' This judgment shall dispose of the following connected civil revisions as they involve common .Questions of facts and law:-- .
"(1) Civil-Revision No,2456 of 1995. "International Credit and Investment Co. (Overseas) Limited v.
Mian Rafique Saigol and another."
(2) Civil. Revision No, 2458 of 1995. "Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v.
Mian Rafique Saigol and another."
2. Briefly stated facts out of which these petitions have arisen are that Messrs Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited (In Liquidation) and International Credit and Investment Co. .(Overseas) Limited, the petitioners before this Court, have instituted Civil Suits Nos.387/1 of 1992 and 117 of 1993, for recovery of US$ 1,844,851.50 (equivalent to Pak Rs,47,966,139.00) and US$ 17,250,006 equivalent to Pak Rs,470,235,000 approximately), respectively, against the respondents, which had been entrusted to the Court of Mr. Ghaffar Jalil, learned Civil Judge, Lahore and were presently pending in the Court of Mr. Zafar Iqbal Khan, Civil Judge, Lahore. The suits have been contested by the' respondents by filing of independent written statements in both the suits. In the written statements, preliminary objections have been raised, out of which the following objection of lack of jurisdiction has also been raised: ' This Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. The plaintiffs being a Banking Company and transacting business in Pakistan cannot file suit in this Hon'ble Court.
' Also the defendant M. Rafique Saigol does not live in Lahore. He is living at Islamabad having his business there."
3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, in presence and with the help of learned counsel for the parties, vide order dated 22-7-1993, learned trial Court settled as many as twelve issues of law and facts including the issue of jurisdiction in each case, which is reproduced as under:-- "Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit?0PD." The cases were set down for recording of evidence on all the issues.
4. On 4-9-1994, the respondents filed applications in both the suits under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C.
Praying that the suits should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as there is a term in the agreement between the parties on the basis whereof the suits have been filed, according to which the place for filing of the suits has been agreed upon to be the Courts of England. Relevant portion of the said applications is reproduced respectively as under:-- "2. That the plaintiff along with the plaint has enclosed documents. One of such documents is agreement dated 24-4-1986 mentioned at Serial No,4 of the list of documents submitted by the plaintiff. In paragraph 23 of the said document it has been provided that the jurisdiction shall be that of the England Courts. Similar provision is made in the document Assignment dated 24-4-1986 mentioned at Serial No,5 of the list of documents filed by the plaintiff.
3. That the defendants submit, on the basis of the document attached with the plaint by the plaintiff this Hon'ble Court has no territorial jurisdiction in the matter.
' The plaintiff has placed on record an agreement dated 18-12-1984 mentioned at Serial No,2 of the list of documents. Para. 3 of the said agreement reads as follows:-- ' This agreement shall be governed by English Law and .The claims hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts in England.
' The plaintiff has also placed on record the document dated 12-11-1985 which is mentioned at Serial No,9 of the list of documents filed by the plaintiff. Paragraph 3 of which is exactly the same as reproduced above."
5. 'These applications were contested inter alia on the grounds that the question of determination of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and facts, hence, decision thereof will require recording of evidence even on merits of the main suits, therefore, the applications are not maintainable, hence, the same may be dismissed. After hearing the arguments therein, learned trial Court vide identical orders, dated 8-3-1995, dismissed the applications holding that the determination of question of jurisdiction in these cases is a mixed question of law and facts, which can only be determined after recording of evidence on merits of the cases along with issues of merits. Operative part of the order passed in the applications is reproduced as under:-- 3.. "I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties addressed at length and also perused the record of the case. The present application under Order 7, rule 10 has been moved on behalf of the defendants for the dismissal of the present suit for want of jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that in the light of the provisions contained in the.
Agreement dated 24-4-1986 the Courts of England are to have jurisdiction to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with this agreement and that accordingly all suits, actions or proceedings arising out of or in connection with this agreement may be brought in the Courts of England. The agreement dated 24-4-1986 copy of which is available on record was minutely gone through. There is no doubt that in paragraph No,23.2 of the said agreement dated 24-4-1986 the borrower had irrevocably agreed that the Courts of England were to have jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of this agreement, the question that this Court has the jurisdiction to try the present suit or not has become a moot point in view of contention of the plaintiffs/respondents that jurisdiction vested in the Pakistani Courts cannot be taken away by consent or even by an expressed agreement of their parties. It is pertinent to note that provisions relating to jurisdiction of Courts as contained in paragraph Nos.23.2, 23.3 and 23.4 do not apparently have an effect of altogether ousting the jurisdiction of the Pakistani Courts. The question, therefore, whether this Court has jurisdiction to .Try the present suit is a mixed question of fact and law which can be decided only in the light of evidence which is yet to be produced. Issues have already been framed by my learned predecessor. Among these issues, issue No,2 specifically relates to the question of jurisdiction. The propriety, therefore, demands that the suit be decided on merits in the light of findings given on all the issues of law and fact including the one on jurisdiction. No findings on the issue of jurisdiction can be given at this stage in any arbitrary manner without first recording the evidence of the parties. In order to prove that this Court does not have jurisdiction the petitioners/defendants have to produce their evidence and also a copy of the agreement dated 24-4-1986 according to the provisions of which as per contention of the respondents/plaintiff this Court does not have the jurisdiction to try the present suit. Without production of the said document in evidence the question of jurisdiction cannot be decided. Accordingly the present application is dismissed."
6. The orders were challenged by the respondents in re: Civil Revisions Nos.794 and 795 of 1995, which were dismissed by this Court vide order dated 29-5-1995, which order is reproduced as under:-- "After arguing this matter at some length, learned counsel for the petitioner, under instructior is from his-client, states that the petitioner does not press this civil revision as well as application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Which may be dismissed as withdrawn. He further states that the petitioner would like to move an application for treating the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
2. In view of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that he wishes to withdraw the civil revision as well as application under Order VII, rule 10 of the C.P.C., this civil revision is dismissed as withdrawn. No order as to costs."
' This order was not further challenged, and, hence, became final.
7. Subsequently, the respondents filed applications under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. For treating the issue No,2 regarding jurisdiction as preliminary and to decide the same first. These applications were contested. During the pendency of the applications, two more applications were filed by the respondents: one, under Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. Seeking amendment of the written statement and the other under Order XIV, rule 5, C.P.C. For amendment of the issues. Relevant portion of the application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. Is reproduced as under:- "(2) That when issues were framed in the aforesaid suit, the following issue was framed by this Honourable Court as issue No,2: "Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to 'entertain the suit? OPD"
(3) That in context of this issue it may be noted that the suit filed by the plaintiff is based on certain documents already on record of this Honourable Court) which contain specific clauses whereby parties to the suit have expressly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of certain Courts of law other than this Honourable Court.
(4) That jurisdiction agreements of the nature described above have assumed a jurisprudential position recognized by all systems of law, including that of Pakistan, in the interest of comity and certainty in the carrying out of international business transactions.
(5) That all relevant record and witnesses essential to the defence of the claim filed against the applicants are accessible only in foreign countries, particularly those whose Courts have been chosen by the parties in the jurisdiction agreement referred to above. It would therefore be impossible to present these documents and witnesses before this Honourable Court. Consequently, continuance of the action filed before this Hon'ble Court would be vexatious and oppressive to the applicant and is likely to result in denial to the applicant of the opportunity to prove his innocence.
(6) That in view of the jurisdiction agreements referred to above, and also in the interests of justice the plaintiff should proceed with any action that he wishes to bring, as regards the matters agitated in the suit before this Honourable Court, before the Courts agreed upon in the jurisdiction agreements referred to above.
(7) That in view of the above, the aforesaid issue concerns a basic question of law, and it would be in the interest of justice if this issue is tried first as a decision thereon would determine, whether at all it is necessary to try all the other issues framed by this .Honourable Court in the instant suit."
8. Arguments in all three applications were heard together. However, learned Civil Judge, who was the same person, who had earlier dismissed the applications under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. Filed by the respondents, vide order dated 5-10-1995, accepted the applications under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. And directed that the issue of jurisdiction shall be treated and decided as preliminary issue.
However, other two applications i,e, applications under Order XIV, rule 5 and Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C., were not decided and were kept pending. Hence, the two civil revisions have been filed by the plaintiffs to challenge the orders dated 5-10-1995.
9. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate assisted by Mr. Muhammad Raza Farooq, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioners, whereas Mr.Salman Akram Raja, Advocate has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents. Arguments have been heard at length.
10. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the question of jurisdiction in these cases is a mixed question of law and facts and the evidence to be led on this issue shall also be the evidence on the issues on merits. Therefore, the evidence being not separable on the issue of jurisdiction and the issues on merits, the findings shall also have to be recorded on the issue of jurisdiction as well as the issues on merits together, as all these issues are so inter-linked and overlapping that it is almost impossible to decide the issue of jurisdiction without touching the merits of the case as well, therefore, opinion of the learned trial Court that the issue of jurisdiction can be decided as a preliminary issue is patently without any lawful basis and justification, hence, he has exercised his jurisdiction illegally and with a material irregularity and, as such, the impugned order is not maintainable in law. It is further maintained by the learned counsel for the petitioner that strangely enough while deciding the application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C.
By the respondents, the same learned Judge has categorically held that the question of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and facts and can only be decided after the evidence on merits of the case is also recorded along with other issues, which order has been upheld by this Court, but vide the impugned order has virtually recalled the earlier order which jurisdiction did not vest with the learned trial Court, when the earlier order had merged into the order passed by this Court. On this score as well, according to the learned counsel, the impugned order is patently without jurisdiction.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the following decided cases:- - "(i) T. Ganapathia Pillai v. Somasundaram Pillai and others AIR (37) 1950 Madras 213.
(ii) Bashir Ahmad and 8 others v. Aftab Ahmad and 2 others PLD 1976 Lahore 1433.
(iii) Muhammad Khalid v. A.T.M. Corporation Ltd. 1988 CLC 2359.
(iv) Muhammad Yaqoob Khan v. Dalil Khan and 15 others 1993 CLC 633.
(v) Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali and 4 others PLD 1995 SC 629.
11. As against the above arguments, Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the provisions of Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. And Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. Are independent in nature and are meant for two different stages in a suit, therefore, according to him, any order passed under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Will have absolutely no relevancy to the decision of application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. Which shall have to be decided on its own mertis, as such, the order passed under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Will not stand in the way of passing of a contradictory order by the learned trial Court, which even otherwise has been passed on additional grounds as well. Elaborating his arguments, learned counsel contends that while applying the provisions of Order VII, rule 10 C.P.C. Contents of the plaint alone are to be seen and on the basis thereof it is to be determined as to whether the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit as framed or not, whereas while deciding the application under Order XIV, Tule 2, C.P.C. The Court has to form an opinion, after going through the plaint as well as other attending circumstances including the documents appended to the pleadings of the parties, as to whether the issue of jurisdiction can be decided first to the issues of merits so that the parties may not have to undergo the rigours of trial of the lis on merits, which cannot be taken cognizance of by the said Court. It is maintained that even the order passed under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Clearly demonstrates that the learned trial Court had taken a tentative view regarding the jurisdiction and has held that apparently it does not appear at that stage that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Regarding the observations made by the learned trial Court that the question of jurisdiction is mixed question of law and facts, it is contended that the said observations shall have to be read as an "obiter" and at any rate in context of the subject-matter which was in issue at that time and will not operate as res judicata to debar the exercise of jurisdiction under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C:, which is entirely an independent exercise. In this behalf, he has referred me to the applications under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. And has explained that in the said application the only ground in support of ouster of jurisdiction of the Court urged was that there was an agreement between the parties that it is the Courts of England which shall be competent to entertain the suit, whereas in the application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. In addition to the above said objection, it has also been contended that in view of the application filed by the respondents themselves that the primary evidence is not available and they want to produce the secondary evidence; that majority of the evidence is available in England; that the documents which are to be led in evidence, have also been sealed and are lying there, therefore, following the principle of "forum- non-convenience" it is necessary that in the interest of justice the case is heard in Courts of England and that interim orders of procedural nature do not operate as res judicata. Therefore, the impugned orders passed in discretionary exercise of jurisdiction are quite valid in law and cannot be said to have been passed illegally and without a material irregularity.
12. Learned counsel further contends that there are three types of questions to be decided by a trial Court i,e, (a) pure question of law, which can be determined without recording of any evidence merely on the basis of averments in the pleadings of the parties; (b) question of law which can be determined after recording of evidence, which evidence does not touch the merits of the main case: for instance the question of registration of a society, and (c) mixed questions of law and facts, where the question of law cannot be decided unless the evidence on issues of merits is also led and all the issues are decided together. According to the learned counsel it is the third category of cases alone, where issues of law and facts are to be decided together, whereas in the first two categories of cases the questions of law particularly questions of jurisdiction is always to be decided as preliminary issues and as these cases do not fall in the third category, hence, the learned trial Court has rightly held that the issue of jurisdiction should be decided as a preliminary.
Hence, the impugned order is unexceptionable.
13. As regards the objection with regard to the keeping of two other applications pending, learned counsel contends that those applications had to be kept pending because the learned trial Court had come to the conclusion that the question of jurisdiction is to be decided first and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order passed by the learned trial Court on this score. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases of Dhakeshwar Prasad Narain Singh and another v. Pookhar Panday .And others AIR 1918 Patna 618; Rekhab Das v. Mt. Sheobai and another AIR 1923 Allahabad 495; Sri Gopal Jew Thakur v. Radha Binoda Mondal and others AIR 1925 Calcutta 996; Mir Subhan Ali v. Imami Begum and others AIR 1925 PC 184; Arumuga Thambiran and other v. Namasivaya Pandara Sannadhi and others AIR 1926 Madras 162; Man Mohan Das v. Shib Chandra Saha and another AIR 1931 Calcutta 353; Shankar Yesu Kargutkar v. H. H. Khem Sawant AIR 1932 Bombay 3; Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Bara Gopal Thakur and others AIR 1935 Calcutta 641; Janki Das and another v. Kalu Ram and another AIR 1936 Patna 250; Ramcharitar Sao and another v. Bawan Prasad Singh and others AIR 1946 Patna 225; Asrar Ahmad v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer AIR 1947 PC 1; P.C. Gangulee v. Sm. Kadhuri Devi AIR 1952 Patna 281; The Province of Bombay v. The Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad AIR 1954 Bombay 1; Fazlehussein Haiderbhoy Buxamusa and others v. Yusufally Adamji and others AIR 1955 Bomaby 55; Mst. Rupa Gauntiani and another v. Mst.
Sriyabati AIR 1955 Orissa 28; Pritam Kaur v. State of Pepsu and others AIR 1963 Punjab 9; Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others AIR 1964 SC 993; Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Pak Cigarette Labour Union and others PLD 1964 Karachi 337; Mohd. Jamiruddin Ahmad and others v. Mohd. Nurul Islam and others PLD 1967 Dacca 441; Messrs K.C. Bishwas & Sons and others v. Central Alkusa Colliery Co. AIR 1973 Patna 184; Abdul Latif and others v. Muhammad Ali and another 1974 Law Notes 262; Muhammad Saleem v. Hafiz Ahmad Din PLD 1975 Lahore 425; Muhammad Anwar v. The Chief Settlertient and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and 3 others .PLD 1975 Lahore 1463; Hidayat Ullah v. Deputy Commissioner/Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land) and 2 others,1976 SCMR 243; Bashir Ahmad and another v. Aftab Ahmad and 2 others PLD 1976 Lahore 1433; Mir Afzal and others v. Qalandar and others PLD 1976 Azad J&K 26; Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. Muhammad Sharif and 9 others 1979 CLC 527; Javed Iqbal Butt v. Mst. Nighat Ara 1982 SCMR 1111; Mst. Kaneez Fatima and another v. Ghulam Hussain and 10 others 1985 CLC 217: Abdul Ghafoor v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner and another 1985 SCMR 464; Mst. Gul, Farosha v. Umar Gul and 11 others 1985 CLC 810; Muhammad Siddique and others v. District Magistrate, Tharparkar and others 1985 CLC 2885; Ghulam Ali v. Hashum alias Hussaini and others 1986 CLC 1165; Razzak Hussain Shah v. Kazi with Powers of Family Court and another 1986 CLC 1691; Gul Ahmad Khan and others v.
Muhammad Nawaz and others 1988 CLC 142; Adalat Khan v. Mst. Begum Bibi through Legal Heirs and another 1991 SCMR 1381; Murtaza Khan and others v. Muhammad Zarif Khan 1991 MLD 1015; Raja Ghulam Hyder v. Major (Retd.) Jamshed Alam Khan 1991 MLD 1284; Shah Behram v. Akbar Khan PLD 1992 Pesh. 18; Sameer Ehsan Ullah Makhzan v. Muhammad Asif Zaman. PLD 1993 Lahore 554; Messrs Rupali Polyester Ltd. v. Dr. Nael G. Bunni PLD 1994 Lahore 525 and. Mian Abdul Qadoos v. Faqirullah Minlias 1994 MLD 1153.
14. A perusal of the relevant statutory provisions and case-law on the subject shows that following established legal principles have been laid down therein:--
(i) That the applications under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. And Order XIV, .Rule 2, C.P.C. Pertains to two independent stages of a suit and have to be decided on their own merits;
(ii) That the principles of resjudicata as contained in the provisions of Section 11 of the C.P.C. Do not apply to the interim orders particularly of a procedural nature, which are passed during the course of proceedings of a suit;
(iii) That in spite of the fact that strict principles of res judicata are not applicable to interim orders of procedural nature, yet, if a substantial question is decided by an interim order and findings are rendered by the Courts,. And became final either without challenge and after challenge before the higher forums, the original Court is precluded to render contradictory findings at a subsequent stage of the same list particularly when the question in substance is almost the same;
(iv) That pure questions of law which can be determined on the basis of pleadings of the parties and the documents appended thereto and which can be determined even by recording of evidence, which is not germane to the merits of the suit, should ordinarily be decided as a preliminary issue particularly when it is a question of jurisdiction of the Court, which goes to the root of the case;
(v) That mixed question of law and facts, which require resolution after recording of evidence, which is overlapping and also affects the issues on merits as well, should be decided together and piecemeal decision of such issues should be avoided;
(vi) That while taking decis
(vii) ion as to whether a particular Court has jurisdiction to decide a cause, the principle of "forum- non-convenience" and ends of justice have also to be kept in view; and
(viii) That the order passed under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C. Is though discretionary in nature, yet, is amenable to exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
5. I have considered the arguments addressed at the bar and have perused the record in the light of enunciated principles of law as taken note of above. It is denied that almost on the same grounds an objection had earlier been raised in application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. For dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction. Learned trial Court has given a definite finding that such an objection can only be decided after recording of evidence on all the issues on merits, which have already been framed in the suit. It has also been held in the order that it is a case where mixed questions of law and facts are involved, resolution whereof requires recording of evidence even on merits of the case. This order has been upheld by this Court and, therefore, has become final, at least to the extent of finding to the effect that this is a case which involves mixed questions of law and facts, resolution whereof is possible after recording of evidence on all issues including the issues on merits together therefore, the same learned Court had no jurisdiction to sit on a judgment on those findings again while deciding an application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.0 and holding to the contrary. In fact, although the principle of res judicata may not be strictly applicable to this case, yet, the respondents cannot be allowed to raise the plea to the effect that the question of jurisdiction does not require recording of evidence on merits as under the general principles the issues once adjudicated upon up to the level of this Court have to be finalized and if this practice is permitted that an issue once haying been finalized up to this Court is again re- opened during the course of proceedings in the same suit, 'controversies can never come to an end, which exercise is not permissible under the law as held in case of Aziz Ahmad and others v.
Mst. Hajran Bibi and another 1987 SCMR 527, at page 529 of which report, it has been held as under:- "It is then contended on behalf of the appellants that before the suit at Bahawalpur was dismissed the suit at Faisalabad had already been instituted; that being so, rule 9 of Order IX was not in terms applicable as this rule only prevented a plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit but had no effect on a suit which had already been filed. The contention in so far as the construction of rule 9 is concerned is correct but that does not mean that the second suit is not barred and can be tried on merit. There is well-established principle that no one is to be twice vexed for the same cause of action. Reference in this context is invited to a Division Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court in Amir Din Shahab Din v. Shiv Dev Singh AIR 1947 Lah. 102 where the maintainability of the second suit brought before the dismissal in default of the first suit was considered and it was held that the second suit was hit by the abovementioned principle and it was also liable to be dismissed on the ground that its institution and trial amounted to the abuse of the process of the Court.
(5) It was then argued by the learned counsel that the causes of action in the two suits were different as the suit filed at Bahawalpur was in respect of the property situate in Bahawalpur alone whereas the suit instituted at Faisalabad covered properties both at Bahawalpur and Faisalabad; consequently, the, dismissal of the first suit could not have any effect on the second suit. This contention is again without any merit. The causes of action in the two suits were precisely the same, that is, the wrongful allocation of a share in the property left by Sultan Muhammad to respondent No,2. The mere fact that in the first suit the appellants did not seek relief in respect of the property at Faisalabad would not make the cause of action in the second suit a different one. In fact by not seeking any relief in respect of the property situate in Faisalabad in the suit filed at Bahawalpur the appellants would be taken to have given up their claim to the said property, and the second suit would be hit by the bar contained in rule 2(2) of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial Court could not have held that the issue of jurisdiction in this case is purely a question of law and can be decided without recording of evidence on merits.
16. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that some additional grounds have been urged in support of application under Order XIV, rule 2, C.P.C., suffice it to observation that the said grounds are also correlated with the main issues as to whether the Court has jurisdiction in the overall facts and circumstances of the case, which includes the merits thereof as well, therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case where question of jurisdiction can be decided without leading of evidence touching the merits of the case as well. Consequently, the order passed by the learned trial Court is not sustainable.
17. As regards the argument of the learned counsel that the principle of "forum-non-convenience" requires that the case should be heard in London, suffice it to say that the issue of jurisdiction is still to be decided by the trial Court and. This point shall also be one of the relevant question to be taken into consideration by the trial Court while deciding the question of jurisdiction and, therefore, at this stage I will avoid to dilate on this aspect of the matter, lest it should effect decision of the issue by the learned trial Court, and also for the reasons that resolution of this issue is not necessary to decide the controversy involved in these petitions.
18. Resultantly, I accept these civil revisions and set aside the impugned orders. Learned trial Court shall decide all the issues of law and facts, already settled in suits together. Keeping in view the difficult legal questions involved in these cases, parties shall bear their own costs.