' Involved in the murder of one Mushtaq Ahmed son of Hazrat Gul vide F.I.R. No,45, dated 11-10-1986, Police Station Dadiwala, Bannu lodged by one Hidayatullah, the accused named Abdul Majid and Sarwar Khan were acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lakki of the charge under section 302 307/34, P.P.C. Through judgment, dated 19-7-1994 and hence this revision by complainant Hidayatullah.
2. A strong preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Dost Muhammad Khan learned counsel for the accused-respondents fully supported by Mr. Muhammad Khan Khakwani learned State Counsel that by the time the revision petition was filed on 19-1-1995, the complainant Hidayatullah had a right for appeal given to him by Act XX of 1994 with effect from 14-11-1994 and hence the revision petition was not maintainable and the matter having become time-barred, the revision now could also be not treated as an appeal.
3. Mr. Gohar Zaman Kundi, learned counsel for the petitioner alleged that the right accrues from the date of judgment i,e, 19-7-1994 and even if he had brought an appeal on the very date of Act (14- 11-1994), it would have been rendered as time-barred. He further added that right of appeal was a substantive right and could not be given retrospective effect. To the latter part of the argument. I do not subscribe because the argument would have been valid, had the right of appeal been taken away from the one who was so vested with such right. In the instant case, it is a right which is being given to the complainant-petitioner and not snatched away from him. The retrospectivity, in the circumstances, rather benefits the complainant.
4. From the argument of all the three learned counsel, I come to this clear conclusion that the complainant could have tiled the appeal which he failed to file till 19-1-1995 and that the instant revision could also be not treated as an appeal, the latter having become time-barred by then.
5. The right of appeal, as such, would be treated subjectively and by itself without referring to the party in whom it vested or is likely to vest. In this perspective, the right of appeal, as such, vested in the State which could file the same within six months. It means that for six months after the judgment the right remained in existence. It was never vested in the complainant nor the limitation had expired when on 14-11-1994 it was given to the complainant as well. This right was created through an Act of Legislature not in existence prior thereto and thus the complainant could file an appeal either on 14-11-1994 or up to thirty days thereafter.
6. The right of appeal before the expiry thereof, through an Act of Legislature, happened to be vested in the complainant as well with the only difference that for him the period of limitation was thirty days instead of six months. Rather, the period prescribed for him was full at his disposal on the date of the promulgation of Act XX of 1994. Still the complainant wasted two complete months and instead came with the instant revision on a date when right of appeal had stood vested in the complainant as well. Obviously, when a right of appeal is given, no revision can be filed especially beyond the period provided for the appeal because within the period of limitation, a revision could be or could have been converted into appeal, in the circumstances. The instant revision is, therefore, not maintainable.
7. Even on merits, the learned counsel for the accused-respondents and the learned State Counsel were in perfect agreement with each other that it was the weakest possible case ever. This being beside the point that no acquittal can be converted into conviction through a revision petition.
8. A few objections regarding jurisdiction of the trial Court were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner but those cannot be gone into in the wake of the legal position that the complainant had a right of appeal which he failed to E exercise within the limitation and hence nothing could be heard in revision. It is hereby dismissed.