in the Labour Court under the provisions of the I. R. O., 1969. He is the person who in the first instance is to look into the desirability of filing a complaint against any person. No doubt, the filing of a complaint under different penal provisions of I. R. O.1969, does involve certain pre- considerations to prima facie determine the genuineness of a complaint.
3. Under the scheme of the enactment unfair labour practice is one of the serious criminal offences calling for a punitive deterrent for those who are found guilty of unfair labour practice in the industrial sphere. At the same the an unfair labour practice can very easily be alleged against any person at any the without the least consideration of the importance of its engagements or his social or official status. So an accused person can immediately be summoned by the Court to answer the charge either on the self-statement of the complainant in most cases or by virtue of some additional oral evidence of routine nature. The law appears to have wisely put in the check against the indiscriminate allegations calling for punitive action and the matter of filing complaints has been specifically made a function of the Registrar who has to go through the pre- considerations of making out ad genuine and consistent case against the person accused of a punishable conduct. The very heading of the section gives out the impression that the filing of the complaints under the I. R. O., 1969, has precisely been made a function of the Registrar of Trade Unions and not the option of an aggrieved person by directly taking the matter to the Court without first being taken to the Registrar to decide about the genuineness of the cause or distinguish between a true grievance and frivolous and whimsical action. Any other interpretation of the provisions of section 13(b) of the I. R. O., 1969, can lead to situations unharmonious to the overall effect of the other provisions of the I. R. O., 1969. The law has placed a check on frivolous actions to save the the of the Court as well as to give an implied protection to persons engaged in the performance of important industrial and public functions, undue absence wherefrom may seriously affect larger public interests. The argument that an individual person has been allowed under section 25-A(9) of the I. R. O., 1569, to move the Labour Court in a criminal cause is patently wrong and against the very meaning of the provision. Because under section 25-A (9) an express bar has been provided against the prosecution of any person defying the direction of the Labour Court except when the complaint has either been filed in the criminal Court of competent jurisdiction by the workman concerned aggrieved of the defiance or by the Labour Court or the tribunal whose order or decision has not been complied with. There is nothing in this provision that an individual aggrieved person can bring a criminal complaint directly to the Labour Court to get it disposed of by it. On the other hand it is for the Labour Court itself to initiate or not to initiate a complaint in the proper forum of law in accordance with the situation faced by it in regard to its decision in question.
4. As regards the provision of section 22-A (9), the same considerations can be invoked. The provision reads as follows r- Section 22-A(9)t "The Commission, may, on the application of a party or of its own motion,
(a) initiate prosecution, trial of proceedings or take action with regard to any matter relating to its functions."
According to this provision again it has been left with the discretion of the learned Commission (N.
I. R. C.) to initiate prosecution or a trial of criminal proceedings under the provisions of I. R O.,1969, which does not mean filing of a complaint directly by an individual before the Commission to get it heard and disposed of without any pre-consideration in regard to the Initiation of prosecution or trial of proceedings. If the learned Commission is of the view in any given application of a party that prosecution or trial of proceedings may not be initiated against the person named in the application, no further action will be taken in the matter. The filing of a complaint even before the learned Commission is also the function of Registrar of Trade Unions unless the complaint or trial of proceedings is initiated by the learned Commission itself. Moreover, the bare fact cannot be loft sight that the learned Commission appears to have been given an additional power of taking up the trial of proceedings or any other action relating to its functions which power has not been vested in the Labour Court under section 25-A(9) of the I. R. O., 1969. This being so, the analogy, if any, construed from the provisions of subsection 9 of section 22-A of the I. R. O., 1969, can hardly be pressed into service for taking cognisance of the present complaints without the active intervention or authorisation by the Registrar of Trade Unions.
5. In support of the view taken by me of the provisions of section 13(6) of the 1. R. O., 1969, various allied enactments relating to labour laws can be referred with advantage to show that the individual aggrieved person has not been given the right to take the criminal complaint directly to the Court without the intervention of some specified official mentioned in each enactment. Under section 7(5) of the West Pakistan Industrial & Com--mercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance. 1968, no prosecution or offence punishable under the Ordinance can be lodged except by or with the permission in writing of the Inspector appointed under the Ordinance; Similarly, under section 21(3) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, under section 7 of the Factories Act, under section 28 of the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 19t-9, under section 66 of West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965, and under section 18(a) (2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, officers have been specified to file criminal complaints against the accused persons for the contravention of the provisions of these enactments. This phenomenon clearly points out that fn the matter of filing criminal complaints in regard to the major legislation (Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969) the individual persons cannot be supposed to have been intended by the Ordinance to file criminal complaints of their own for the punishment of the accused persons. Consequently I am of the view that the present complaints have not been competently filed by their complainants without the initiation or authorisation by the Registrar of Trade Unions, Multan. I am fortified by the similar view given in the judgment of Sind & Baluchistan High Court, Karachi, and some of the Labour Courts; already referred above. The complaints are, therefore, dismissed. The file may be consigned. Production attributable to the workers. The Management after taking into the account certain instances of illegal gratification charge-sheeted the respondent and dismissed him on the basis of a full fledge enquiry.
The learned lower Court despite reaching a conclusion that a proper action was taken against the respondent interfered in the quantum of punishment awarded to the appellant, which was not justified in eye of law. In order to make a better scrutiny of the circumstances of enquiry, I have heard the learned counsel for the respondent whose main stay of arguments is that the appellant was neither allowed to cross-examine the witnesses in his defence. But both the contentions are without substance in as much as the enquiry was made in the presence of respondent without denying him the cross-examination and no request on the part of the appellant could be shown to have been-turned down for the production of defence witnesses. The only reference in the evidence is that the respondent wanted to examine his defence witnesses on the assurance of security to tae given to them by the Management in case they made statements in his favour.
Such a plea cannot carry grounds and the non-assurance of security in this connection could not be assumed by the respondent. No such procedure has the sanction of law. In this background of the facts I agree with the finding of the learned Lower Court that the domestic enquiry preceded on the proper lines. However, I disagree with the observation in the impugned order that the order of the dismissal might be modified into some, lenient order for which a Labour Court ordinarily has no jurisdiction. The impugned order therefore, is set aside and the appeal being accepted the original order of dismissal passed against the respondent is upheld.