' The petitioner had laid claim to arrears of wages by approaching the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Jhelum/Chakwal, by way of an application under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Authority held the petitioner entitled to receive certain amount from the respondent concern, by an order passed on 12-6-1995. The respondent concern filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Court No, 6, Rawalpindi; and the said Court, by a judgment announced on 31-10-1995, allowed the appeal and remanded the case for its decision afresh by the Authority.
Dissatisfied with the said decision, the worker has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. The petitioner's representative has assailed the soundness of the decision of the Labour Court, mainly on the ground that the appeal was not entertainable, being barred by flue law of limitation.
It has been pointed out that no application for condonation of delay had been submitted by the employer. The 'Authority' rendered its decision on 12-6-1995, and the employer applied for a certified copy of the same on 18-6-1995; copy was delivered on the following day, but the appeal was preferred (in the Labour Court) on 18-7-1995 i,e, with a delay of six days.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent has controverted this assertion by placing before the Tribunal an extract from the register of the Copying Branch of the office concerned. Application for obtaining certified copy of the order of the 'Authority' had been submitted on the date the order was passed, i,e, on 12-6-1995. Certified copy was made over to the applicant on 19-6-1995, and the appeal in the Labour Court was filed within the period provided under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the same being 30 days. As such, the petitioner's representative is not correct in urging that the appeal before the Labour Court was time-barred, and the Court could not just entertain it and proceed with it.
4. It is odd indeed that the petitioner's representative continues harping on the tune that the Labour Court has not touched the question of limitation, in the course of its impugned judgment dated 31- 10-1995, although para. 6 of the judgment is devoted to the discussion of this question.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent concern has drawn the attention of the Tribunal to an important aspect of the case the same being that the claim relating to the year 1985 was placed before the Authority in December, 1992, long after expiry of the limitation period, being three years.
It is contended that it is the duty of the Court to see to it that the cause before it has been brought within time, even though the respondent in the cause has not raised any objection in that regard.
Reliance has been placed on PLD 1985 SC 153, Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others. Matter of limitation has not been left to the pleadings of the parties, but a duty is cast upon the Court itself in that behalf; limitation being a matter of statute, the same cannot be waived and even waiver by parties would not relieve the Court of its obligation in the matter.
6. Learned Labour Court has spotted certain lapses and lacunae in the ' trial' and has taken note of the fact that the ' Authority' has hastened to pass an order in perfunctory manner, by disposing of the material issues altogether, without undertaking any meaningful discussion, by taking into account the evidence on record, relevant to the said issues. Only conclusions have been given in an executive fashion, without recording reasons in support thereof. It has also been observed that the ' Authority' has not provided an adequate opportunity to the parties to adduce their entire evidence.. In the opinion of the learned Court below, the findings arrived at by the ' Authority' are as such not sustainable in law. The matter has been remitted to the ' Authority' for its decision afresh in accordance with law. I do not think that the learned lower Court has erred on factual as also on legal plane in adopting that course, on the strength of the observations made. I also fail to follow what prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by remand of the case, which is aimed at elucidating evidentiary material in entirety and its appreciation in true per spective. Learned counsel for the respondent has cited, in support of his submissions, 1978 SCMR 168 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, PLD 1980 SC 1 Aziz Khan v.\ Haider Khan, (ii) Siraj Din and others v. Amanullah Qureshi and another, and (iii) 1994 PLC 364 (Lahore High Court), Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Mazhar Hussain.
If the record contains sketchy evidence, the trial is haphazard and a decision has been given without application of mind, there would be a justification for remand of the case for adjudication afresh. An Appellate Court or Tribunal may pass any order, which the trial Court is empowered to announce, including incidental orders.
7. It is also to be noted that revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as of right and the Court concerned has limited to discretion in the matter. The Appellate Court had taken note of errors apparent on the face of the record of the lower authority and this Tribunal would only interfere, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, if as envisaged by section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court below has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter or has declined to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has committed any material irregularity or illegality in rendering the impugned decision. I do not think, there has been any such incidence, warranting interference by this Court with the judgment delivered by the Labour Court. I would maintain the impugned decision, and dismiss the revision petition, being devoid of any merit. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.