This is an application by the purchaser Nabi Ahmad Ansari to set aside the. Order, dated the 18th December, 1991, whereby the money deposited by him on account of purchase price of the property in question in this case was ordered to be refunded to him and the offer of Ramzan Ali to purchase the property was accepted.
2. The property in question is the plots of land bearing No. 1-D-2 and 1-D-3, St-9/1, measuring 971.4 and 974 square yards, respectively, situated at Sector 16-B, North Karachi; and it was ordered to be sold by order, dated the 20th August, 1990, passed under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961.
3. Before the property could be sold in pursuance of the order dated the 20th August, 1990, an application (C.M.A. 2402/91), signed by Mr. S. Zaki Muhammad, Advocate for respondents Nos. l and 2, and Mr. Hidayatullah Ghulamali, Advocate for respondents Nos.3 and 4, purportedly on behalf of the respondents, was filed on 26th August, 1991. It was not signed by any of the respondents but the respondent No.2 filed an affidavit in support of it. In the application it was stated that the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, being partners in respondent No. 1, had "arranged a buyer by private negotiations" and that buyer had agreed to purchase the property for Rs.14,00,000 and the respondents prayed that the property be sold to that buyer at that price. It is significant that the buyer's name was not type-written in the application but was inserted in ink in the space left blank for that purpose. This application was opposed by respondents Nos. l, 3 and 4 who filed counter- affidavits alleging, inter alia, that the counsel had no authority to make it. The record shows that as on the 26th August, 1991 when C.M.A. 2402/91 was filed Mr. Hidayatullah Ghulamali had filed a Vakalatnama on the Ist March, 1989, on behalf of respondent No.4 and on the 14th February, 1990, on behalf of the respondents Nos. l and 3 the latter Vakalatnama being signed by one Abdullah Khan as attorney; Mr. Noorullah Manji had filed a Vakalatnama on the 23rd May, 1991, for respondent No.3, and on the 26th August, 1991, for respondents Nos.1 and 2. Thus, respondent No. l was represented by Mr. Hidayatullah Ghulamali and Mr. S. Zaki Muhammad, the respondent No.2 by Mr. S. Zaki Muhammad alone, respondent No.3 by Mr. Hidayatullah Ghulamali and Mr. Noorullah Manji, and respondent No.4 by Mr. Hidayatullah Ghulamali.
4. Counter-affidavit opposing C.M.A. 2402 of 1991 was filed by Abdullah Khan as attorney of respondents Nos. l and 3 and it was alleged therein that respondents Nos. l, 3 and 4 had published a notice cancelling authority given to respondent No.2. The respondent No.4 had produced with his counter --affidavit a copy of public notice in HURRIYET, dated 15th September, 1991, stating that power of attorney given to respondent No.2 was cancelled on the 21st March, 1989.
5. From the above it would seem that the respondent No.2 alone was responsible for making the application C.M.A. 2402 of 1991 and the "purchaser" Masood Anwar was put up by him. The application came up for hearing on the 6th October, 1991, when the following order was passed--- "Mr. Bashir Memon O.A. States that he has received better offers in respect of the property. He, therefore, prays that fresh offers be invited through advertisement in Dailies DAWN and JANG. In terms of this order, C.M.A. 2402 of 1991 is disposed of. The applicant will, however, be at liberty to make or offer subsequently before the Official Assignee after advertisement. By consent to come up on 28-10-1991 when the offers will be placed before the Court for orders."
6.While the offers were being invited by the Official Assignee, the respondent No.2 made an Application (C.M.A. 3052 of 1991) praying that he be allowed to purchase the property "at two per cent above the highest bid in case the offer is not exorbitant and beyond his means." That application came up for hearing on the 28th October, 1991, alongwith the reference dated the 27th October, 1991, made by the Official Assignee. On that date the offer is not exorbitant and beyond his means." That application came up for hearing on the 28th October, 1991, alongwith the reference, dated the 27th October, 1991, made by the Official Assignee. On that date the offer of Nabi Ahmed Ansari to purchase the property for Rs.25,20,000 was accepted and the respondent No.2 withdrew his Application (C.M.A. 3052 of 1991).
7. Nabi Ahmed Ansari subsequently deposited the balance purchase price and on the 7th November, 1991, the Official Assignee was directed to hand over possession of the property to the purchaser alongwith documents of title in respect thereof. It appears that the documents of title were subsequently handed over to Nabi Ahmed Ansari but the possession of the property could not be delivered to him. He, therefore, filed an application (C.M.A. 3188 of 1991) praying that value of certain machinery which was missing be refunded to himand that possession of the property be obtained from unauthorised persons and handed over to him. By order dated the 27th November, 1991, the Official Assignee was directed to deliver possession to the auction purchaser and obtain police aid if necessary; and the application remained pending with regard to the prayer for refund of part of the purchase price.
8. The Official Assignee was unable to execute the order, dated the 27th November, 1991, and, consequently it was ordered on the 11 th December, 1991, that notice be issued to S.H.O., Gulberg Police Station and S.I. Ghulam Sarwar Mirza to appear before the Court on "12-12-1991 ". It appears that the case was not listed for hearing on the 12th December, 1991, and no proceedings took place on that date. The Diary Sheet, however, contains the following noting on 12-12-1991:--- "Before Mr. Justice H. Kh. Adj. To 16-12-1991."
9. It is necessary at this stage to notice the developments which took place between the 11 th and the 18th December, 1991, when the impugned order was passed. On the 12th December, 1991, Ramzan Ali signed but did not file, an Application (C.M.A. 3586 of 1991) praying that the order for police aid be recalled and constructive possession of the property be delivered to the (Nabi Ahmed Ansari) because, as alleged in the affidavit, he, the tenant in the property, having obtained tenancy respondent No.2 and Kafil Ahmad Siddiqui who were authorised to deal with the property and the lease having been revised by Lease Agreement, dated the 18th February, 1989, executed by the same two persons. On the 15th December, 1991, Mr. Noorullah Manji who had hither to been appearing for respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 filed Vakalatnama on behalf of Nabi Ahmad Ansari. On the 16th December, 1991, the case was listed for hearing and although the purpose for which it was fixed does not appear on the order sheet for that date it appears clear it was for hearing of C.M.A, 3188 of 1991 and one other miscellaneous application. On the same date Ramzan Ali filed his Application (C:M.A. 3586 of 1991). This application finds no mention in the order, dated the 16th December, 1991, but, according to counter-affidavit filed by Nabi Ahmed Ansari on 18th December, 1991, "on 16-12-1991 the police officer remained present but one Ramzan Ali presented an application for recalling the order of the.Police aid." On the same day i.e. 16th December, 1991, respondent No.2 filed a counter affidavit opposing the prayer in (C.M,A, 3188 of 1991) of Nabi Ahmad Ansari for refund of a part of the purchase price and stating that one Mst. Rahmat Begum was prepared to purchase the property for Rs.25,70,000. The hearing was, however at the joint request adjourned to 18-12-1991 ".
10. On the 18th December, 1991, the case came up in Court for orders on` C.M.A. 3586 of 1991 (By Ramzan Ali) and for hearing of C.M,A. 3266 of 1991 (by the petitioner for payment of the purchase money) and C.M.A. 3188 of 1991 (by Nabi Ahmed Ansari). As stated above C.M.A, 3188 of 1991 was pending only in respect of the prayer therein for refund of the purchase money, the other prayer for police aid having been already granted on the 27th November, 1991 Nabi Ahmed Ansari, apparently filed a counter-affidavit on that date opposing the Application (C.M.A. 3586 of 19--1) of Ramzan Ali.
Thus, apart from the petitioner's Application (C.M.A. 3266 of 1991) which is not relevant for the purpose of this order, the only question for hearing before the Court on the 18th December, 1991, was the prayer of Nabi Ahmed Ansari for refund of a part of the purchase price. Ramzan Ali's Application (C.M.A. 3586 of 1991) was listed only for orders. However, the following order was passed on that date: --- "Mr. Noorullab Manji, learned counsel for auction/purchaser states that the purchaser had offered to purchase the property on the understanding that the property would be transferred to him and vacant possession thereof will be delivered by the Official Assignee under the direction of the Court.
Mr. Bashir Memon, learned Official Assignee has pointed out to the advertisement appearing in the dailies 'DAWN and JANG' wherein one of the terms of sale of the property was that the property would be sold on "as and where basis, according to which the purchaser would only entitled to vacant possession of the property if the property had been in vacant possession but if there are tenants/occupants he cannot seek their eviction in a summary manner by the Court. In view of this position Mr. Noorullah A. Manj: requests that amount deposited by the purchaser towards the property be returned to him. Order accordingly. At this juncture Mr. S.A. Mannan, Advocate for applicant Ramzan Ali has made an offer in the sum of Rupees 25,50,000 which offer is acceptable to Mr. Habibullah Jatoi, learned counsel for petitioner as well as representative of petitioner Mr. Zafar Hameed. Accordingly the offer of applicant Ramzan Ali is accepted with direction to him to deposit 25 % of the sale consideration within a week hereof and the balance 75 % within the next three weeks. "
11. Nabi Ahmed Ansari moved the present application on the 26 December, 1991, on the ground that the order, dated 18th December, 1991 was procured by producing a fraudulent document i.e. a lease in favour of Ramzan Ali. In para. 4 of the affidavit in support of the application it is alleged: --th "That the Advocate Mr. Noorullah Manji, who was appearing for defendants Nos.1, 3 and 4 was requested by me to seeking the permission of Court for police assistance and who filed the counter--affidavit but without my instruction had made a statement before the Court without authority, which statement, was inconsistent to the affidavit, I had filed in the Court."
Ranizan Ali has filed a counter-affidavit alleging in para. 5 thereof:- "I say that the averments of paragraphs Nos.4 and 5 are denied as false and misleading the statement for withdrawal of the offer was made by the learned Advocate after consulting the applicant inside the Court room with his construction. "
12. In view of the controversy mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it was considered necessary to record the evidence of the parties. Nabi Ahmed Ansari deposed on his own behalf but Ranizan Ali, in spite of being given opportunities to do so, did not appear to give evidence and did not produce any witness.
13. Mr. Zia Parvez, the learned counsel for Ranizan Ali, contended at the outset that the order, dated the 18th December, 1991, was one either under Order 21, Rule 92 or under section 47, C.P.C. That, in either event, it was appealable; and that, therefore, it cannot be recalled in exercise of inherent power under section 151, C. P.C.
14. As indicated above, the sale of the respondents' property was ordered under the provisions of section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961.
Subsection (10) of that section provides:--- "An order under this section for the attachment or sale of property shall be carried into effect as far as may be in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1988 (Act V of 1908), for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Bank were the decree-- holder. "
It is, therefore, necessary to examine the provisions of C.P.C. Relating to sale of a property in execution of a decree. Those provisions are contained in Order 21, Rules 64 to 103. Rules 64 to 73 contain provisions regarding sales generally and Rules 74 to 81 concern sale of movable property.
Those rules, i.e. Rules 64 to 81 are not germane to the present argument and it is only necessary to consider Rules 89 to 92 of Order 21. Rule 92 provides:--- "(1) Where no application is made under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91, 02 where such application is made and disallowed the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.
(2) Where such application made and allowed, or where, in the case of an application under rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale: Provided that no order shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby.
(3) No suit to set aside an order under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made."
15. Since the impugned order is not one of confirmation of sale but one setting aside the sale in favour of Nabi Ahmed Ansari, it is only sub-rule (2) of rule 92 of Order 21 which needs to be considered. The expression "such application" in sub-rule (2) refers, obviously to an application under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91 mentioned in Sub-rule (1); and the Court is required, by sub--rule (2), to set aside a sale where such an application is made and allowed. Under rule 89, "any person, either owning such property (i.e. Property which has been sold) or holding an interest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale may apply to have the sale set aside. " Rule 90 provides that an application may be made by a decree-holder or any person entitled to a share in rateable distribution of the assets to have the sale set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it; and, under rule 91, the purchaser may apply to have the sale set aside on the ground that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold. Now, in the first place, there was no application in the present case by any one to have the sale set aside. Even Ramzan Ali, far from seeking to have the sale set aside, only wanted that constructive possession of the property be delivered to Nabi Ahmed Ansari and that the order for police aid to obtain physical possession of the property be recalled. Indeed, Ramzan Ali did not claim to be the owner of the property or having any interest therein except being tenant therein. There was, therefore, no occasion for him to apply under rule 89. Again Ramzan Ali, not being a decree --holder or a person entitled to a share in rateable distribution of the assets or a purchaser could not and indeed did not, apply under rule 90 or rule 91. It is, thus, clear that the order setting aside the sale was not passed on any application for that purpose. The impugned order was, therefore, not one under Order 21, Rule 92, C.P.C.
16. It also does not appear that the impugned order has been passed under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Subsection (1) of section 47 provides: -- "All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. "
The question or the dispute before the Court on the 18th December, 1991, was whether Nabi Ahmed Ansari was entitled to physical possession of the property or whether he was entitled only to constructive possession because Ranmzan Ali claimed to be the tenant of the judgment-debtor; and that question of dispute was one between Nabi Ahmed Ansari and Ranmzan Ali. Both of them were representatives of the judgment-debtor because Ansari claimed possession by virtue of title acquired as purchaser of judgment debtor's interest in the property and Ranmzan Ali claimed to be in possession by virtue of an alleged tendency rights. The decree-holder was not concerned with the dispute. The question, therefore, was not one between the parties or their representatives but merely between representatives of the same party. Further, the dispute related to the possession of the property and the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that such dispute does not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.
17. Since the impugned order was not one under either Order 21, rule 92 or under section 47, C.P.C. It may be assumed to have been passed in exercise of inherent powers under section 151, C.P.C.
Therefore, it was not appealable under either Order 43, Rule 1 or section 104, C.P.C. But, even assuming that an appeal lay from the impugned order, this Court is not prevented from recalling the order in exercise of its power under Order 47, rule 1 or section 151, C.P.C. In Onkar Bhagwan v.
Gama Lakhaji & Co. AIR 1933 Born. 205 an appeal challenging a compromise decree passed by consent was dismissed as barred by section 96(3), C.P.C. But it was observed that if a decree was alleged to be fraudulent it could be challenged in review or possibly under section 151, C.P.C. And in the case of Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram Rakhpal Singh AIR 1926 Oudh. 315, where a District Judge had allowed an application to set aside a decree based on an alleged compromise, it was held:--- "The District Judge has relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court: Basangowda v.
Yogangowda (1910) 34 Born. 408; 12 Born. LR 223 where it is stated that every Court has an inherent power to correct its own proceedings, and where it was held that a Court could set aside its own decree based on a compromise which it found to have been filed by a person having no authority to make or present the compromise: No authority to the contrary has been shown to us and we are of the opinion that the lower Court had power to act in the manner stated. It is immaterial whether this power is to be found in section 151 or section 153 of the Civil Procedure Code, or whether it is a power in review."
In unreported case of Mst. Noor Jehan v. Azmat Hussain Farooqi (Civil Appeal No.278-K of 1990), High Court Appeal was disposed of on the basis of a joint statement by the counsel for the parties and the order disposing of the High Court Appeal was challenged by an application under section 151, C.P.C. Praying that the order be recalled because the joint statement was filed by the petitioner's counsel without her authority and/or instructions. The application was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court and in appeal it was held by the Supreme Court that since the statement pertained to a collateral matter, the Advocate had no authority to make it. It was held: - - "We are, therefore, of the view that the statement seems to have been made inadvertently, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without any specific authority from the appellant in respect of matter which in the peculiar facts of this case was collateral to the main controversy between the appellant and the respondent No. Such undertaking, therefore, cannot be allowed to be continued."
It will be seen that the order passed on that basis of a statement made by a counsel was recalled or set aside on application made under section 151, C.P.C. It would, thus, appear that the application to recall the impugned order is maintainable either under section 151 or under Order 47, rule 1, C.P.C.
18. Mr. Zia Parvez sought to rely on the cases of Mir Haji Ghulam Shah v. 8 Khan Chand Gopaldas AIR 1939 Sindh 137; Muhammad Bibi v. Abdul Ghani PLD 1973 Kar. 444 and Mrs. Mehr Sultan Jang v.
Qurban Hussain 1971 SCMR 73. In AIR 1939 Sindh 137, a subordinate Judge at Hyderabad had dismissed the suit as against one of the defendants on the ground that it was not maintainable because the liability for specific performance of an agreement to sell land was within the term "debts and liabilities" in sections 8 and 9 c)f the Sindh Incumbered Estate Act. His successor, taking a contrary view, came to the conclusion that the suit was competent and set aside the order, purportedly under section 151, C.P.C. He had, however, "clearly reviewed the judgment of his predecessor" as was observed in appeal. It was held that he was not entitled to do so and further that neither Order 47 nor section 151, C.P.C. Were intended to be used to allow one Judge to sit in appeal on orders of his predecessor exercising an equal jurisdiction. The facts of the present case are entirely different. The case reported in PLD 1973 Kar. 444 was concerned with setting aside an order obtained by fraud. In the present case, the impugned order wa passed on the basis of a statement made by the Nurullah Manji and what is questioned in the present proceedings in his authority to make such statement. It is true that the application does mention fraud but that fraud is obviously alleged to be on the part of Ramzan Ali and the impugned order is not based on any act of Ramzan Ali but on the statement made by Mr. Manji. In 1972 SCM R 73 the petitioner refused to make an application for appointment of receiver under Order 40, C.P.C. And it was held that he could not seek directions, under section 151, C.P.C., to the Nazir to collect occupation charges from persons in possession of the property. That case is, therefore, distinguishable.
19. In order to see whether Mr. Noorullah A. Manji had the authority to act in the manner in which he did on the 18th December, 1991, it is necessary to recapitulate, briefly, the preceding events. The inventory of the property was prepared on the 19th December, 1988, by the Deputy Nazir who reported, inter alia, that "one Rahim Bux stated to be labour of the factory was present. The factory was not in running condition and all the rooms etc. Were lying opened." Before the offers for the purchase of the property were received by the Official Assignee, the respondent No.2 made two attempts - vide C.M.A. 2402 of 1991 and C.M.A. 3052 of 1991 to ensure that the property was not sold or, at least, sold to his nominee. Nabi Ahmed Ansari made his offer personally and also obtained an order for delivery of possession, if necessary, through police aid. On the 15th November, 1991, the Application (C.M.A. 3188 of 1991) made by Nabi Ahmad Ansari was pending only in respect of the prayer in it for refund of a part of the purchase money and it was on that date that he engaged Mr. Noorullah A. Manji, who was then also appearing for some of the respondents. Ramzan Ali made his Application (C.M.A. 3586 of 1991) on the 16th December, 1991, to recall the order for police aid and to deliver only constructive possession to Nabi Ahmed Ansari. Thus, on the 18th December, 1991, when the case came up before the Court, only questions before it were whether Nabi Ahmad Ansari was entitled to refund of part of the purchase price and whether Ramzan Ali was entitled to remain in physical possession of the property and Nabi Ahmad Ansari was entitled to only constructive possession thereof. The property had already been sold to Nabi Ahmed Ansari and the sale had been completed and the title in the property had vested in him. There was, therefore, no question before the Court regarding the cancellation or the setting aside of the sale of the property to Nabi Ahmed Ansari.
20. Mr. Habibur Rehman submitted that in these circumstances, it was incumbent upon Mr. Manji to consult Nabi Ahmed Ansari before requesting the Court that the amount deposited by him for purchase of the property be returned to him; and further that the return of the purchase price or the cancellation of the sale was a matter which was collateral to the matters pending before the Court and, therefore, Mr. Manji had no authority to make such request. He relied on the case of Ghasiram Goenka v. Hari Bux Goberdhon Das AIR 1930 Cal. 477 and Mst. Noor Jehan v. Azmat Hussain Farooqui (C.A. No.278-K of 1990). In AIR 1930 Cal. 477, a consent decree had been made by Buckland, J. And' an application to set aside that decree on the ground that the counsel had no authority to consent and had in fact consented against the wishes of his client was heard by Panckridge, J. The decree was set aside and it was held that when a client is present in Court, he has right to be consulted before the counsel gives his consent to a decree and consent given by the counsel without such consultation is without authority express or implied. In the case of Mst.
Noor Jehan v. Azmat Hussain Farooqui, the respondent No. l had filed a suit for recovery of possession of a house which the respondent No.2 had transferred to him, and for mense profits.
The house was in the possession of the appellant who was not impleaded as a party. The respondent No.2 confessed judgment and the suit was decreed in terms of compromise directing the respondent No.2 to hand over the possession of the property to respondent No. 1. The appellant made an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Challenging the decree as having been obtained by collusion and fraud and also an application for stay of execution in the meantime. The application of the appellant for stay of execution was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court and the appellant filed a High Court Appeal against the order dismissing her application. At the hearing of the High Court Appeal, a joint statement by the Advocates for the parties was recorded whereby the appellant was required to deposit in Court a sum of Rs.2,000 per month subject to the result of her application under section 12(2), C.P.C. And the appeal was accordingly disposed of. The appellant claimed that the joint statement by her counsel was filed without her authority and/or instructions, and filed an application under section 151, C.P.C. For recalling the order by which the appeal was disposed of. The learned Judges of the Division Bench took the view that the Vakalatnama executed by the appellant in favour of her Advocate expressly conferred the power of compromise on him and, therefore, he was competent to make a compromise statement which was impugned by the appellant. It was held that the question of recovery of mense profits from the appellant was a subject collateral to the main controversy between the appellant and the respondent No.1 and that if the facts and circumstances of the case had been considered and made known to the appellant in normal course she would not have agreed or instructed her counsel to enter into such a compromise. It was further held that there was nothing on the record that the appellant had instructed her counsel specifically to enter into such a compromise and that the compromise was on the basis of the general authority given in the Vakalatnama which was extended to collateral subject. The Supreme Court, therefore, took the view that the statement made by the counsel in High Court Appeal was made inadvertently, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without any specific authority from the appellant in respect of a matter which was collateral to the main controversy between the appellant and the respondent No. l and that the undertaking given by the counsel could not be allowed to continue.
21. As indicated above, the question of refunding the entire amount of purchase price to Nabi Ahmad Ansari and the consequent cancellation or setting aside of the sale was not before the Court on the 18th December, 1991. It was a question which was, thus, collateral to controversy which was pending. The learned counsel who was appearing for Nabi Ahmed Ansari had, therefore, no authority to make the request for refund of the purchase money. It may further be noted that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it does not appear possible to believe that any reasonable person would have consented to an order which was passed on the 18th December, 1991. The inventory prepared on the 19th December, 1988, did not show Ramzan Ali or any one else to be in possession of the property. Neither in C.M.A. 2402 of 1991, which was made at the instance of respondent No.2, nor in C.M.A. 3052 of 1991 made by respondent No.2 is there any mention of any tenant in the property. The alleged agreement of lease executed in favour of Ramzan Ali by respondent No.2 states expressly that the lesson ' is in physical possession' of the property; and Nabi Ahmed Ansari had filed a counter-affidavit on the 18th December, 1991, disputing the claim of Ramzan Ali and alleging that the lease alleged to have been executed in his favour is fraudulent. It is difficult to imagine, that Nabi Ahmad Ansari having filed a counter-affidavit mentioned above would immediately consent to an order being passed which ran counter to his strong assertion.
Nabi Ahmed Ansari has categorically stated in his evidence that his Advocate did not consult him on the 18th December, 1991, and has maintained his stand even during cross-examination. Ramzan Ali, on the other hand, failed to appear and give evidence to support his assertion, reproduced here in above, that Nabi Ahmad Ansari was consulted by his counsel before making the request for refund of the purchase money. It is therefore, clear that Mr. Noorullah A. Manji. Made the request on the 18th December, 1991, without consulting his client and without his authority. The order, dated the 18th December, 1991, is, therefore, liable to be, and is, hereby, recalled.
C.M.A. No.3188 of 1991 and C.M.A. No. 3586 of 1991 will be fixed for hearing in due course.