' SH. RIAZ AHMAD, J.---The dispute in this appeal relates to the agricultural land measuring about 80 Kanals situated in Chak No, 45 T.DA., Tehsil Bhakkar. Admittedly, this land was owned by one Jagga Khan who died issueless on 8-12-1970. About 1-1/2 year before his death, by a registered sale-deed dated 17-2-1969, Jagga Khan had sold this land in favour of the appellant. On 26-7-1971, the respondents instituted a civil suit for the possession of this land as collaterals of Jagga Khan. It was alleged that Jagga Khan had not sold the land in dispute to the appellant and the sale-deed was a forged document. Prior to the institution of this suit by respondents 1 to 10, the respondent No, 11 and some others had also instituted a suit for possession of the disputed land on the ground that the appellant was their tenant but was not vacating the land and was reluctant to hand over its possession. Jagga Khan (deceased) was also made a party to the suit but he died during the pendency of the said suit.
2. The suit brought by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 10 was resisted by the appellant and the Trial Court framed the following issues:-
(1) Whether the court-fee has been wrongly assessed and the deficiency in court-fee has not been made good within time?
(2) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?
(3) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata?
(4) Whether the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 to 5 are the heirs of Jagga Khan and as such are the owners of the suit property?
(5) Whether Jagga Khan deceased sold away the suit land in favour of defendant No, 1 through a registered deed dated 17-2-1969?
(6) Whether the rights of defendant No, 1 are protected under the Transfer of Property Act?
(7) Whether the sale-deed dated 17-2-1969 is fictitious and collusive and without consideration. If so its effect.
(7-A) Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi? OPD (7-B) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of rectangle No, 39/5 and the suit is maintainable in its present form? OPD C) Whether the defendants Nos. 2 to 6 are the owners of rectangle No, 40/1.
(8) Relief.
3. The Trial Court decreed both the suits i,e, suit brought by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 10 and the plaintiff/respondent 11 and others. The learned Trial Court held that the sale-deed dated 16-2-1969 was illegal, inoperative being without consideration. The judgment of the learned Trial Court was assailed in appeal by the appellant against the respondents/plaintiffs 1 to 10. The learned Additional District Judge accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court with the finding that there was no reason why the genuineness of the registered sale-deed should not have been assumed. The judgment delivered by the learned Additional District Judge, the First Appellate Court, was assailed in appeal before the Lahore High Court by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 10 and the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court accepted the appeal and restored the finding of the Trial Court holding that the sale was without consideration.
4. . Leave to appeal was granted to the appellant to consider whether it was proper on the part of the High Court to have reopened the finding of the First Appellate Court in second appeal on the question of consideration and also the effect of the statement made by Jagga Khan (deceased) on 22-5-1970 in the suit instituted by respondent No, 11 and some others wherein deceased Jagga Khan had clearly stated that he had sold the land to the appellant. .
' For the determination of the controversy arising in this appeal, the crucial issues are the following: ' Whether deceased Jagga Khan sold the suit land in favor of the appellant through registered sale-deed dated 17-2-1969, and as to whether the rights of the appellant were protected under the Transfer of Property Act and whether the sale-deed is a fictitious and collusive document without consideration? .Before touching the issues referred to above, learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the collateral being a stranger as against the vendor and the vendee, had no locus standi to institute this suit and to assail the sale of the land between late Jagga Khan and appellant. It is true that such stranger cannot challenge the sale, but the case would be otherwise if it is alleged by the stranger that the sale or the sale deed was bogus and fraudulent. This principle was enunciated by a Judicial Cfnamittee of the Privy Council in a case reported as 27 Allahabad 271 that a stranger to a deed which is intended to be real and operative between the parties thereto cannot dispute the payment or non-payment of consideration and its adequacy or inadequacy, as it has no bearing in a case where a deed is challenged as fictitious never designed to operate as a real deed so as to effect the transfer of title. We respectfully subscribe to the view of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as enumerated above. . In the circumstances of the present case, it was contended by collaterals (respondents/plaintiffs) that the sale deed executed between late Jagga Khan and the appellant was intended to deprive them of their due share in inheritance, because Jagga Khan had died issueless, and the sale deed was bogus and fraudulent as no consideration had passed.
In this view of the matter, we are of the view that respondents/plaintiffs had the locus standi to institute the present suit. . Adverting to the substantial issue arising in the disposal of this appeal, we have perused the sale- deed in question. For the construction of document, as it has been laid by this Court from time to time, the intention of the parties is to be gathered, and it is to be seen whether the vendor really intended to pass on or transfer the title to the vendee. After careful perusal of the sale-dead, we are of the view that although it is not happily worded, but it is apparent that late Jagga Khan really intended to sell this land to pass on its title in favour of the appellant. The document is a registered document, and it also contains a certificate signed by. The Registrar while effecting the sale-deed.
The document clearly shows the acknowledgement on the part of late Jagga Khan to have received the consideration of Rs,50,000 in lieu of the sale. The Sub Registrar has appended a certificate certifying such acknowledgement on the part of the vendor late Jagga Khan. In our view, the most authentic documentary evidence and the facts enumerated and the certificate signed by Registrar will be presumed to have occurred, and presumption of genuineness and correctness is attached to such certificate of the Sub-Registrar, because provision of section 60 of the Registration Act were complied with and the facts sought to be proved within the meaning of sections 52 and 58 of the Registration Act have also been proved, therefore, the Sub-Registrar's endorsement authenticating the acknowledgement of the vendor to have received the consideration is a proof of the payment of consideration. Furthermore, we are of the view that the statement Exh. D9 made by Jagga Khan himself during the proceedings' of the suit instituted by respondent No, 11 is also pertinent and relevant. . This statement was made by deceased Jagga Khan himself on 22-5-1970 and he clearly stated that he had sold the land to the appellant. In this view of the matter, the question as to whether the sale is with or without consideration has no relevance. In our view heavy burden laid upon the plaintiffs/respondents to prove that the consideration for sale had not passed and the sale was fictitious and bogus, but in view of the authentic documentary evidence coupled with the statement of late Jagga Khan deceased vendor himself during the proceedings of the suit, we are of the view that it is fallacious on the part of the plaintiffs/respondents to contend that the consideration had not passed. Unfortunately, the High Court also overlooked this vital issue, particularly, the legal effect of the transaction in the light of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The sale-deed Exh. D2 leaves no room to doubt that the vendor intended to transfer the land in favour of the vendee, and to pass the title to the later.
The document Exh. D2 also shows that the possession was also delivered to the vendee. In the light of these circumstances as already observed by us heavy onus laid upon the respondents to prove that the transaction was fraudulent. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that: (i) sale must be by a registered document if it is worth more than Rs,100, (ii) that there must be a price paid or promised or part paid or part promised. It is thus cleat that there is no difficulty in holding that the title in property can pass by sale even if no consideration is paid provided the parties intended that it should be paid at some future date.
' Learned counsel for the appellant also drew our attention to the case law on the subject. . The facts of every case differ from each other, and this Court being the ultimate Court, we have to examine and lay down the law carefully, and particularly, keeping in view the circumstances of each case. The discussion of the case law, particularly, in Hemraj Marwari v. Trimbak Kunbi AIR 1924 Nag 146, (2) Bhonu Lal v. WA. Vincent AIR 1922 Pat. 619, (3) Jagdeep Sahav v. Sonu Lal AIR 1919 Pat 469 and (4) Basalingava v. Chinnava AIR 1932 Born. 247 ultimately boils down to the fact that it is the intention of the parties which has to be looked into to decide whether the sale deed operated as a transfer of interest from the vendor to the vendee on the date of its execution. If this was the intention, then it does not matter whether the whole of the consideration or part of it remained unpaid. Further, where a registered-deed of sale purporting to operate as a conveyance on the face of it exists, the burden of proving that it was not so intended is on the party who asserts this fact. .
' Unfortunately, respondents/plaintiffs ailed; to discharge the onus lying upon them to prove that the vendor in fact never intended to transfer the property in favor of the vendee/appellant. . To the contrary, we are of the view that late Jagga Khan did intend to transfer the title in the property to the appellant, and not only he acknowledged to have received the payment as consideration for the sale of the property before the Sub-Registrar, but in a Court of law reiterated this fact by making a statement acknowledging the receipt of the payment. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that fading's in the judgment impugned are unsustainable because not only the title passed to the appellant but the consideration was also received. Consequently, this appeal succeeds, and the order dated 28-12-1992 of the Lahore High Court is set aside, and the judgment and decree delivered by learned Additional District Judge, Mianwali dated 18-4-1975 whereby, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was reversed is upheld. The parties are left to bear their own costs. . .