' MALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.---This appeal under section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 arises out of a suit for recovery of money filed by respondent No,1 which is a Banking Company against the appellant and respondent No,2 which has been decreed without trial by the Tribunal on 10-5-1989 on the ground that the appellant despite having been served through citation in the newspaper had failed to submit his reply to the show-cause notice within the prescribed period.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties it is necessary to refer to some facts which are that it was on 14-7-1988 that the appellant had filed the suit claiming a decree for recovery of Rs,1,91,948 impleading Indus Match Company, the appellant herein, as also Haji Muhammad Aslam respondent No,2 as defendants. On receipt of the plaint the Tribunal directed that notices be issued to the defendants personally; through registered acknowledgment due post and proclamation in daily Pakistan Times, a copy of which be sent to the defendant.
3. It is common ground between the parties that the citation was published in daily Pakistan Times of 21-9-1988 while the notice through registered post, was received by the appellant on 27-9-1988.
4. The appellant presented its reply to the show-cause notice on 5-10-1988 which by majority was held to be beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the suit of the appellant was decreed, The plea raised on behalf of the respondent that in, the circumstances of the case the limitation would run from the date on which the notice was served upon it through registered post was repelled by observing that the petitioner having been earlier served through citation appearing in daily Pakistan Times of 21-9-1988 he was bound to file his reply within 10 days therefrom and having not done so the reply submitted by him on 5-10-1988 was barred by time.
5. One, of the Members of the Tribunal took a different view and held that the limitation to file the reply to the show-cause notice should be computed from the day when the appellant was served through registered post and not from the date on which the citation appeared in the newspaper.
6. Before us learned counsel for the parties have taken the same stand. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the period prescribed in section 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals. Ordinance, 1984 should be reckoned w,e,f, 27-9-1988 when the notice through post was received by it while according to respondent's learned counsel time should be taken to run from the date notice was published in daily Pakistan Times dated 21-9-1988.
7. The procedure which has to be followed by the Banking Tribunal is provided by section 6 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance which reads as under:-- "6. Procedure of Banking Tribunal.---(1) Where a customer commits default in fulfiling any obligation to a banking company, the banking company may file against such customer with the Banking Tribunal a plaint which shall be verified on oath by the Branch Manager or an officer of the rank of Assistant Vice-President or Assistant Manager or such other officer as the Board of Directors of the Banking Company may authorise in this behalf.
(2) On a plaint being filed with the Banking Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1), the Banking Tribunal shall issue notice requiring the defendant to show cause within ten days of the service of such notice as to why decree as prayed for in the plaint should not be passed against him.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6) ..
' As would appear from subsection (2) above the defendant before the Banking Tribunal has to file a reply to the notice within 10 days the service of such notice. There is no procedure provided in the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 itself for effecting service upon a defendant but by virtue of subsection (3) of section 6 the procedure for service of notice laid down in subsection (3) of section 4 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 becomes applicable. A reference to section 4(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 would show that the notice under that provision can be served either personally or by registered post or by publication thereof in a' newspaper or by affixation. The important thing to be noticed in this behalf is the use of word ' or' rather than ' and' in this provision which makes it disjunctive and not conjunctive. The Banking Tribunal could not have as such, directed service in all the methods simultaneously. If, however, it did so the appellant was well within its rights to insist that the limitation should run when the service was effected on him through registered post.
8. This conclusion stands further fortified by comparison of section 4(3) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 with rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans)
Ordinance, 1979 framed under the aforesaid Act. It is to be seen that though section 4(3) prescribes procedure for service of notice by the Bank to the borrower but no procedure is prescribed in the Act for service of summons on defendant by the Court which is dealt with by rule 8 of Banking Companies (Recovery of. Loans) Ordinance, 1979, Rule 8 of which requires that the service on defendant be effected by resorting all the three methods simultaneously i,e, personally, through registered post and by publication of the summons in a newspaper. The rule specifically provides that' service effected in any of the methods would amount to due service. There is, however, no such corresponding provision in section 4(3) of the Ordinance. That being so, in cases falling under section 4(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, unlike rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, it is open for a defendant to show that the publication in the newspaper did not come to his knowledge and does not amount to due service. The fact that the object of promulgating Banking Tribunals Ordinance is to ensure speedy disposal of the cases instituted thereunder, does not take away the right of the defendant to be dealt with in accordance with due process of law and of a fair hearing. It needs no again saying that the purpose of issuing of summons/notice is to make the addressee aware of the proceedings initiated against it, and the defendant cannot be prevented from showing that in a given case the publication never came to his notice. It may also be mentioned that the Banking Tribunal while issuing notices through citation had itself directed that a copy of the publication be sent to the defendants under postal certificate which, however, was not done.
9. We are not unaware that the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of M/s. Ahmed Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 497) has held that the service of notice issued by the Special Court (Banking) under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 in any of the three methods prescribed in rule 8 is effective and the limitation would run from the date on which the service is effected. But that case was decided on the language employed in rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 which not only provides for service simultaneously through all the three methods but also ordains in clear terms that service effected in any of the manners would be effective. There is no corresponding provision either in Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, the rules framed thereunder or section 4(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance which by reference becomes applicable to proceedings under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 by virtue of section 4(3) of the latter Ordinance.
In view of what has been stated above, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the Banking Tribunal is set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh in accordance with law.
' No order as to costs.