JUDGMENT ABDUL RAHIM KAZI, J.- This Bail Application has been moved on behalf of the applicant who is involved in the case registered as Section 141, 148, 434 and 109 PPC.
2. The allegations in the FIR are that on the morning of the incident at 7.30 am. The complainant had left in his Jeep to go to attend the office of Mohtasib-e-Aala at Karachi when at about 7.45 a.m. 15/20 boys came there from a lane having stones in their hands stoned the vehicle of the complainant and surrounded the' same. The complainant and his driver Haji Khan got down from the vehicle and within their sight the boys put the said vehicle to torch, In the meanwhile, the Police Party in their vehicle reached there and the said culprits made good their escape. The Police Parts helped in putting of the fire. AS1 Abdullah of Police Station City stated that he identified some of the culprits and gave the names of five persons which includes the name of the present applicant.
Subsequently a FIR was registered by the complainant at Police Station wherein he mentioned the above facts. The Police after usual investigation arrested/all the accused and sent up the accused for trial.
3. During the trial three witnesses i.e. Complainant, his driver Haji Khan and Muhammad Tahir the Police Constable have been examined \ Bail application was moved on behalf of the present applicant which was rejected and. Therefore, this Bail Application.
4. It may be pointed out that earlier a- B.T! Application was moved on behalf of the co-accused Yameen who has been granted bail by this Court being criminal Bail Application No. 220/1994 on the ground that his name was not mentioned in the FIR and he was not put identification test.
5. We have heard Mr. Nadir Hussan, the learned counsel for the applicant. The learned counsel has vehemently argued that in the present case this FIR cannot be treated to be a FIR. u/S. 154, Cr.P.C, and that there was no recovery from the applicant. He has further argued that the these witnesses examined in the Court do not implicate the present applicant and that there are inconsistencies in evidence. He has also argued that in such circumstances the present applicant is entitled to bail specially when the only scheduled offence, section 435, PPC: is punishable with seven years imprisonment and this being less than ten yt'ars, the bail is to be granted as a rule and with- holding the bail is an exception.
6. We have given anxious consideration to the subm issions of the learned counsel, It may be observed at the very outset that while hearing a bail application this Court will not go deep into the evidence, It may also be observed that sifting of the evidence or deeper appreciation of the evidence at bail stage is not required to be done. All that is required u/S. 497. Cr.P.C, is to assess as to whether the reasonable grounds exist to believe the applicant to be connected with t'he commission of the I alleged offence or otherwise, In the present case as per FIR, A.S! Abdiillah Khan has j identified the culprits. He has not yet been examined, In the case Sanaullah and 3 j others v.
The State (1983 SCM R 15) Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the evidence of even one witness in face of affidavits of other witnesses exonerating the accused, would be Sufficient to award conviction in case the same stands, In the present case as far as the three witnesses already examined are concerned, the complainant does not disown the FIR but all that Ive says is thait he signed the FIR without reading the same. The learned counsel' has also referred to certam improbabilities. These facts are not required to be taken into consideration at this stage but can only be dealt with at the time of the trial or hearing of an appeal, In the case of Shah Muhammad Khan v. The State (198l P.Cr.L.J. 65) which has been relied on by the learned counsel for the applicant, it has been held by a learned Single Judge of Peshawar High Court that neither elaborate or deep assessm ent of evidence on record nor detailed discussion on various items or evidence which prosecutidh intends to produce at the trial was at the bail stage but it is only-the provisional and tentative sifting of evidence which can be done. This on the contrary supports the case of the prosecution wherein it has been shows that AS1 Abdullah had identified the culprits and he has not yet been examined. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on the case of Tariq Bashir and five others v. The State (PLD 1995 S.C. 34) wherein their lordships have been pleased to observe that grant of bail in offences punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years is a rule and refusal and exception, In the same case their lordship have further held that this exception is to be exercised in extraordinary cases where tile bail is to be declined. .An example of such exceptions have been laid down by their lordships in the same case wherein it 1s observed as under:
7. "It is crystal clear that in bailable offences the grant of baij is a right and not favour, whereas in non-bailable offences the grant of bail is not a right but concession/grace. Section 497, Cr.P.C, divided non-bailable offences into two categories i.e. (i) offences punishable with death, imprisonment of life or imprisonment for ten years. The principle to be deduced from'this provision of law is that in non-bailable offences falling in the second category (punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years) the grant of bail is a rule and refusal an exception. So the bail will be declined only in extraordinary and exceptional cases, for example
(a) where there is likelihood of abscondence of the accused;
(b) where there is apprehension of the accused tempering with the prosecution evidence;
(c) where there is danger of the offence being repeated if the accused is released on bail; and
(d) where the accused is a previous convict."
8. The above clauses very clearly show that in case there is apprehension of the accused tempering with prosecution evidence or there is danger of the offence being repeated if the accused is released on bail then the bail is to be withheld, In the present case's circumstances and the situation obtaining at Hyderabad such possibility cannot be ruled out. The very manner in which the alleged act has been Committed by the accused itself disentitles him from such grace or concession which can be exercised in his favour. Lastly it may be observed that the rule of consistency also would not be applicable in the present case as the co-accused Yameen was granted bail on the ground that his name was not in FIR and he was not subjected to identification test, In view of the above discussion we are of the view that the provisions of section 8 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act rftay be applicable wherein the burden shifts to the accused to prove his innocence as the accused had b,een named in the FIR. And identified on the very spot.
9. In this view of the matter we find no substance in this Bail Application which is accordingly dismissed.