' Pursuant to a report lodged by complainant Ghulam Rasul a case was registered vide F.I.R.
No,95/94, dated 28-6-1994 under section 302/34, P.P.C. At Police Station Pahrianwali, Tehsil Phalia, District Mandi Bahauddin, against Zafar Iqbal, respondent, his brother Razzaq Ahmad and their sister Mst. Rashida Bibi for having murdered Iftikhar Ahmad deceased, a brother of complainant Ghulam Rasul, on 28-6-1994 at about 7 a.m. In the area of Dhoke Maluwal, which is about 12 miles from Police Station Pahrianwali, Tehsil Phalia, District Mandi Bahauddin.
2. It is pertinent to mention that complainant Ghulam Rasul was the husband of Mst. Rashida Bibi but unfortunately the marital relations were unhappy and became worse by the dispute over a minor boy.
3. The case of the prosecution is to the effect that while Mst. Rashida Bibi and Zafar Iqbal caught hold of the deceased by the arms, co-accused Razzaq Ahmad fired the only and fatal shot at the deceased, as a result of which he died.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-complainant contends that Zafar Iqbal respondent facilitated the commission of the crime which falls within the prohibition contained in subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. And therefore, he was not entitled to the grant of bail. In this context learned counsel for the complainant-petitioner places reliance upon the following cases:--
(i) Riaz Rashid v. State 1988 SCMR 281,
(ii) Mir Afzal v. Muhammad Haneef PLD 1992 Pesh. 123,
(iii) Mst. Rasham Jan v. Abdur Rehman 1991 SCMR 1849,
(iv) Tanveer Ahmad v. Muhammad Saqib PLD 1994 SC 88.
5. It is indeed true that where prima facie there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life then such a person is not entitled to the grant of bail.
However, the expression "reasonable grounds" denotes a stronger meaning than a mere bald allegation of suspicion. If indeed it is true that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has facilitated the commission of a crime which is punishable with death then by virtue of the application of section 34, P.P.C. Such a person would be disentitled to the grant of bail. However, each case must proceed on its own facts and merits because there is no such thing as an authority in criminal jurisprudence and for the safe administration of criminal justice. Every case necessarily has to be decided on its own facts. I do not want to make any observation at this stage lest it prejudices the case of either party. Be that as it may, it is a matter of common knowledge that when a person is armed with a fire-arm, the normal course of human conduct is that if he muse fire then all that he has to do is to pull the trigger and that certainly does not need assistance of others particularly women-folk to hold the target by the arms.
6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has granted bail to the accused-respondent after exercising due care and caution and in accordance with the principles for the grant of bail laid down by the superior Courts. It is now a settled principle of law that where a discretionary jurisdiction has been exercised fairly and equitably, the superior Courts do not interfere in the exercise of such jurisdiction.
' I find no merit in this petition for cancellation of bail which is dismissed.