' Revision petition is directed against the order dated 19-7-1993, passed by Haji Muhammad Akram Baitu, Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,2, Lahore, rejected an application submitted on 3- 5-1993 by Imtiaz Ahmad, serving as conductor with the Punjab Road Transport Corporation in the course of the main petition filed on 13-4-1993, under section 22-A(12), Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. Imtiaz Ahmad was employed in the year 1981 and he opted for retirement under the Golden Hand Shake Scheme, having to his credit twelve years of service, thus, entitled to earn pension, besides other service benefits. His option was accepted but he was held disentitled to the aforesaid benefits; and this allegedly amounted to an unfair labour practice, for stopping which Imtiaz Ahmad approached the Labour Court, with an additional prayer that he be treated at par with the other employees, similarly circumstanced.
3. Status quo order was issued on 13-4-1993, on entertaining Imtiaz Ahmad's petition, next date given being 21-4-1993, beyond which date it was extended. He was retired from service on 2-5- 1993; and for suspension of t is order he submitted an application on 3-5-1993. His request vas resisted by the respondents, Authorities of the P.R.T.C., according to whom, the order of Imtiaz Ahmad's retirement from service having been acted upon, he could not be brought back in service, and there was no legal justification for suspension of the order dated 2-5-1993. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner, however, maintains that the order dated 2-5-1993 had been passed by the P.R.T.C. In disregard of the status quo order dated 13-4-1993 and was liable to rescission. Reliance is placed on PLD 1962 Lah. 305, Mst. Umda Begum etc. v. Saad Saood Jan etc., and 1980 SCM R 89, Bakhtawar etc. v. Amin etc. Facts of the cited cases, however, are distinguishable. In the former case ejectment proceedings pending before the Rent Controller had been stayed by the Appellate Authority; and when the order was not extended, the ejectment proceedings were revived and the Rent Controller proceeded further. Obviously, the object of filing appeal by the aggrieved party would have been defeated and the appeal would have been rendered redundant or infructuous, if the Rent Controller did not stop there and instead carried on the proceedings before him, with a mind to take the same to their logical end, in the manner as if the matter was not pending before any higher Court. It was held that during pendency of the appeal the stay order granted by the Appellate Authority would hold good and would be effective till final decision of appeal. Evidently, then, it was not open to the Rent Controller to have taken up the matter and proceeded with the same, irrespective of pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. Latter case enunciates a principle applicable in exceptional situations. There is no denying the fact that a higher Court, especially High Court and Supreme Court, are empowered, in exercise of their inherent jurisdiction, to see to it that no party is wronged, and even if an ad interim injunction order is not extended or is varied or vacated, affected party may be brought back to its original position and the 'aggressor' or 'wrong-doer' may be prevented from taking advantage of his own wrong.
Superior Courts, in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction, can always make such an order, for safeguarding ultimate ends of justice.
4. In normal circumstances, an injunction order, granted for a limited period, would stand vacated by efflux of time, unless it has been extended or made to last till end of litigation before a particular Court. It has been so pronounced in 1985 CLC 1995 (Karachi) Muzaffar Ali Khan v. Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority and others. In the instant case, the stay order, issued on 13-4-1993, having not been extended beyond the next date, which was 21-4-1993, was not binding on the employer, who was at liberty to take any action against the employee, as permissible under the relevant rules.
Before the Labour Court the learned counsel for the respondents had undertaken that the petitioner's service being more than twelve years, he would be paid his pension, as also other benefits. The petitioner, having voluntarily opted for his retirement, thus stood to lose nothing, because of his retirement.
5. 'It is also to be pointed out that the revision petition has been filed with an inordinate delay of 64 days, if 90 days is taken to be the time limit f preferring a revision petition. I am, as such, of the considered view that present revision petition is liable to dismissal, on merits, as also by reason of its being hopelessly time-barred. It is hereby dismissed, with costs.